Opinion
2:21-CV-00861-CCW
03-31-2022
JEAN ELIZABETH COULTER, BARBARA ELLEN COULTER VALVANO, Plaintiffs, v. JAMES PURVIS COULTER, GERRI PAULISICK, JOSEPH PAULISICK, JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JOHN DOE #3, JOHN DOE #4, UNKNOWN SURVEYOR, Defendants,
Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand (via ECF) JEAN ELIZABETH COULTER PRO SE (via U.S. First Class Mail) BARBARA ELLEN COULTER (VALVANO) PRO SE
Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand
(via ECF)
JEAN ELIZABETH COULTER
PRO SE
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
BARBARA ELLEN COULTER (VALVANO)
PRO SE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
This civil action was initiated in this court on July 6, 2021, by pro se Plaintiff Jean Coulter (“Plaintiff Coulter”) against Defendants James Purvis Coulter, Gerri and Joseph Paulisick, Willette Construction, John Does #1-4, and an Unknown Surveyor. See Compl. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Coulter asserts state-law causes of action against Defendants, stemming from damages to property owned jointly by Plaintiff Coulter and Defendant Coulter. See id.
Presently before the court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendants. (ECF Nos. 28, 30). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motions be granted, and this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Report
A. Factual and Procedural History
The exact details giving rise to the instant case are somewhat unclear, but what is clear is that the matter involves real estate located in Butler, Pennsylvania, which is owned jointly by Plaintiff Coulter and Defendant Coulter. This real estate is immediately adjacent to real estate owned by the Paulisick Defendants. It appears that the Paulisicks hired Willette Construction to perform work on their property in the spring of 2021, and it is Plaintiff Coulter's position that during the course of the at work, individuals trespassed on and damaged the Coulter property.
As will be discussed in more detail infra, this is not the first or only time Plaintiff Coulter has brought claims against these defendants related to this property. Nor is it the first time that this Court has considered the issue of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiff. See Coulter v. Paulisick, 2018 WL 6266879, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018), aff'd, 778 Fed.Appx. 180 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding the District Court “lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because it was conclusively determined that Coulter was a Pennsylvania citizen when the case was filed”); Coulter v. Coulter, 715 Fed.Appx. 158, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming the District Court's holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff “Coulter did not produce a preponderance of evidence sufficient to meet that burden of proof and overcome the presumption of her Pennsylvania domicile”).
Thus, on July 6, 2021, Plaintiff Coulter instituted the instant civil action against Defendants. Compl. (ECF No. 1). Defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 9, 14). In response, on September 24, 2021, Plaintiff Coulter filed an Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this matter. Amend. Compl. (ECF No. 25). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Coulter asserted the same state-law claims against the same defendants, and also added her sister, Plaintiff Barbara Ellen Coulter (Valvano), as a Plaintiff. Id. On October 4, 2021, Defendant Coulter filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for, inter alia, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 28). Similarly, on October 6, 2021, the Paulisick Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff Coulter filed responses to the motions to dismiss, and the motions in this matter are now ripe for disposition. (ECF No. 39).
Also on September 24, 2021, Plaintiff filed what she entitled a “response to the order requiring Coulter to explain the basis for assertions of diversity jurisdiction in this Court.” (ECF No. 26).
In addition, on October 7, 2021, this Court issued a rule to show cause on Plaintiff Coulter as to why Defendant Willette Construction should not be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to serve. (ECF No. 32). On October 21, 2021, Plaintiff Coulter requested this Court “temporarily dismiss without prejudice the complaint against” Willette. Resp. (ECF No. 36) at 5. On November 17, 2021, this Court dismissed Willette Construction without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to serve. Order (ECF No. 42).
