Opinion
No. 0-730 / 00-0116.
Filed February 28, 2001.
Appeal from the Iowa District for Woodbury County, DEWIE J. GAUL, Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellee appeals the trial court's decision determining that he was not entitled to arbitrate his dismissal by the County. AFFIRMED.
Robert B. Deck, Sioux City, for appellant.
Douglas L. Phillips of the Klass, Stoos, Stoik, Mugan, Villone Phillips, Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by HABHAB, S.J. and R. PETERSON, S.J. and HONSELL, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code Section 602.9206 (2001).
Plaintiff-appellant Jay B. Cosgrove appeals the trial court's decision finding him to be an at-will employee and determining that he was not entitled to arbitrate his grievance following his discharge as a correctional officer at the Woodbury County jail. It is his position that he could only be terminated "for cause" as provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between the parties at the time of his dismissal.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Plaintiff's employment as a correctional officer at the Woodbury County jail was terminated on February 24, 1999. There was in effect at that time a Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 20. Mr. Cosgrove filed a grievance and sought reinstatement. The County took the position that Mr. Cosgrove was an at-will employee and that the contract did not accord him the opportunity to arbitrate the dismissal. The County's refusal to arbitrate prompted plaintiff to file a lawsuit in Woodbury County seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the County to participate in arbitration pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts and the court denied plaintiff's requested relief.
Article XIII of the agreement between the parties defines a grievance as follows:
A grievance is defined as a dispute between an employee and the Employer concerning the interpretation, application, or violation of the express terms of this Agreement.
Plaintiff asserts that the "express terms" of the agreement as set forth in Article II were violated, therefore he is entitled to avail himself of the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement.
Article II of the agreement is titled Management Rights and Responsibilities. Sections 1 (h) and 2 provide as follows:
Section 1: In addition to all powers, duties, and rights of the Employer established by constitutional provisions, statute, ordinance, charter, or special act, the Union recognizes the powers, duties, and rights which belong solely, exclusively, and without limitation to the Employer, to-wit: (h) the right to discipline, suspend, and discharge employees for cause;Section 2: The list of management rights set forth above is not exclusive and it is understood that except as specifically and expressly modified or limited by this Agreement, all of the rights, power, authority and prerogatives the Employer had prior to this Agreement are retained by and reserved to it and shall remain within its exclusive control.
I. Standard of Review.
Our scope of review in this equity action is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4. The appeal in an equity case is not a trial de novo, but is limited to de novo review of identified and preserved error. Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996).
II. The merits.
We first note that under the common law public employees were presumed to be employed at will. See Van Baale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1996); see also Lee v. Halford, 540 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1995) (observing that "the contractual rights of public employees are largely a creature of statute"). Employment at will has traditionally been defined to permit an employer to discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. See French v. Foods, Inc. 495 N.W.2d 768, 769 (Iowa 1993). Consistent with this traditional definition of the doctrine, we have noted: In the absence of a valid employment contract either party may terminate the relationship without consequence. Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa 1995) (emphasis added). Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community School District, 577 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1998).
In Lockhart, id. at 848, the court observed that it would be "illogical" to hold that a public employee could no longer be dismissed under the common law because of the "for proper cause" language set forth in section 20.7(3) of the collective bargaining chapter of the Iowa Code concerning public employees.
Article II of the agreement between plaintiff and the County did not take away any of the powers provided to a public employer under the common law or statute. Nor does this article of the agreement in any way limit the discharge of an at-will employee.
In considering all of the circumstances alluded to above and reviewing the submitted record de novo; we find that the trial court was correct in denying plaintiff's request to order the County into arbitration pursuant to the agreement between the parties.
AFFIRMED.
R. PETERSON, S.J., concurs; HABHAB, S.J. concurs specially without opinion.