Opinion
No. 4:03-CV-583-A.
March 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Came on for consideration the motion of defendants, Sheriff Phil Ryan ("Ryan") and Deputy Kenneth Steel ("Steel"), to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court, having considered the motion, the response of plaintiff, Norman Cotton, the record, the summary judgment evidence, and applicable authorities, finds that the motion should be granted.
I. Plaintiff's Claims
On June 9, 2003, plaintiff filed his original complaint in this action. He generally complained that defendants had failed to protect him from being beaten while incarcerated in the Wise County Jail and that they had refused to provide him medical treatment after the assault. By order signed June 13, 2003, the court ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint to state more specifically his claims. On July 2, 2003, plaintiff filed a document that purported to be his first amended complaint. By order signed July 2, 2003, the court interpreted the "first amended complaint" to be a supplement to plaintiff's original complaint. Together, the documents allege that defendants failed to protect plaintiff and failed to provide him necessary medical care. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2001, he was attacked by other inmates in the same cell and that he would have been beaten to death had not another inmate called the security office for help. Plaintiff claims to suffer continuing headaches as a result of the attack. He says that he was refused medical attention and medication.
II. Grounds of the Motion
Defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because he has not specifically pleaded facts to show deliberate indifference or a cognizable injury under § 1983. In the alternative, they allege that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because there is no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to a risk of attack on plaintiff or to his physical and mental health needs. Moreover, each defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
III. Applicable Rule 12 Principles
The standards for deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are well-settled. The court's task is to determine "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The court construes the allegations of the complaint favorably to the pleader. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. However, the court does not accept conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact as true. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court likewise construes the allegations of the complaint favorably to the pleader. Id. However, the court is not limited to a consideration of the allegations of the complaint in deciding whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The court may consider conflicting evidence and decide for itself the factual issues that determine jurisdiction. Id. Because of the limited nature of federal court jurisdiction, there is a presumption against its existence.See Owen Equip. Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). A party who seeks to invoke federal court jurisdiction has the burden to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists. McNutt, 298 U.S. at 178; Wilson v. Republic Iron Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921).
IV. Applicable Summary Judgment Principles
A party is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s]." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1984).
The standard for granting a summary judgment is the same as the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597. See also Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc) (explaining the standard to be applied in determining whether the court should enter judgment on motions for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
V. Controlling Principles of Law
Qualified immunity insulates a government official from civil damages liability when the official's actions do not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a right to be "clearly established," the right's contours must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Individual liability thus turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the defendant's actions assessed in light of clearly established law at the time. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40. In Harlow, the court explained that a key question is "whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred" because "[i]f the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to `know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." 457 U.S. at 818. In assessing whether the law was clearly established at the time, the court is to consider all relevant legal authority, whether cited by the parties or not. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994). If public officials of reasonable competence could differ on the lawfulness of defendant's actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 (1992). "[A]n allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.In analyzing whether an individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court considers whether plaintiff has alleged any violation of a clearly established right, and, if so, whether the individual defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991);Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276-80 (5th Cir. 1992). In so doing, the court should not assume that plaintiff has stated a claim, i.e., asserted a violation of a constitutional right. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. Rather, the court must be certain that, if the facts alleged by plaintiff are true, a violation has clearly occurred. Connelly v. Comptroller, 876 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1989). A mistake in judgment does not cause an officer to lose his qualified immunity defense. In Hunter, the Supreme Court explained:
The qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley, [475 U.S.] at 343. . . . This accommodation for reasonable error exists because "officials should not err always on the side of caution" because they fear being sued. . . .502 U.S. at 229.
The law is clearly established that the doctrine of respondent superior does not apply to § 1983 actions. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1990). Rather, the misconduct of a subordinate must be affirmatively linked to the action or inaction of the supervisor. Southard v. Texas Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 550 (5th Cir. 1997). A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he, by action or inaction, demonstrates deliberate indifference to a plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 551. "`[D]eliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Neither a supervisory official nor a governmental entity can be held liable for failing to adopt policies to prevent constitutional violations. See, e.g., Vela v. White, 703 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 1980). Moreover, a plaintiff must allege more than an isolated incident of purported harm to establish a claim against such person or entity. Fraire, 957 F.2d at 1278;McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983),cert. denied, 467 U.S. at 1215 (1984). Without a pattern or practice of recurring constitutional violations, neither negligence nor gross negligence suffices as a basis for liability. Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 1988). There must be a link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985).
VI. Law Applied to the Facts Pleaded
As the Supreme Court has noted, the court should not assume that plaintiff has stated a claim. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. And, having considered the June 9 and July 2, 2003, documents more closely, the court is satisfied that plaintiff has not stated a claim based on the attack against him by other inmates. Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to show that Ryan or Steel was aware of any danger to him. Rather, plaintiff has pleaded that he was attacked after warning the other inmates in his cell that he would call a jailer if they failed to dispose of a weapon they had made. As for medical treatment, plaintiff pleads that he filed grievances addressed to Steel and Ryan, but that they refused to allow him to see a doctor. If plaintiff was refused medical care after almost being beaten to death, as he alleges, then his constitutional rights were violated.
Even assuming that all of plaintiff's claims were properly pleaded, the summary judgment record belies those claims. Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence to raise a genuine fact issue as to any knowledge on the part of Ryan or Steel that plaintiff was in any danger or had any serious medical need that was not being met. There is simply no evidence of any deliberate indifference, but only an isolated incident of purported harm. Moreover, the summary judgment record establishes that plaintiff was taken to the emergency room following the attack and that he was treated in accordance with the instructions given by medical personnel. Further, even before the attack, on September 15, 2001, plaintiff received eight medications his sister delivered from the Veteran's Administration. After the attack, plaintiff again saw a doctor on November 26 and on December 6, 2001. And, on December 20, 2001, when he continued to complain of headaches, plaintiff was scheduled to be seen by a neurologist. There is no evidence that any serious medical need was ignored. And, there is no evidence that either defendant was personally involved in plaintiff's care or treatment.
Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations, such as "[p]laintiff was refused proper medical attention." Pl.'s decl. at 1. And, he does not dispute the authenticity of defendants' summary judgment evidence. Rather, he points out that some of the jail records are not signed, which, contrary to plaintiff's argument, does not raise any "disputed issue" of genuine fact for trial. Id. at 4-5.
VII. Order
For the reasons discussed herein,The court ORDERS that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and is hereby, granted; that plaintiff take nothing on his claims against defendants; and, that such claims be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.