Opinion
No. 21893.
June 1, 1953.
APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, JACKSON COUNTY, BEN TERTE, J.
Sam Mandell, Kansas City, Vance Julian, Clinton, for appellants.
David H. Bresler, Frank L. Cohn and Harry A. Hall, all of Kansas City, for respondent.
This is a declaratory judgment action instituted by Daniel P. Cotton against Iowa Mutual Liability Insurance Company, a corporation (hereinafter referred to as insurer), and Haden R. Frisbie and John A. Harris. The petition seeks a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant Frisbie is not relieved from liability for his negligence merely because he was an officer of the Missouri State Guard at the time of an automobile collision, hereinafter mentioned; and that a policy of liability insurance issued by defendant insurer covered any judgment for personal injuries and property damage sustained by plaintiff in said collision. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim against defendant Harris, and plaintiff makes no complaint of this ruling. Other issues essential to a decision will be developed in the course of the opinion.
Defendants Frisbie and insurer prosecuted their appeal to the Supreme Court, which court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the record did not affirmatively disclose that the amount involved exceeded $7500, and that the constitutionality of a certain statute was not properly and unequivocally raised, and transferred the cause to this court. Cotton v. Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co., Mo.Sup., 251 S.W.2d 246.
Plaintiff's petition alleges that on September 22, 1946, defendant Frisbie, while driving a "jeep" (which was the property of the Missouri State Guard) eastward on U.S. Highway 50, negligently drive on the wrong side of the highway and into plaintiff's car, damaging it and causing personal injuries to plaintiff; that defendant Frisbie claims that he is not liable to the plaintiff for the latter's damages by reason of the provisions of section 4, Laws of Missouri 1943, p. 646; that defendant insurer, by its policy, a copy of which is attached and made a part of the petition by reference, for a valuable consideration insured John A. Harris and the Missouri State Guard and its members against liability for bodily injuries in a sum not exceeding $100,000 and for property damage in a sum not exceeding $5,000, but that defendant insurer claims that under the terms of its policy and said section 4, supra, it is not liable for the negligent acts of defendant Frisbie and the resulting damages and injuries to the plaintiff; that under the law defendant Frisbie is not relieved from legal liability for the injuries caused to plaintiff by his alleged carelessness and negligence, and that defendant insurer is not relieved from its obligations under its policy. The prayer of the petition requests the court to construe said section 4: and to declare that it does not relieve the defendants from legal liability for the damages suffered by the plaintiff; to construe the insurance policy, and to declare that the defendant insurer is legally responsible for any judgment procured by plaintiff against defendant Frisbie because of his negligence; that the policy insures against property damage and personal injury liability under the facts and circumstances alleged; and to declare the rights, status and legal relations of the parties.
The separate answer of defendant insurer admits the collision and that plaintiff received personal injuries and that his automobile was damaged, and admits the execution of its policy to "The Missouri State Guard and John A. Harris, Commanding General and Adjutant General," but denies that insurance was granted to or covered the members of the Missouri State Guard. It pleads a certain special endorsement limiting the coverage, which will be considered more fully infra. The answer further alleges that at the time of the casualty defendant Frisbie was a member of the Reserve Military Force of the State of Missouri (generally referred to as the Missouri State Guard); that he was driving a jeep, which was the property of the Missouri State Guard, pursuant to the performance of lawfully ordered duties as a member of the State Guard; that its only insureds under the policy are the Missouri State Guard and John A. Harris, Commanding General and Adjutant General; that the insurance granted by it did not and does not cover the individual liability of defendant Frisbie; that defendant Frisbie was not liable to the plaintiff because of the provisions of said section 4, and that defendant insurer was therefore not liable to plaintiff; that the Missouri State Guard, named as its insured, is a branch and department of the State of Missouri and, as such, is not suable. Its answer joined with the plaintiff in praying that the court find and declare its rights and liability under its policy; that the court find that the policy insured only the Missouri State Guard and John A. Harris, Commanding General and Adjutant General, against losses defined in the policy, and that no other person or persons are insured against loss thereunder; that defendant Frisbie is relieved from liability to plaintiff by virtue of said section 4; that the Missouri State Guard is a branch and department of the State of Missouri and is not liable for tort: that defendant insurer is under no obligation to defend plaintiff's action against defendant Frisbie and is under no obligation to pay any judgment which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Frisbie.
