Opinion
C. A. 2:23-cv-03104-RMG-MHC
04-02-2024
Howard Cottman, Plaintiff, v. Derek Rodriguez, Christopher Smith, Ptl. McPherson, Ptl. Royer, Affiant J.E. Roberts, Sgt. Danielle Sherwood, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Howard Cottman (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. Defendants Derek Rodriguez, Christopher Smith, Ptl. McPherson, Ptl. Royer, Affiant J.E. Roberts, and Sgt. Danielle Sherwood (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). ECF No. 26. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 31. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 32. The matter is, therefore, ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) and (f) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 14. Specifically, in his Amended Complaint, he alleges his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8. He also appears to assert violations of various South Carolina state statutes.
Plaintiff lists S.C. Code §§ 20-4-100 (Petition for Order of Protection), 16-3-1910 (Permanent Restraining Order), 8-1-60 (Law Enforcement Officer Neglect of Duty), 23-17-90 (Illegal arrest), 15-78-70 (Tort Claims Act Exclusive Remedy), 40-1-110 (Licensing Board's ability to sanction a licensee). Plaintiff also lists Rule 401, presumably the Rules of Evidence. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is difficult to follow. Plaintiff asserts that the alleged events took place in North Charleston, South Carolina, on April 3, 2023. ECF No. 14 at 9. He appears to allege claims about his arrest on that date. See ECF No. 14 at 10-13. He alleges that Defendants breached an apartment in North Charleston without knocking or announcing themselves and maintains this fact was “omitted from [the] arrest warrant.” ECF No. 14 at 10. He alleges he was falsely imprisoned without probable cause. ECF No. 14 at 10. Once Defendants were inside the apartment, Plaintiff alleges he gave his name and cell phone to Defendant Rodriguez “as evidence,” but he “was ignored and forced to face the wall where [he] was handcuffed and searched without warrant or reason.” ECF No. 14 at 11. It is unclear what evidence Plaintiff was purporting to show Defendant Rodriguez.
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Rodriguez used a pocket knife to open a locked bedroom door “without again knocking or announcing.” ECF No. 14 at 11. Once inside the bedroom, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rodriguez “coerced testimony” from an unnamed victim, while Defendant Smith “did nothing.” ECF No. 14 at 1l. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Rodriguez that there was “an active General Sessions permanent restraining order in place on said victim.” ECF No. 14 at 11.
Plaintiff further alleges an affidavit prepared by Defendant Roberts misled a magistrate judge with “information that the affiant knew was false” in reckless disregard for the truth. ECF No. 14 at 12. Plaintiff appears to contend that arrest warrants linked to his arrest in the apartment were based on false testimony. See ECF No. 14 at 12-13.
In their Motion, Defendants offer some context to Plaintiff's allegations. Defendants maintain that officers were dispatched to the apartment of the unnamed victim, who is identified as “LL” by Defendants in their brief and in the arrest warrants. ECF No. 26-1 at 1; ECF No. 262. Upon arrival, they allege they could hear LL crying and a male (Plaintiff) yelling inside the apartment. ECF No. 26-1 at 1. Defendants maintain they entered the apartment based on exigent circumstances after being called to the scene. ECF No. 26-1 at 1. According to the arrest warrants and accompanying affidavits in support, Plaintiff had knocked on LL's door, and LL was attacked by Plaintiff as soon as she opened the door. ECF No. 26-2 at 2. It is alleged that Plaintiff continued assaulting LL inside, but she was eventually able to get free, go into her bedroom, and lock the door. ECF No. 26-2 at 2. Plaintiff was arrested for Domestic Violence first degree, and Violation of a Permanent General Sessions Restraining Order. ECF No. 26-2 at 1-4.
The Court may consider the arrest warrants and affidavits in support of the arrest warrants in addressing Defendants' Motion as Plaintiff specifically references these documents in his Amended Complaint and has not challenged their authenticity. See Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding “that when a defendant attaches a document to its motion to dismiss, a court may consider it in determining whether to dismiss the complaint [if] it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and [if] the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff requests monetary damages, letters of caution or admonition, public reprimands, suspensions or disbarments, and proper training. ECF No. 14 at 15.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for dismissal of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 26. “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of [affirmative] defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue dismissal is appropriate because, inter alia, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any of the named Defendants. The Court agrees.
As noted above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is difficult to follow. Plaintiff maintains that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, and he also appears to assert violations of various South Carolina state statutes. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8. As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual basis for violations of his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, or any violations of South Carolina law. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts Fourth Amendment violations against Defendants, those claims fail.
