Costa v. Marotta

8 Citing cases

  1. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico

    650 B.R. 309 (D.P.R. 2022)

    His pleadings do not assert that he is a creditor of any of the Title III Debtors or that he otherwise has any personal stake in the outcome of the Title III Cases generally, or in the relief sought in the Motion specifically. Cf. Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC, 281 F. App'x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Appellant Pat Costa, a former director and officer of the debtors, objected [to fee applications filed by various chapter 11 professionals], accusing the professionals of malpractice and related misconduct. As a creditor, Costa had standing to advance such objections as a basis for seeking denial (or disgorgement) of the requested fees."); Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that creditors had standing to challenge sale order where they "declare[d] that Guccio Gucci's conduct diminished the value of the estate's assets, thereby limiting their recovery as creditors").

  2. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico

    618 B.R. 349 (D.P.R. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    UTIER and Windmar's allegations that PREPA has made ill-advised strategic decisions in its negotiation of the Contracts and that assumption of the Contracts would be, for a wide range of reasons, financial disadvantageous for PREPA, are consistent with the creditor concerns that are within the zone of interests covered by Section 365(a). Cf. Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC, 281 F. App'x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) ("As a creditor, Costa had standing to advance such objections as a basis for seeking denial (or disgorgement) of the requested fees."); Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that creditors had standing to challenge sale order where they "declare[d] that Guccio Gucci's conduct diminished the value of the estate's assets, thereby limiting their recovery as creditors"). Moreover, when a debtor is authorized to assume a contract, "[a]ssumption not only requires cure, but it subjects the estate to potential administrative liability for failure of future performance, thus priming the claims of general unsecured creditors."

  3. DeOtte v. Azar

    332 F.R.D. 173 (N.D. Tex. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Denying intervention as of right based on an "attenuated" financial interest in the outcome of the case

    ions in the pleading.") (collecting cases) (emphasis added); Gilyard v. Texas Laurel Ridge Hosp. LP, 2009 WL 10670038, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2009) ("The Court must accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an intervention motion.") (emphasis added) (citing Mendenhall v. M/V Toyota Maru No. 11, 551 F.2d 55, 56 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977)); see alsoSw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] district court is required to accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an intervention motion.") (emphasis added); Lake Inv’rs Dev. Grp. v. Egidi Dev. Grp., 715 F.2d 1256, 1258 (7th Cir. 1983) ("In evaluating the motion to intervene, the district court must accept as true the non-conclusory allegations of the motion and cross-complaint.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC, 281 Fed.Appx. 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[A] court need only accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an intervention motion.") (cleaned up) (emphasis added)). Even assuming that between 600 to 1,200 women would no longer have full contraceptive coverage as a result of the relief sought by Plaintiffs, "it still does not follow that any of these women will make demands on the state’s treasury in response to their employer’s decision."

  4. Great Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Tanner

    NO. 3:16-CV-70-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2017)

    However, a court need not accept conclusory allegations as true. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] district court is required to accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an intervention motion."); Lake Inv'rs Dev. Grp. v. Egidi Dev. Grp., 715 F.2d 1256, 1258 (7th Cir. 1983); Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd &Dzera, LLC, 281 F. App'x 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2008). "Although the movant bears the burden of establishing its right to intervene, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed."

  5. Sumida & Tsuchiyama, LLLP v. Kotoshirodo (In re Kyung Sook Kim)

    433 B.R. 763 (D. Haw. 2010)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that because the subject memorandum "did not determine the amount of sanctions, it did not fully end the sanctions dispute, much less indicate the bankruptcy court's intention that the [memorandum] be its final act on the matter" and reasoning that "construing the [memorandum] as a final order would lead to a ridiculous result of the bankruptcy court being divested of jurisdiction to determine the amount of sanctions"

    Id. (quoting Fondiller v. Robertson, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983)). A creditor has standing to object to the payment of fees to the bankruptcy trustee's attorneys. See, e.g., Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd Dzera, LLC, 281 Fed. Appx. 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008); In re Kucek Dev. Corp., 113 B.R. 652, 656 (E.D. Cal. 1990); In re Mundo Custom Homes, Inc., 214 B.R. 356, 360 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1997).

  6. Clinton Nurseries, Inc. v. Harrington (In re Clinton Nurseries, Inc.)

    608 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Accepting the Trustee's argument on this point

    This power is broad enough to permit a court to "convert a contested matter to an adversary proceeding on its own motion." Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Wilborn) , 401 B.R. 872, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC , 281 F. App'x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Johnson v. Stemple (In re Stemple) , 361 B.R. 778, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) ). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES the Procedural Objection and CONVERTS this matter to an Adversary Proceeding.

  7. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc.

    606 B.R. 260 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2019)   Cited 16 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the 2017 Amendment violates the Bankruptcy Clause

    Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Wilborn ), 401 B.R. 872, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC , 281 F. App'x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Johnson v. Stemple (In re Stemple ), 361 B.R. 778, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) ).

  8. In re Wilborn

    401 B.R. 872 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)   Cited 11 times

    Even if the distinction between an adversary proceeding and a contested matter somehow affected this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has the power to convert a contested matter to an adversary proceeding on its own motion. See, e.g., Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC, 281 Fed.Appx. 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming both the bankruptcy court and the district court after "the bankruptcy court sua sponte converted the contested matter into an adversary proceeding"); Johnson v. Stemple (In re Stemple), 361 B.R. 778, 784 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2007) (converting, sua sponte, a party's motion to dismiss to a complaint and initiating an adversary proceeding as required by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7001(5)). Here, however, the Court does not need to convert a contested matter to an adversary proceeding because, given the need for discovery and the equitable and injunctive relief requested, the Plaintiffs properly filed the Complaint as an adversary proceeding.