By his separate answer, defendant Frisbie alleges that at the time of the collision he was a member and an officer of the Missouri State Guard and was engaged in the performance of lawfully ordered duties as a member of said State Guard, and is therefore exempt from liability for injury to persons or damage to property by virtue of the provisions of said section 4.
Plaintiff filed reply to the defendants' answers, denying the allegations therein and sought to raise the question of the constitutionality of said section 4, which issue is eliminated by the decision of the Supreme Court, supra.
The pleadings and the evidence present the following issues: (1) Does section 4, supra, relieve defendant Frisbie from Liability for negligence under the facts hereinafter related? If so, then defendant insurer would not be liable to plaintiff under its policy; (2) if defendant Frisbie is liable for his negligence, then does defendant insurer's policy cover his liability?
Relative to the question of defendant Frisbie's liability, the evidence discloses that he was an officer of the Missouri State Guard, stationed at Columbia, Missouri; that there were several companies of the Guard in various cities of the state, including Columbia, Boonville, Sedalia and Warrensburg; that the officers of the companies in Boonville, Sedalia, and Warrensburg decided to hold maneuvers (target practice) at a point near Knob Noster, Missouri; that Lt. Col. Funk, Major Frisbie's superior officer in the Guard, ordered him to take a jeep, which belonged to the Guard, and drive to the scene of the maneuvers as an observer, there was no disturbance, riot or emergency which required the presence of the men at the place of maneuvers; it was a routine matter, and the members of the various companies were not required to go, and many of them did not go, on this maneuver; Major Frisbie drove from Columbia to the place of maneuvers and observed the conduct of the men and was returning to Columbia when the jeep, which he was driving, collided with plaintiff's automobile.
Further evidence will be considered in the course of the opinion.
The court found that Frisbie was not relieved from liability for his negligence under section 4; that defendant insurer's policy was intended to and did insure the officers and members of the Missouri State Guard, and particularly defendant Frisbie, against any liability imposed by law for damages to plaintiff or others for bodily injuries and property damage; that the issues of defendant Frisbie's negligence and the amount of damages resulting therefrom was left "open for future determination according to law"; that if section 4 attempts to exempt Frisbie from civil liability for negligence in the operation of a jeep on the public highway, in the absence of public exigency or military emergency and necessity, then such statute is unconstitutional. Judgment was entered accordingly, and defendants perfected their appeal.
Under the decision of the Supreme Court, supra, the issue of the constitutionality of section 4 is no longer in the case, and our field of inquiry is limited to a construction of said section.
In 1943, after the National Guard had been called into federal service, the General Assembly passed an act, Laws 1943, p. 645, which authorized "the Governor * * to maintain * * * the Reserve Military Force in a state of preparedness. For the purpose of preparedness the Reserve Military Force shall have the same status as the National Guard when on active duty under the provisions of Chapter 121, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939; provided, that no part of the Reserve Military Force shall receive pay except for the performance of active duty as approved and certified to by the President of the Military Council * * *." Section 2 of the act provides: "For the purposes of insuring the internal security of the state, perfecting a state of preparedness, suppressing insurrections, repelling invasions or suppressing lawlessness, the Governor may, * * * declare by proclamation martial law throughout the state or any part thereof." Controversial section 4 reads: "Neither the officers not the enlisted men of the Reserve Military Force shall be liable for civil action, for the death of, or any injury to, persons or for any damage to property as a result of any action taken by any member or members of the Reserve Military Force while engaged in and pursuant to the performance of lawfully ordered duties as members of the Reserve Military Force." (Italics ours.)
Section 7 provides that the act shall remain in force and effect until twelve months after the competent authorities shall proclaim that the present state of war between the United States and Germany, Japan and Italy has terminated.
