Upload a complaint or brief to quickly find on-point case law.
CARA A.I. uses the facts and legal issues in your document to find relevant authorities.
Drag a complaint or brief hereUpload a complaint or briefPDF documentWORD documentTXT documentOr, choose a document to uploadChoose DocumentSecure
Find on-point cases faster with CARA A.I.
§

Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co.

99 Conn. 545 (Conn. 1923)
Depth of Treatment
Newest to Oldest
Oldest to Newest
Cite Count
Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co.

12 Citing cases

  1. Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy

    294 Conn. 564 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 59 times
    In Marandino, our Supreme Court considered whether the commissioner properly relied on a medical report from the plaintiff's attending physician in determining that the plaintiff's knee injury was compensable.

    With this distinction in mind, we turn to our previous cases interpreting the language of § 31-308 (b). We first examine the case of Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 A. 79 (1923). In Costello, the plaintiff suffered an injury that caused, inter alia, the amputation of two phalanges and the greater part of the third phalanx of the second finger of the right hand.

  2. Rayhall v. Akim Co.

    263 Conn. 328 (Conn. 2003)   Cited 93 times
    Holding in post-amendment case that offsetting social security retirement benefits against permanent total disability payments rationally related to reducing wage-replacement benefits for retired workers

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 713; see Public Acts 1919, No. 142, § 7. Thereafter, "[i]n Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., [ 99 Conn. 545, 550, 122 A. 79 (1923)], which concerned an award for partial incapacity following the original amputation of a finger, [this court] said of the change made by the amendment of 1919: `This addition, so far as it affects the prior construction of the section, provides a more liberal measure of compensation because it obliterates the distinction theretofore drawn between total incapacity preceding and following the loss, and thereby reverses the ruling in the Kramer case.'" Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co., supra, 713.

  3. Orvis v. Hutchins

    123 Vt. 18 (Vt. 1962)   Cited 11 times
    In Orvis v. Hutchins, supra, the employer argued that a permanent partial disability award calculated in accordance with the schedule in 21 V.S.A. § 648 should be reduced by the temporary disability award.

    By the same token, we think it should not be cut down by the period of temporary partial disability. Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 A. 79. The result sought by the defendants is not aided by the words "shall be in lieu of all other benefits except those provided in sections 640 and 641 . . . ."

  4. Wunsch v. Stanley Works

    75 A.2d 489 (Conn. 1950)   Cited 2 times

    In substance and in so far as pertinent in this case, the first paragraph of the statute as so printed was included in the original enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, being a part of 12 of chapter 138 of the Public Acts of 1913. The specific awards provided apply not only to the complete loss of any of the members stated but, in the case of a finger, to the loss of a phalanx or phalanges as well. Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 548, 122 A. 79. The second paragraph was added by the enactment of 7 of chapter 368 of the Public Acts of 1917. This gives the commissioner, where the injury consists of "the loss of a substantial part of a member," with the consequent specified loss of use or function of the member, or where the injury results in a permanent partial loss of function, a discretion to make an award inter alia of such a proportion of the sum for incapacity provided in the statute as shall represent the proportion of total loss or loss of use found to exist. The third paragraph was added by the enactment of 7 of chapter 306 of the Public Acts of 1921. This was apparently designed to supplement the second paragraph of the statute by conferring like discretionary power on the commissioner in two additional situations: (1) where the injury involves no "loss of a substantial part of a member" and (2) where no "permanent partial loss of function" results. It is apparent from the terms of the commissioner's finding and award

  5. Morgan v. Adams

    16 A.2d 576 (Conn. 1940)   Cited 2 times
    In Morgan, the disability award was for the "loss of sight in one eye" under General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5237, also a predecessor to § 31-308 (a). This court reasoned that "[t]he statute specifically refers to the loss of sight, not to the loss of the eye.

