Cotto v. Nutbrown

Full title: Christina Cotto v. Wesley Nutbrown

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Sep 15, 2016

HHDCV146051146 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 15, 2016)

Opinion

HHDCV146051146

09-15-2016

Christina Cotto v. Wesley Nutbrown

Constance L. Epstein, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR ADDITUR

Constance L. Epstein, J.

In this automobile accident case the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff, awarding her economic damages in the amount of $8, 235.36, the total amount of plaintiff's medical bills minus the charge for one missed appointment. The jury did not award noneconomic damages, even subsequent to the court's giving an additional instruction as to the possible inconsistency of the jury award in the initial verdict form.

It had long been believed that the rule in Connecticut was that an award of economic damages, without an award of noneconomic damages, was inadequate as a matter of law. Johnson v. Franklin, 112 Conn. 228, 152 A. 64 (1930). In Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 663 A.2d 398 (1995), however, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that " the common law of this state does not recognize the principle that awards limited to economic damages are inadequate as a matter of law and must be set aside." Id., 121. In Childs the plaintiff had been awarded only approximately 19% of the claimed economic damages, with no noneconomic damages, and the " cause, nature, and extent" of the plaintiff's injuries was " hotly contested" at trial. Id., 118-19. The Childs court did not directly overrule the Johnson decision, but it did hold that the trial court was not required to award an additur.

The economic/noneconomic damages issue was revisited in Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 745 A.2d 789 (2000). Although liability had been admitted, the parties again " hotly contested" the extent of plaintiff's injuries and there was evidence that that plaintiff had suffered from preexisting conditions. The jury awarded the plaintiff the exact amount of his claimed economic damages, $3, 377, but no noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a motion for additur. On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the dilemma then facing litigants and trial court judges:

We agree with the defendant that the departure in Childs from what was perceived to be the Johnson per se rule, has left trial judges in some confusion, and that to attempt to harmonize the decisions would require this court to establish an arbitrary demarcation of what percentage of a full economic damage recovery mandates an award of noneconomic damages. Any such attempt to engage in arbitrary line making is both unnecessary and unwise. We conclude that Johnson should be overruled explicitly, and that a case-specific standard should apply to the instance in which a party seeks to have a verdict set aside on the basis that it is legally inadequate.

Id., 181.

Wichers instructs us that mere doubt about the adequacy of the amount awarded is an insufficient basis for disturbing a jury's verdict. Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 187. Similarly a judge's conclusion that the jury merely exercised poor judgment is insufficient for the court to intervene. Id., 187. The most notable limitation on the trial court in considering motions to disturb a jury's verdict is a litigant's constitutional right to have factual issues decided by a jury. Id., 188. The Wichers court held:

The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.

Id., 187

Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue. That decision should be made not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do . . .

The evidential underpinnings of the verdict itself must be examined. " Upon issues regarding which, on the evidence, there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonably, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial court and this court be that a different result should have been reached."

Id., 188-89, citing Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 464, 11 A.2d 846 (1940).

In Wichers, the high court reversed the trial court's order for an additur and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment on the jury's verdict, an award of only economic damages. The Wichers court concluded:

. . . the jury could have accepted the evidence that it was advisable for the plaintiff to see his chiropractor more frequently than usual following the accident, but that the accident did not cause him actually to suffer greater pain than he already had experienced as a result of his preexisting condition . . . the jury reasonably could have found that the accident had not aggravated the plaintiff's condition, and that his pain was the same as what he had experienced before . . .

Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 189-90.

In Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 789 A.2d 459 (2002), plaintiff claimed injuries as a result of having hit his head on a door frame that was one foot lower than other door frames in the restaurant to which he was making a delivery. The jury found liability on the part of the defendant, but forty-nine percent comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff. The jury found economic damages in the amount of $750, 400, but no noneconomic damages. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, but the Supreme Court held this to be error, reasoning:

Unlike the plaintiff in Wichers, however, the plaintiff in the present case underwent invasive spinal surgery. The jury reasonably could not have initially found the defendant liable for the expense of the surgery but not responsible for any pain or disability attendant to such surgery. This is in stark contrast to the facts of Wichers, wherein the plaintiff, as a result of his injury, merely underwent additional chiropractic treatment for an aggravation of a preexisting injury . . .

Id., 333.

The above review of applicable law reveals that there is no bright-line test for determining whether a jury's decision to award economic but not noneconomic damages warrants judicial intervention.

In this case, the plaintiff's vehicle was struck in the rear by defendant's vehicle. The defendant testified that the collision was a " tap" of his car to plaintiff's and that there was no damage to his vehicle or plaintiff's vehicle. Photographs of defendant's vehicle confirmed a lack of any damage to that car. The plaintiff testified, however, that the collision was so severe that she was thrown forward violently and she believed that she would have gone through the windshield if she had not been restrained by her seatbelt. According to plaintiff, the two passengers in plaintiff's car, her neighbor and her grandson, a any claims for injuries.

Plaintiff drove home after the accident, but contended that she had such severe pain the next day that she had to seek treatment. Plaintiff, who is seventy-three years of age, testified that she had not suffered any prior injuries to her neck or back, but now, because of her continuing neck pain, she has difficulty playing with her grandchildren, doing housework, and sleeping. Plaintiff also testified that she has moved to be with family in Puerto Rico because the cold winters in New England exacerbate her symptoms.

Although the plaintiff claimed that she had had injections for her symptoms and that a physician had recommended surgery, no medical records were introduced into evidence to substantiate those assertions. Plaintiff's treating chiropractic doctor assigned a six percent permanent injury to the neck as a result of the accident. A magnetic resonance imaging test (MRI) revealed degenerative changes in the spine, joint disease, and low bone density, but none of these findings were related by any physician, including plaintiff's treating chiropractor, as causally connected to the accident.

The ultimate test for the court in a motion for additur is whether the verdict falls within necessarily uncertain limits or shocks the sense of justice compelling a contrary conclusion. Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. 187. Having reviewed the evidence in this case, the court does not believe that there is a basis under the law for awarding an additur.

Plaintiff's motion is denied.