Cotton v. County of Clark

Full title: George COTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF CLARK, a political…

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Aug 28, 2001

17 F. App'x 659 (9th Cir. 2001)

Opinion

17 Fed.Appx. 659 (9th Cir. 2001) George COTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF CLARK, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada, Defendant-Appellee. No. 00-15894. D.C. No. CV-S-98-01245-JLQ. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. August 28, 2001

Submitted August 13, 2001 ^*.

* The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)

County employee brought claims under Title VII and § 1981 for age and race discrimination and retaliation, relating to change in employee's job title. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Justin L. Quackenbush, J., granted summary judgment for county. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals held that employee failed to show that departmental reorganization was mere pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Affirmed.

Page 660.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Justin L. Quackenbush, District Judge, Presiding.

Before HAWKINS, TASHIMA, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^**

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Appellant George Cotton ("Cotton") appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment in favor of Clark County ("County") in his action alleging, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of age and race and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de novo. DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 641 (9th Cir.2000). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Cotton's discrimination and retaliation claims because even assuming Cotton established a prima facie case, Cotton did not provide specific and substantial evidence that the County's proffered reason for its actions--departmental reorganization--was a pretext for changing Cotton's job title. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir.1994). Nor did he offer significant statistical evidence demonstrating disparate impact. See Mayor v. Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 621, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974) (deeming sample size of 13 to be statistically insignificant for purposes of proving discrimination).

AFFIRMED.