B. Standard of Review
i. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). “A district court has to first determine [] whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents a ‘facial' attack or a ‘factual' attack on the claim at issue, because that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed.” Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). “A district court's determination regarding domicile or citizenship is a mixed question of fact and law, but primarily one of fact[.]” McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). “[W]hen a party attacks the factual allegations of jurisdiction, the courts are not limited in their review to the allegations of the complaint. Any evidence may be reviewed and any factual disputes resolved regarding the allegations giving rise to jurisdiction as it is for the Court to resolve all factual disputes involving the existence of jurisdiction.” Leuthe v. Off. of Fin. Inst. Adjudication, 977 F.Supp. 357, 359 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1998).
ii. Pro Se Pleadings
Because Plaintiff is pro se, this Court is mindful of the following. A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In addition, “when a complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court should permit a curative amendment.” Thompson v. Police Dep't of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 4835831, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011). “However, we need not provide a plaintiff with leave to amend if amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Id. “Where a claim is frivolous, amendment is necessarily futile and, thus, leave to amend is not warranted. A claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
C. Discussion
As the primary issue in this matter is this Court's jurisdiction, this Court points out the following. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and when there is a question as to our authority to hear a dispute, it is incumbent upon the courts to resolve such doubts, one way or the other, before proceeding to a disposition on the merits.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court's “jurisdiction to hear cases in diversity arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which provides that district courts ‘have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and, and is between ... citizens of different States.'” Id. at 419. “Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Id. “The key inquiry in establishing diversity is thus the ‘citizenship' of each party to the action.” Id. Where a party is an individual, a “person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he [or she] is domiciled.” Id.
An individual's domicile changes immediately when the individual takes residence at the new domicile and intends to remain there. But [a] domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed. Thus, there exists a presumption favoring an established domicile over a new one. The party claiming a new domicile bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the established domicile. This presumption does not
shift the burden of proof to establish diversity of citizenship away from the proponent of federal jurisdiction.... Accordingly, the presumption's only effect is to require the party asserting a change in domicile to produce enough evidence substantiating a change to withstand a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on the issue. If the party does so, the presumption disappears, the case goes forward, and the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving diversity of citizenship.Est. of Khalil by Mohamedali v. Mursalov, 2021 WL 5356791, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
By way of background, on July 27, 2015, Plaintiff Coulter initiated a civil action against Defendant Coulter regarding this same real estate. See Coulter v. Coulter, 2:15-cv-957. Defendant Coulter filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that Plaintiff Coulter resided in Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff Coulter appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit offered the following.
[T]he District Court took judicial notice of Coulter's residence in Pennsylvania as noted in Coulter's prior litigation. Order to Show Cause, D. Ct. Doc. No. 2 at 1 (citing Compl., Coulter v. Gale, et al., W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:12-cv-01461, D. Ct. Doc. No. 1). With regard to the current action, the District Court noted that Coulter's mailing address was in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and that the return address for her complaint was in Butler, Pennsylvania. The District Court noted also that in Coulter's response, she described herself as having moved to the Philadelphia area, although her current apartment was in Camden, New Jersey, across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. Coulter's response also stated that many of her friends and business connections were still in Pennsylvania. Based on those factors, the District Court's factual determination that Coulter had previously established a domicile in Pennsylvania was not clearly erroneous.
Considering both her response to the District Court's order to show cause and her motion for reconsideration, Coulter did not produce a preponderance of evidence sufficient to meet that burden of proof and overcome the presumption of her Pennsylvania domicile. Her arguments and evidence, to be sure, articulated some desire to establish a new domicile somewhere outside of Pennsylvania. But they did not establish an intent to remain in New Jersey in particular-as the District Court noted, Coulter admitted that she intended to change her current
residence at some point. Coulter therefore did not meet her burden to show that she had, as of that time, established a new domicile in New Jersey, substantially for the reasons set out in the District Court's order.Coulter v. Coulter, 715 Fed.Appx. 158, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2017) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, as of July 27, 2015, Coulter's domicile was Pennsylvania.
In this case, Plaintiff Coulter asserts both the existence of diversity jurisdiction and a change in domicile. According to Plaintiff Coulter, she is now domiciled in New Jersey, and Defendants are domiciled in Pennsylvania, and therefore diversity jurisdiction has been established. See Pl.'s Br. (ECF No. 39) at 6. It is Defendants' contention that Plaintiff Coulter is still domiciled in Pennsylvania, and therefore diversity jurisdiction does not exist. See Paulisicks' Br. (ECF No. 31) at 5; Def. Coulter's Br. (ECF No. 29) at 6.