The 1943 Act did not create the Reserve Military Force. That unit was authorized by Laws 1919, p. 503. Therefore, in arriving at a proper construction of section 4, we think it is necessary to refer to other sections which have a direct bearing on the question. Chapter 121, RSMo 1939 (now Section 41.010 et seq. RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.), is a complete code for the organization, power and authority of the State Military Forces. The primary force is the Missouri National Guard. But Section 15019, R.S. 1939 (now V.A.M.S. § 41.760), provides that when the National Guard is absent from the state in federal service, or when for any reason the strength of the same is not adequate to furnish a force sufficient to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, repel invasions and suppress lawlessness, "the governor shall have the power, * * * to organize from the unorganized militia of the state * * * a reserve military force for duty within the state." This reserve military force is referred to in the pleadings and in the evidence as the Missouri State Guard, and we shall refer to it as such Section 15021, (now V.A.M.S. § 41.780) provides that the organization, discipline and government of this military force shall be the same as prescribed by law for the National Guard; and section 15022 (now V.A.M.S. § 41.790) authorizes the Governor to call out the State Guard or any part thereof "to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections, repel invasions and suppress lawlessness under the same circumstances and in the same manner as is now provided by law for the use of the national guard in such emergencies * * *," and when the State Guard is so placed on duty it shall have the same status, power, authority and limitations as is conferred upon the National Guard. Section 15039 (now V.A.M.S. § 41.110) provides that "The governor may call out the national guard or any part of the same to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections, repel invasions and suppress lawlessness", and further provides that "Every commissioned officer and enlisted man acting under the orders of the governor, or of any officer, civil or military, * * * shall be upon the same footing as other conservators of the peace under the provisions of the laws of this state." V.A.M.S. § 41.130.
Defendants first contend that section 4 provides immunity from civil liability on account of injury to person or property resulting from any action taken by any member of the Missouri State Guard while engaged in the performance of lawfully ordered duties, and that Major Frisbie was so engaged at the time the jeep he was driving collided with plaintiff's car. Should such a broad and all-inclusive construction be given the statute? We think not. From reading the statutes referred to, supra, it is perfectly apparent that the underlying purpose of the Missouri National Guard and of the State Guard is to, when necessary, execute the laws, suppress insurrections, repel invasions and suppress lawlessness; all done in the interest of and for the protection of the public. None of these emergencies existed at the time certain members of the State Guard decided to hold maneuvers. The record justifies the conclusion that the maneuvers were not held as a result of any order given by the Governor or by the Adjutant General, but were conceived and planned by some of the officers of the companies located at Boonville, Sedalia and Warrensburg. The members of those companies could attend the maneuvers if they desired. In a certain sense, the officers and members of the three companies voluntarily, and on their own initiative, decided to hold rifle practice and advised their superior officer, Col. Funk, of that fact, and he in turn directed Major Frisbie to attend the maneuvers as an observer.
Under the facts disclosed by the record, to hold that section 4 grants immunity to Major Frisbie for violation of the statutes regulating highway traffic, would produce an unconscionable result. Such a construction would mean that any officer or member of the State Guard, while on routine maneuvers, could, with impunity, violate any other statute enacted for the protection of the public. It is unnecessary to decide the extent of the protection given the officers and members of the State Guard while engaged, under the Governor's orders, in suppressing insurrections or lawlessness or executing the laws or repelling invasions. No such situation existed in this case.
A very recent case involving a similar statute has been construed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851, 163 A.L.R. 1425. The Illinois statute granting immunity to firemen reads:
"Provided that in no case shall a member of a municipal fire department be liable in damages for any injury to the person or property of another caused by him while operating a motor vehicle while engaged in the performance of his duties as fireman." Laws 1931 Ill. p. 618.
Defendant, a member of the Cicero Fire Department while driving a fire vehicle to a fire in Chicago (under orders) for the purpose of observing metropolitan fire fighting methods, collided with plaintiff's car. In doing so he disregarded stop signals and drove at an excessive speed in violation of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act. In holding that the statute was no defense, the court said, 391 Ill. loc.cit. 547, 63 N.E.2d loc.cit. 856, 163 A.L.R.loc.cit. 1432:
"The distinction * * * which prevents the statute granting immunity to firemen from being discriminatory and unconstitutional, is based upon the greater necessity for haste and the greater danger from delay in the fighting of fire. The only consistent and constitutional construction of this immunity provision of the statute, therefore, is that the immunity granted extends only to firemen operating motor vehicles while engaged in fire fighting or in the performance of duties directly relating thereto. If defendant, at the time of the collision, was on his way to the fire as an observer to obtain knowledge of metropolitan fire fighting methods, clearly he was not protected by the statute.