A. Failure to state a claim
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's claims, as pled, do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual basis for violations of his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, or any violations of South Carolina law. Although Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions including claims of “equal protection,” “false arrest,” “deliberate indifference,” and a myriad of other alleged violations, the Amended Complaint lacks any real factual and/or legal basis for connecting the bulk of these claims to Defendants' alleged conduct. Rather, Plaintiff lists various alleged violations and then describes-extremely generally-what appears to be the circumstances of his arrest for Domestic Violence first degree and Violation of a Permanent General Sessions Restraining Order. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8, 10-13. Consequently, Defendants do not have “fair notice” of what they, as individuals, are being accused of. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for any misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, the Amended Complaint contains conclusory allegations that do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants entered an apartment in North Charleston and “falsely” arrested him. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8, 10-13; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations). Indeed, there are no facts from which to infer that Defendants engaged in conduct that ran afoul of the Constitution or South Carolina statutes. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (noting “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))).
While the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8 only require a short and plain statement of the claim, Plaintiff must offer more detail than merely stating Defendants violated the Constitution or South Carolina statutes by arresting him. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”). The undersigned cannot divine a cause of action from Plaintiff's filings, nor should the Court attempt to advocate on Plaintiff's behalf. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (“District judges are not mind readers. Even in the case of pro se litigants, they cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments, which is essentially what [Plaintiff] is seeking here.”).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, nor does he state a claim as to the various South Carolina statutes he cites. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Amended Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
B. Personal involvement and supervisory liability
Moreover, to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate the Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
As noted above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sets forth general conclusory allegations against Defendants. Specifically, as to Defendant Sherwood, Plaintiff merely asserts that Defendant Sherwood “should have known of [this] misconduct.” ECF No. 14 at 11. Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant Sherwood had any personal involvement in any of the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)).
As to Defendants Smith, McPherson, or Royer, it appears Plaintiff names them because they were present at the time of his arrest. There are no allegations of any personal action by any of these Defendants, let alone action that allegedly violates any constitutional rights. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold these Defendants liable under a theory of bystander liability, such claims fail. See Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting “an officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act” (footnote omitted)). In addition to failing to state a claim as a general matter-already discussed above- Plaintiff fails to set forth any facts that could support the elements of a bystander liability claim. See id.
The limited allegations against Defendants Roberts and Rodriguez involving personal actions are addressed below in Section C.3.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges any Defendants are vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of their subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that go toward satisfying any of these required elements.
C. Fourth Amendment
Liberally construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants appear to be for an unreasonable search, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See ECF No. 14 at 7-8, 10-13. “Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Phillips v. Campbell, No. 6:20-CV-04447-DCC-KFM, 2021 WL 11485284, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 5, 2021). Thus, at their core, Plaintiff's claims are an allegation that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. See Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating “there is no such thing as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution' claim,” rather, “a ‘malicious prosecution' claim . . . is simply a claim founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution-specifically, the requirement that the prior proceeding terminate favorably to the plaintiff'); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting false arrest and false imprisonment claims “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
1. Unreasonable search and seizure
Plaintiff appears to take issue with the Defendants' entry into LL's apartment, stating that Defendants were “without a warrant,” and noting that they entered the apartment “without knocking or announcing themselves.” ECF No. 14 at 10. Plaintiff also appears to take issue with being “handcuffed and searched without warrant or reason.” This claim fails.
The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state actors from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022). “A government agent's search is unreasonable when it infringes on an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.” United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A home search ordinarily requires a warrant. United States v. Lyles, 910 F.3d 787, 791 (4th Cir. 2018). Indeed, there is a “firm line” drawn at the entrance of a house by the Fourth Amendment, and, absent exigent circumstances, “that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
However, the Supreme Court has made clear “‘wrongful' presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141 n.9 (1978). Indeed, a “burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season, for example, may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as ‘legitimate.'” Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 409 (2018) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12). Furthermore, in the context of an arrest, the “search-incident-to-arrest exception allows arresting officers to search both the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.” United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. May 7, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, to the extent Plaintiff appears to maintain Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights because of their “warrantless entries” into the apartment, such a claim fails. See ECF No. 14 at 10. Taking the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff was at the apartment legitimately; thus, Plaintiff has not shown he even has standing to bring an unreasonable search or seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff did not allege he was the owner of the apartment or that he was an invited guest, nor did he allege that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. To the contrary, Plaintiff was arrested for Domestic Violence first degree and Violation of a Permanent General Sessions Restraining Order-a restraining order that was against Plaintiff for the protection of LL. ECF No. 26-2 at 1-4. Consequently, Plaintiff does not even have standing to object to the legality of the alleged “warrantless entry” or search of the apartment. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n.9 (noting “wrongful” presence at the scene of a search does not enable a defendant to contest the legality of the search). Likewise, because he was being arrested, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim regarding any search of his person. See Davis, 997 F.3d at 195 (noting the search-incident-to-arrest exception allows arresting officers to search the arrestee's person without a warrant). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2. False arrest
Plaintiff appears to allege that he was falsely arrested by Defendants. See ECF No. 14 at 10-13. To maintain a claim for false arrest or imprisonment under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested without probable cause. Sowers v. City of Charlotte, 659 Fed.Appx. 738, 739 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the Fourth Circuit has held that “a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant;” rather, at most, that “official can be pursued through a cause of action for malicious prosecution.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). In other words, the “distinction between malicious prosecution and false arrest in this situation is whether the arrest was made pursuant to a warrant.” Dorn v. Town Of Prosperity, 375 Fed.Appx. 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2010). This means that a claim for false arrest “must fail where it is made pursuant to a facially valid warrant.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 568 (noting “a claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained” (emphasis added)).
Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, which he referenced in his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 14 at 10-13. Defendants attached two arrest warrants to their Motion, and Plaintiff does not argue or contend that these warrants did not facially conform to constitutional requirements. Rather, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint only sets forth alleged issues with the underlying affidavits supporting the arrest warrants. Accordingly, Plaintiff's false arrest claim fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., Williams v. Saluda Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 8:12-CV-03212-JMC, 2013 WL 2416319, at *4 (D.S.C. June 3, 2013) (finding Plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim for false arrest because he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, even though the Amended Complaint alleged that “‘Officer Lt. Charles B. Padget . . . falsified his arrest warrants' when Plaintiff was arrested and detained”); Rouse v. Nessel, No. 8:20-CV-00954-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6279198, at *4 (D.S.C. July 6, 2020) (“Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, and he has filed a copy of the arrest warrant. Because Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, his claim for false arrest is without merit.” (internal citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:20-CV-00954-DCC, 2020 WL 4435189 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2020).
Consequently, at most, Plaintiff “can allege only ‘a cause of action for malicious prosecution' based on an alleged lack of probable cause for seeking and issuing the warrant in the first instance.” Dorn, 375 Fed.Appx. at 286 (citation omitted); see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C. , 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996) (“However, allegations that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant was not supported by probable cause, or claims seeking damages for the period after legal process issued, are analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.”). As Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant, Plaintiff's claim of “false arrest” is more properly framed as a malicious prosecution claim. See Williams, No. 8:12-CV-03212-JMC, 2013 WL 2416319, at *4 (liberally construing Plaintiff's claim as a malicious prosecution claim where the Amended Complaint alleged that “Lt. Charles B. Padget unlawfully falsified his statements against [Plaintiff] about possession of a firearm” in the arrest warrants, and that Plaintiff was “still [in] lock-up due to these false and fabricated lies and statements”).
3. Malicious prosecution
Construing Plaintiff's filings liberally, Plaintiff appears to argue that he is being maliciously prosecuted. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Roberts lied in the warrant affidavits that a magistrate judge ultimately signed, and thus appears to suggest he was arrested by Defendant Rodriquez without probable cause. See ECF No. 14 at 12-13. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution.
To establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the Fourth Circuit has required that (1) the defendant “seized plaintiff pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause” and (2) “that the criminal proceedings have terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 2005)); see also Williams, No. 8:12-CV-03212-JMC, 2013 WL 2416319, at *4 (“To state a viable claim for a seizure with a warrant that violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor.”).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that his criminal proceedings terminated in his favor; thus, he has failed to state any claim for malicious prosecution. See Rouse, No. 8:20-CV-00954-DCC-JDA, 2020 WL 6279198, at *5 (“Because the Complaint does not allege that criminal proceedings have terminated in Plaintiffs favor, the Complaint does not state a claim for malicious prosecution.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4435189; see also McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2160 (2019) (noting that, although the injury caused by a malicious prosecution claim occurs as soon as legal process is brought against a defendant, “favorable termination remains the accrual date”); Taylor v. Himes, No. CV 1:21-4036-MGL-PJG, 2022 WL 4001185, at *1 (D.S.C. June 13, 2022) (“Precedent holds that a Fourth Amendment claim based on malicious prosecution does not accrue until the prosecution ends.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:21-4036-MGL-PJG, 2022 WL 4000843 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2022). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted at this time; thus, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold any of the other Defendants liable for this claim on the basis of supervisory liability (ECF No. 14 at 13), they should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim for these reasons, as well as those set forth in Section B above.
To the extent Plaintiff's claims can be interpreted as asserting state law claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution against Defendants, or any other state law claims (see, e.g., ECF No. 14 at 8), the undersigned recommends declining to exercise jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (noting, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, be GRANTED.
The parties are directed to the attached Notice for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).