Opinion
3:21-cv-05804-RSM-BAT
12-09-2021
ANTHONY LYNN COUCH SR., Plaintiff, v. RICK SCOTT, et al., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, Anthony Lynn Couch Sr., commenced this civil rights action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkts. 3-1. Plaintiff is a prisoner currently housed at Grays Harbor County Jail and proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, in this action. Dkts. 3, 3-1. Plaintiff's complaint names the following Defendants: Rick Scott, Sheriff at Grays Harbor County Jail; Brad Johanson, under Sheriff at Grays Harbor County Jail; Travis Davis, “Chief of Jail” at Grays Harbor County Jail; Norma J. Tillotson, Grays Harbor County Prosecuting Attorney; Jason Fielding Walker, Grays Harbor County Prosecuting Attorney; and David Edwards, Judge, Grays Harbor County Superior Court. Dkt. 3-1. The Court, having reviewed and screened the complaint recommends that Plaintiff's claims alleged in Counts II and III be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971), and that Plaintiff's complaint, containing the remaining Count I, be served upon the remaining Defendants, Rick Scott, Brad Johanson, and Travis Davis.
BACKGROUND
In Count I of the complaint Plaintiff alleges Defendants Scott, Johanson, and Davis violated “client lawyer confidentiality.” Dkt. 3-1. He alleges the conference rooms at the Jail have video and audio recording devices in each room at all times and that he has “personally watched Travis Davis install some of these.” Id. Plaintiff alleges his lawyers have been told to make appointments at least an hour ahead so that Defendant Davis can watch these visits and that Defendant Davis says it's for “safety.” Id.
Plaintiff also raises allegations with respect to his legal mail. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims:
[M]y legal mail has been opened without my presence. My legal mail was kept from me for over 3 weeks and they said my work product is not work mail. I was pro se at the time. Mrs. Tillotson and Chief Davis also witheld [sic] outgoing mail to do a Quid Pro Quo. Also lawyer calls are recorded and Chief Davis refuses to fix that.Id.
With respect to injury, Plaintiff alleges “I believe the Prosecuting Attorneys are getting to know trial strategy and work product information when they shouldn't have. Client lawyer confidentiality has been violated uncountable times.” Id.
In Count II of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Davis, Tillotson, Walker, Scott, Johanson, and Edwards have violated his right to due process. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Tillotson and Walker have “involved themselves in [his] work product and stopping public records requests from being properly done.” Id. He alleges Defendant Edwards has violated his speedy trial rights and also stopped counsel from going through with withdrawing from his case in Superior Court. Id. He alleges Defendants Walker, Tillotson, Scott, Johanson, and Davis have stopped mail from going where it should. Id. He alleges Defendant Walker told his attorney he was a racist and his tattoos tie him to the Arian nation and that this has created an issue between himself and his attorney who is black. Id. He alleges Defendant Edwards will not allow his attorney to withdraw or even address his motion to withdraw. Id.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges “governmental misconduct” on the part of Defendant Walker. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker has reached out to other agencies personally to make sure that they prosecute Plaintiff to the fullest. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker has gone out of his way to “break up” his relationship with his attorney by making his attorney aware of the confederate flag tattoos on Plaintiff's shoulders. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker has also intercepted his legal mail “on separate occasions and then given it to the District Court which I'm pro se defense there.” Id. Plaintiff alleges he filed an “antiharassment order in district court” and that he discovered Superior Court prosecutors had his mail that they handed back to the district court. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Walker does not accept his pro se work product as legal mail. Id.
As relief Plaintiff requests that his Superior Court cases be dismissed with prejudice as well as monetary damages in the amount of $1,400,000.00. Id.
Relevant Legal Standards
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), where a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court is also required to dismiss the complaint if it fails on these same grounds. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Court holds pro se plaintiffs to less stringent pleading standards than represented plaintiffs and liberally construes a pro se complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). When dismissing a complaint under these statutes, the Court gives pro se plaintiffs leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order for a pleading to state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. The statement of the claim must be sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The factual allegations of a complaint must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In addition, a complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff must also plead facts showing the defendants were acting under color of state law. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
DISCUSSION
A. Counts II and III - Younger Abstention and Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff may not challenge the propriety of ongoing state criminal proceedings in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. Federal courts will not intervene in a pending criminal proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is both great and immediate. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45, 46 (1971). The Court should abstain from considering Counts II and III against Defendants pursuant to the Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine is based on principles of equity and comity. Id. The equitable principle at play is that courts should refrain from exercising their equitable powers when a movant has an adequate remedy at law. Notions of comity require the federal government to let states be “free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id. at 44. The Ninth Circuit applies a four-part test to determine application of Younger abstention:
We must abstain under Younger if four requirements are met: (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). Federal courts do not invoke the Younger abstention if there is a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982).