* * * * * *
"It is insufficient that defendant averred he was acting `in the performance of his duties,' a fact which plaintiffs have conceded. The statute cannot be construed to grant immunity from liability to a fireman who, while enroute to a fire in another city merely as an observer, drives at an unreasonable rate of speed, ignores stop signs and, in general, the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law * * *. A familiar rule of statutory construction is that where a statute admits of two constructions, one rendering the statute reasonable and wholesome, and the other leading to mischievous, if not absurd, results, the former construction should be adopted."
Massachusetts has a statute which provides;
"United States troops and any part of the organized militia parading or performing any duty according to law, shall have the right of way in any street or highway through which they may pass". (Italics ours.) G.L.(Ter. Ed.) c. 33, § 47, as added by St. 1939, c. 425, § 1.
In New v. McCarthy, 309 Mass. 17, 33 N.E.2d 570, 572, 133 A.L.R. 1291, the court construed that statute under a set of facts where the plaintiff was in the military service and was driving a truck, under orders, in a military convoy on a routine maneuver and drove cross a state highway intersection against a red signal light and collided with a car driven by the defendant, a civilian. The question arose whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This called for a construction of the above statute. Certain parts of that opinion are so pertinent to the issues in the instant case, that we quote at length therefrom.
"The State, as the original and general sovereign, establishes and maintains the public ways and regulates their use. The Federal government may use them for all purposes necessary or reasonably incidental to the carrying out of the powers delegated to it and is not to be thwarted or hampered in the execution of those powers by State regulation. On the other hand the general control remains in the State and may be exercised by it to secure safe and orderly use of the ways for the benefit of all persons and agencies in so far as such control can be exercised without substantial interference with any function of the Federal government. * * * A person who enters military services is not thereby relieved from his obligation to observe the law of the jurisdiction in which he finds himself. Speaking generally, he is liable for his torts as are other persons. * * * In this country the special powers and privileges of the military, both State and Federal, * * * have been carefully limited, even in time of public disorder or actual war, to situations of immediate and imperative necessity, and the civil courts have not hesitated to determine for themselves in each instance whether or not such necessity existed. * * * In order to maintain the traditional and proper relation between the civil and military authorities it is necessary that the courts continue to perform this duty. * * * The event out of which this action arises occurred in time of peace. There was no public disorder. No belligerent operations of any kind were in progress. There was no need of haste. There was no emergency. * * *, Possibly the journey had aspects of military training * * *, but the case discloses nothing to convince as that there is any difficulty which cannot be overcome by reasonable dispositions or which requires that the army submit the community to the serious peril to life and property almost certain to result from disregard of the signals relied upon by all other persons using the highways. * * * Without pausing to construe or to determine the application of the words `performing any duty, according to law,' we are satisfied that this section was intended to establish the prior right to use and occupy the streets and highways and particular portions of them as between parties each of whom would otherwise have the right to use and occupy them. In such circumstances civilian travellers are to give way. But it was not intended to confer upon anyone a right to proceed against the absolute prohibition of some other law." (Italics ours.) See, also, Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 14 L.Ed. 75; State v. Josephson, 120 La. 433, 45 So. 381.
In the instant case there was no emergency; no need to violate the rules of the highway in order to carry out the orders which had been given Major Frisbie. It is our conclusion that section 4 does not, and that the legislature did not intend that it should. Grant immunity to Major Frisbie for his negligence, if any, under the circumstances disclosed by the record. To hold otherwise would, in effect, license the members of the State Guard to violate all other statutory regulations on slight military provocation.
This brings us to a consideration of the question whether the insurer's policy covers the liability, if any, of Major Frisbie.
Defendant insurer contends that its policy insured only "The Missouri State Guard, and John A. Harris, Commanding General and Adjutant General." Plaintiff contends that the general term "Missouri State Guard" included in the policy as insureds the defendant Frisbie and all other officers and members of the Guard while using vehicles owned or assigned to the Missouri State Guard; that the name "Missouri State Guard" was a collective and descriptive terms used by the insurer to describe the members who, in fact, were the insureds.
