( Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 967.) Real parties compare the case management order in this case with the order upheld in Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882] ( Cottle). In Cottle, approximately 175 owners and renters of various residential properties in an area once used by the oil industry as a dumping ground for hazardous wastes and other by-products brought an action for personal injuries, and the action was deemed complex.
and as trustee of the Brooks Thomas Walker Trust, the Susie Kate Walker Trust, and the Della Grace Walker Trust; Wellington Smith Henderson, Jr., as trustee of the Henderson Revocable Trust; Elena D. Henderson; Mark W. Henderson, as trustee of the Mark W. Henderson Revocable Trust; John C. Walker, individually and as trustee of the Della Walker Van Loben Sels Trust for the Issue of John C. Walker; James A. Henderson; Charles C. Henderson, as trustee of the Charles C. and Kirsten Henderson Revocable Trust; Joan H. Henderson; Jennifer Walker, individually and as trustee of the Emma Walker Silverman Trust and the Max Walker Silverman Trust; Kirby Walker; and Lindsey Walker or Lindsey Walker-Silverman, individually and as trustee of the Reilly Hudson Keenan Trust and the Madison Flanders Keenan Trust. On the eve of trial in July 2013, the consolidated actions were dismissed following a hearing on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and for presentation of a prima facie case pursuant to Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 ( Cottle ) after the trial court concluded Cal Fire could not as a matter of law state a claim against Sierra Pacific, Beaty, or landowner defendants, and that no plaintiff had presented a prima facie case against any defendant. After judgment was entered, the trial court awarded defendants costs without apportionment amongst plaintiffs.
We also agree with the results of the challenged Cottle proceedings. ( Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882] ( Cottle).) Lockheed did not submit sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for coverage under the Harbor policies of the pollution-related liability Lockheed incurred in connection with its Burbank facility.
The court elected to “sustain all the demurrers with leave to amend,” explaining that plaintiffs needed to provide “a much better drawn complaint.” The court further explained that “with respect to the statute of limitations arguments[,]” it might enter an order “pursuant to ... Cottle versus Superior Court [ (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 ( Cottle ) ]” requiring each plaintiff to provide “an offer of proof as to ... [w]hat the person learned and when. Who they learned it from. Did they read something?
The flexibility afforded courts by Code of Civil Procedure section 187 is particularly apt in cases managed under the complex litigation standard. Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882], illustrates the type of creativity courts are permitted to exercise in dealing with complex cases. There, in a complex toxic tort case, the trial court commendably devised an efficient nonstatutory procedure, considerably simpler than the traditional procedure for motions for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, to determine which of some 175 plaintiffs would be able to establish a prima facie claim for injuries.
This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury." Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456, 460 (2 Dist. 1985) (citations omitted); Cottle v. Superior Court (OxnardShores Co.), 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 892 (2 Dist. 1992). It should be emphasized that expert testimony is required to establish causation, since this case involves scientific issues that are "beyond the experience of laymen."
Alternatively, a doctor who examines a patient may use a medical "differential diagnosis" to determine mold as the cause of a diagnosed illness. ( B.T.N. , at p. 1340, 845 N.Y.S.2d 614 ; see also Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc . (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 586, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 67 ; Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384-1385, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882.) Here Simon, as a medical doctor and a researcher, attempted to use both methods.
But before the plaintiff is even entitled to submit his claim to a factfinder, he must make a prima facie case, meaning he must proffer evidence sufficient to permit a finding in his favor. ( Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1385, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882 ( Cottle ); Evid. Code, § 550, subd. (b).) Where causation is "beyond the experience of laymen," as it is in complex medical injury cases, such evidence must be in the form of an expert opinion that could be accepted by the factfinder as satisfying the plaintiff's burden of proof. (See Ortho Pharmaceutical, supra , 163 Cal.App.3d at pp. 402–403, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456.)
(LeFrancois v. Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1096, 1104, 1107; Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 739; Bagley v. TRW, Inc., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1097.) Finally, defendant contends that "the trial court invited [it] to file a second summary judgment motion as an alternative to a planned motion pursuant to Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367. Indeed, during the hearing on [defendant's] demurrer to the Fifth Amended Complaint on November 21, 2013, the trial court encouraged [defendant] to seek resolution of the claims against it through a successive motion for summary judgment.
Where, as here, plaintiffs claim injuries caused by exposure to certain substances, they "need to introduce evidence that to a degree of reasonable medical probability, their injuries had been caused by exposure to [the substances]." (Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1385 (Cottle).) We review the jury's verdict for substantial evidence.