All of the Younger criteria appear to be satisfied here with respect to Counts II and III of Plaintiff's complaint. First, it appears Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee with ongoing state proceedings. Second, as these proceedings involve a criminal prosecution, they implicate important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49, (1986); Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, Petitioner has failed to allege facts showing he has been denied an adequate opportunity to address the alleged constitutional violations in the state court proceedings. Last, Petitioner raises claims that would effectively enjoin the ongoing state judicial proceeding. Specifically, in Counts II and III of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges due process violations by the Judge, prosecutors, Sheriff and under Sheriff, as well as misconduct by the prosecutor, all in the context of his ongoing criminal proceedings. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have intentionally interfered with his ability to obtain information necessary to his criminal defense, intentionally interfered with his attorney-client relationship with his defense attorney, violated his right to a speedy trial, and have improperly disallowed his defense attorney's attempts to withdraw as counsel in his criminal case. The Court also notes that as relief, in addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks to have his state court criminal cases dismissed with prejudice.
Based upon the facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, it appears that any finding by this Court that Plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated by prosecutorial misconduct, denial of right to counsel, or denial of due process, in the context of Plaintiff's ongoing state criminal proceedings (as Plaintiff claims in his complaint), would unduly interfere with those state court criminal proceedings in a way Younger disapproves. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Counts II and III be dismissed without prejudice.
The Court also notes that even if Plaintiff's claims were not barred by Younger, he would be barred from bringing § 1983 claims for damages against Defendants Tillotson, Walker and Edwards for acts performed in their prosecutorial or judicial capacity.
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts performed within their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991); see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978); accord Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Judges are absolutely immune from damages actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”) (citation omitted). Judicial immunity applies even when a judge acts in excess of his or her authority. Id. at 356. This strong immunity protects judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988). This immunity is immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability, so a defendant with absolute immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985).
Similarly, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the prosecutor “acts within his or her authority and in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31); see also Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1984) (“If the prosecutor acts as an advocate ‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,' absolute immunity is warranted.”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31). Prosecutorial immunity applies, furthermore, “even if it leaves ‘the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.'” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Campbell v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir. 1986)).
Here, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Edwards appear to arise solely out of his actions as a Judge performed in the context of Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings. As such, Defendant Edwards would also be entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff's claims for damages and dismissal of those claims against him on that basis. Although somewhat less clear, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Tillotson and Walker also appear to relate to actions taken in their role as a prosecutors and, to the extent this is the case, they would also be entitled to immunity from Plaintiff's claims for damages.
Given the nature of Plaintiff's claims in Counts II and III, it does not appear these claims are capable of amendment. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's claims in Counts II and III be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend pursuant to Younger. Because these are the only claims raised against Defendants Tillotson, Walker and Edwards, those Defendants should be terminated from the action.
B. Count I - Monitoring of Attorney-Client Conferences and Legal Mail
The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims raised in Count I against Defendants Scott, Johanson, and Davis related to alleged monitoring of attorney-client conferences and improper processing and interference with legal mail, state sufficient facts to warrant a response from Defendants. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the action proceed with respect to Count I and the complaint be served on Defendants Scott, Johanson, and Davis.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's claims in Counts II and III be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend pursuant to Younger. Because these are the only claims raised against Defendants Tillotson, Walker and Edwards, those Defendants should be terminated from the action. The Court recommends that the action proceed with respect to Count I and the complaint be served on Defendants Scott, Johanson, and Davis. The Court recommends that the matter be referred back to the undersigned for further proceedings.
OBJECTIONS AND APPEAL
This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order. Therefore, a notice of appeal seeking review in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should not be filed until the assigned District Judge enters a judgment in the case.
Objections, however, may be filed and served upon all parties no later than December 30, 2021. The Clerk should note the matter for December 31, 2021, as ready for the District Judge's consideration if no objection is filed. If objections are filed, any response is due within 14 days after being served with the objections. A party filing an objection must note the matter for the Court's consideration 14 days from the date the objection is filed and served. The matter will then be ready for the Court's consideration on the date the response is due. Objections and responses shall not exceed 8 pages. The failure to timely object may affect the right to appeal.