The obligation of the insurer, under the policy, is to pay on behalf of the insureds all sums which the insureds should become legally obligated to pay for damages for bodily injury or death not to exceed $100,000, and to pay all sums which the insureds should become legally obligated to pay for property damage not to exceed $5,000; and to defend in the name and on behalf of the insureds any suit against them for damages to person or property.
Item I of the policy named as the insured. "The Missouri State Guard, John A. Harris, Commanding General and Adjutant General." The word "various" was typed in at line 4 as describing where the vehicles would be garaged. Lined 5, calling for the designation of the insured as an individual, corporation or co-partnership, was left blank. Line 6 listed the occupation of the named insured as the "State Guard." Item 4, listing the vehicles covered by the policy, described them as all automobiles and trailers owned, leased or borrowed by the Missouri State Guard (herein called the named insured) and all automobiles and trailers assigned to them by the Federal Govt." Items 5 listed the use of the vehicles as "pleasure and business" and "commercial" the latter being defined as "use principally in the business occupation of the named insured as stated in Item 1." The "Employees non-ownership liability" rider attached to the policy shows an advance premium of $35 for all persons designated as Class 1 and Class 2 persons for personal liability coverage and $15 for property damage liability Class 1 persons are defined as: "All employees including officers of the named insured * * * and all direct agents and representatives of the named insured." Class 2 persons are defined as; "All employees, including officers of the named insured, not included in Class 1 persons." Under the schedule for listing the names of the "persons appears the word "all" and the location of the headquarters of such "persons" is given as "various."
By insuring agreement 3, termed the "omnibus clause," the coverage of the policy extended to include, in addition to the named insured, "any persons while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named insured." This provision would include third persons not members of the State Guard. However, by an endorsement or rider attached to the policy, the definition of "insured" as set forth in insuring agreement 3, was amended or limited by this provision: "That this policy covers only the named insureds as shown in Item 1 of the policy, that insuring agreement three, Definition of `insured', as shown in the policy, is hereby amended to include only as insureds those shown in Item 1 of policy as aforesaid."
It is conceded that the plaintiff is not entitled to, and does not, rely upon the provisions of the "omnibus clause," quoted supra, because that provision has been restricted by the rider referred to.
The insurer argues that the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous and the language thereof must be given its plain meaning. It cites authorities announcing that general principle, and there can be no doubt that is the general rule, but we do not believe it is applicable in this case. An insurance policy must ordinarily be construed as any other contract and must not be construed by an isolated word or portion thereof but must be read and construed as a whole. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Suburban Service Bus Co., Mo.App., 211 S.W.2d 524, 529.
The policy names as one of the insureds "The Missouri State Guard." What is "The Missouri State Guard?" We do not find any statute defining or creating any such organization, and there is nothing in the record to indicate the origin of such a named military unit. The statutes referred to supra designate the unit which the parties evidently intended to insure as the "Reserve Military Force". However, it is apparent from the record that all parties considered and treated the designation, "Missouri State Guard," as being the same unit and the same military force as "the Reserve Military Force", which is created by statute. Thus it can hardly be said that the policy is so clear and unambiguous that the words used must be given their plain meaning. To so hold, would be to say that the parties intended to name a non-existent "insured." Furthermore, it is conceded that the so-called "Missouri State Guard" (Reserve Military Force) is an agency of the state government and, therefore, immune to suit. Certainly it was not intended to name an insured who could not be sued. This poses the question, whose liability was covered and protected, or intended to be covered and protected, by the policy?
The trial court admitted evidence relative to the manner of the organization of this military unit; the number of officers and enlisted men; the equipment under its control; that its membership was voluntary, and that it had frequent and constant changes in the personnel of the members; and also the negotiations between the military officers and the agents of the insurer concerning the person or persons who were insured or intended to be insured under the general term "Missouri State Guard." The effect of this testimony is that the military officers, who negotiated for the policy with the agents of the insurer, advised such agents that they wanted a policy which would protect the officers and the members of the State Guard against any judgment for damages to person or property as a result of using the military vehicles while on duty. One of the insurer's agents who took part in the negotiations was also a member of the State Guard and thoroughly familiar with its organization, function and duties, and the frequent change in personnel. His understanding was that a policy was to be prepared which would protect the members of the guard, and not just the "State Guard" as a unit. Defendant insurer offered testimony contradicting plaintiff's evidence on this point. The trial court resolved that issue in favor of the plaintiff, and we approve that finding.