    The statutes involved and the relevant cases are fully reviewed in Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co., 113 Conn. 707, 156 A. 802. Where, as here, there is disability followed by specific indemnity and subsequent disability the question always is whether the final disability is distinct from and due to a condition which is not a normal and immediate incident of the loss. Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 550, 122 A. 79. In the Panico case, as in Stapf v. Savin, 125 Conn. 563, 7 A.2d 226, the final disability was not only traceable to the original injury but was due to a condition which was a normal and immediate incident of the loss.

  6. McConnell v. Murphy Bros.

    45 Wyo. 289 (Wyo. 1933)   Cited 26 times

    In Kramer v. Sargent and Co., 93 Conn. 26, 104 A. 490, the "in lieu" clause in that act was given the construction as in the Georgia cases. But the lawmaking body of the state thereafter declined to allow this interpretation to stand with the result that, in Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 A. 79, 80, the court, adopting an opposite view from that taken in the Kramer case, used this language: "It has already been stated that the Kramer and Franko Cases ( 93 Conn. 13, 104 A. 485) were decided prior to the amendment of 1919, which added to Section 5352 the words `in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity.' This addition, so far as it affects the prior construction of the section, provides a more liberal measure of compensation because it obliterates the distinction theretofore drawn between total incapacity preceding and following the loss, and thereby reverses the ruling in the Kramer case."

  7. Panico v. Sperry Engineering Co.

    113 Conn. 707 (Conn. 1931)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that ‘‘specific indemnity for proportionate loss of use accrued" when injury ‘‘reached the stage of ultimate improvement"

    In 1919, § 5352 (now § 5237) was so amended as to expressly state that the specific compensation for loss or loss of use of a member therein provided for should be "in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation." In Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co. (1923) 99 Conn. 545, 550, 122 A. 79, which concerned an award for partial incapacity following the original amputation of a finger, we said of the change made by the amendment of 1919: "This addition, so far as it affects the prior construction of the section, provides a more liberal measure of compensation because it obliterates the distinction theretofore drawn between total incapacity preceding and following the loss, and thereby reverses the ruling in the Kramer case." It is true that the amendment of 1919 did not change the words "in lieu of other compensation" in the portion of the statute under which the plaintiff claims.

  8. Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co.

    43 Idaho 450 (Idaho 1927)   Cited 16 times

    A contract and award for specific indemnity survives the death from other causes of the person injured, and to whom specific indemnity has been granted. ( Forkas v. International Silver Co., 100 Conn. 417, 123 Atl. 831; Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 94 Conn. 618, 110 Atl. 63; Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 Atl. 79; Bowman v. Industrial Co., 289 Ill. 126, 124 N.E. 373; Ward v. Heth Bros., 212 Mich. 180, 180 N.W. 245; C. S., secs. 6231-6234; Statutes of Connecticut, secs. 5351, 5352.) WM. E. LEE, C. J.

  9. Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co.

    105 Conn. 297 (Conn. 1926)   Cited 34 times
    In Bassett, the court made essentially the same statement; see Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co., supra, 105 Conn. at 300, 135 A. 574, but also affirmed that an estate may receive benefits that matured prior to the claimant's death.

    It thus has all the earmarks of a statutory award of liquidated damages." Forkas v. International Silver Co., 100 Conn. 417, 421, 123 A. 831; Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., 94 Conn. 618, 628, 110 A. 63; Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 A. 79. The permanent loss of a member is of this character, and such awards survive.

  10. Forkas, Admrx. v. International Silver Co.

    100 Conn. 417 (Conn. 1924)   Cited 14 times
    Distinguishing benefits

    As the statute now reads, it is awarded in addition to compensation for partial incapacity not caused by the ordinary and immediate incidents of the loss. Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co., supra; Costello v. Seamless Rubber Co., 99 Conn. 545, 122 A. 79. It is an award which is not dependent on the fact or continuance of an impairment of wage earning power, but all the conditions necessary for its allowance in full are present as soon as the irreparable loss occurs. It thus has all the earmarks of a statutory award of liquidated damages for the loss, and we so described it in the Saddlemire case and the Costello case.