“It is well established that the basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot ‘be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” S. Freedman & Co. v. Raab, 180 Fed.Appx. 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2006). Furthermore, “bald allegations ... are insufficient to carry [the] burden of pleading diversity of the parties.” Id. As discussed supra, it is Plaintiff's burden to establish that changed her domicile to New Jersey between July 27, 2015, and the filing of this action in July of 2021.
The information provided by Plaintiff Coulter is hard to pin down, as she sets forth a recitation of many events in her life, beginning with Michael Dukakis's loss in the 1987 Presidential election. Affidavit (ECF No. 26) at 3. At some point, and it is not clear when, Plaintiff Coulter decided to become politically active, and in order to facilitate doing so, she wished to make brief trips to Washington, D.C. “intended to persuade those in Washington to take the steps necessary to improve people's lives directly.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff Coulter avers that she “considered where she should live once again.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff “Coulter decided to make, what she believed then (and still believes) will be her last move - to a ‘domicile' [] in New Jersey.” Id. She goes on to state that she “has, for many reasons, not chosen a final, specific address where she believes that she will someday be found dead on the floor by a meter reader - [she] has consistently found herself in ‘homes' in what might be considered the Eastern Suburbs of Philadelphia.” Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff Coulter “considers New Jersey to be made up of the Philadelphia region.” Id. at 13.
What is clear is clear from the record is that in early 2020, at the time Covid-19 began being a concern, Plaintiff Coulter was physically in Pennsylvania “related to the taking of depositions in another case in the federal court.” Pl.'s Br. (ECF No. 26) at 13. At that time, Plaintiff Coulter was staying in an extended stay facility in the north suburbs of Pittsburgh. Id. at 14. According to Plaintiff Coulter, “because the virus was hitting so hard in New Jersey, and the Lockdown's restrictions on travel were so strict, [she] felt compelled to remain in Western Pennsylvania until the situation would change.” Pl.'s Br. (ECF No. 39) at 6. The situation at the extended-stay facility became unsuitable, and in September 2020, she moved to an Extended Stay America hotel in Akron, Ohio. Id. Plaintiff Coulter returned to Western Pennsylvania in the spring of 2021, and moved into the home she owns in Butler, Pennsylvania, which is the subject of this lawsuit. Id. at 7.
At the time Plaintiff Coulter filed this lawsuit, she was still in her home in Butler. Compl. (ECF No. 1). She claimed she “is a resident of New Jersey, ” but has a mailing address for a Post Office Box in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. Plaintiff Coulter lists two phone numbers for herself, one with a New Jersey area code and one with a Western Pennsylvania area code.
In fact, in other filings in this Court by Plaintiff Coulter in 2021, she lists the Butler address as her address. See Coulter v. Dunbar, 16-cv-125-AJS at ECF No. 359.
Plaintiff Coulter explains she opened that P.O. Box in 2012, and maintains it, due to issues with her mail in New Jersey. Pl.'s Br. (ECF No. 39) at 3.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Coulter has not demonstrated with a preponderance of the evidence any material difference between the conclusion the Third Circuit reached in Plaintiff Coulter's prior case and the present time. As of 2015, Plaintiff Coulter had not established domicile in New Jersey, and this Court has found nothing in the record to support a different conclusion at this time. Plaintiff has provided no new information about what steps she took between 2015 and 2020 to establish a domicile in New Jersey. Plaintiff Coulter physically remains in Pennsylvania and utilizes her Philadelphia P.O. Box.
Based on the foregoing, this Court respectfully recommends that the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ramirez v. Gonzalez, 2020 WL 3447772, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (pointing out that a decision regarding jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and therefore the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to permit a court with jurisdiction to consider the merits).
“When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.” Tauss v. Jevremovic, 2017 WL 3087993, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having concluded this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdictions, the remaining claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are now moot.
D. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motions to dismiss be granted and this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the Plaintiff, because she is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by April 18, 2022, and Defendants are allowed until April 14, 2022, to file objections. Failure to timely file objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their objections and any response to the initial objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.