It seems clear that the parties did not intend merely to name an insured which did not exist, or, if it did exist, could not be sued. Therefore, the insertion of "The Missouri State Guard" as one of the insureds was intended to mean something. We think such an all-inclusive name means, and was intended to mean, that the officers and members of the "Missouri State Guard" were protected according to the provisions of the policy.
Because of the peculiar and unusual situation in this case, we think parol evidence was admissible to show who the parties intended as the assureds. In Estes v. Great American Ins. Co., Mo.App., 112 S.W.2d 153, at page 158, the court said: "Furthermore, if there is any ambiguity in the policy as to who the assured is, parol evidence is admissible to show who the parties intended as the assured and the person intended to be indemnified or to be covered may recover on the policy, or any one acting for them may recover, and hold the proceeds as a trustee for the intended assured whether they are parties to the contract or not." Without further lengthening this opinion by quotation, we call attention to certain cases which sustain this principle of law, although the facts are not identical: Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Perry County Board of Education, D.C., 72 F.Supp. 142, 146; Becker v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Mo.App., 99 S.W.2d 148; Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., 313 Mo. 143, 281 S.W. 47, 45, A.L.R. 189; Fairbanks Canning Company v. London Guaranty Accident Co., 154 Mo.App. 327, 133 S.W. 664; Woodman v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.App.2d 321, 91 P.2d 898; Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, La.App. 191 So. 148.
Considering the provisions of the policy as a whole, together with certain oral testimony, we conclude Major Frisbie's liability is protected by the policy.
Under its last contention the insurer argues that by virtue of the "no action" provision of the policy, which provides that no action shall lie against the insurer unless, as a condition precedent, the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined by a judgment, and therefore, since the plaintiff had no judgment against Frisbie, plaintiff could not maintain the action.
If this were a suit for money damages against the insurer, it might be true that the plaintiff could not join the defendant insurance company along with the insured. However, this is not a suit for money judgment, but is an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, wherein the plaintiff asked the court to declare the rights, status and legal relations of all the parties under the policy and to construe the statute in question. The issues in this case are not limited to the negligence of Frisbie and the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to, but embrace the broader issues above outlined. However, it is not necessary to determine whether or not the insurer might have stood on this provision of the policy, since it has requested the determination of these issues and a declaration of the rights sought by the plaintiff. The insurer's answer admits that it and Frisbie contend that the statute exempts them from any liability. It admits the issuance of its policy as plaintiff alleged, and further alleges that the policy does not include Frisbie as an insured in view of the exclusion of the "omnibus clause" above referred to. It further alleges that at the time of the accident Frisbie was a member of the Missouri State Guard in performance of his duty and that neither the State Guard nor John A. Harris, the named insured, was liable in tort and that by reason thereof there was no liability under the policy either to defend any action or to be responsible for any negligence of Frisbie. The insured's answer specifically alleges;
"An actual controversy exists between the plaintiff and this defendant concerning the coverage afforded by said policy of insurance and the obligations of this defendant thereunder, and for which this defendant joins with the plaintiff in asking the court to find and declare the rights and legal relationship of the parties with respect thereto."
The answer then proceeds to ask the court to make a declaration of rights under the statute and under the policy, joining plaintiff in this request.
The Declaratory Judgment Act, Mo.R. S.A., Section 1127, Section 527.020 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides that any person interested under a written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute.
"* * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
Our courts have held that insurance companies can obtain a construction of their policy obligations and a declaration of their rights and liabilities under various statutes, and having joined the plaintiff in such a request insurer cannot argue that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 125 A. L.R. 1149; Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Suburban Service Bus Co., supra, Union Automobile Indemnity Ass'n v. Reimann, Mo.App., 171 S.W.2d 721.
We conclude that the trial court arrived at the correct result, and that the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
All concur.