Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission

78 Citing cases

  1. Lieberman v. Aronow

    319 Conn. 748 (Conn. 2015)   Cited 20 times

    Aronow and the commission do claim, however, that the commission's interpretation of the phrase “record of the performance and evaluation” in § 10a–154a should be entitled to some degree of deference because the commission has consistently applied a reasonable construction to similar language found in § 10–151c and the commission applied that same construction to § 10a–154a in the present case. In support of this claim, the commission cites to Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989), and Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398—99, 604 A.2d 351 (1992). In the first of these two cases, this court upheld the commission's interpretation of the term “operational meeting” contained within a statute that, at the time, provided an exemption to the act's open meeting requirement for “[a]ny operational meeting of active members of a volunteer fire department....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

  2. Envirotest Systems Corporation v. F.O.I.C

    1999 Ct. Sup. 6027 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    "The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183(j) and is very restricted. See Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104, 561 A.2d 429 (1989); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). . . . [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant. C H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 176 Conn. 11, 12, 404 A.2d 864 (1978); DiBenedetto v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 168 Conn. 587, 589, 362 A.2d 840 (1975); see General Statutes § 4-183 (g). New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 773.

  3. Albini v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd.

    72 A.3d 1208 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013)

    Here, however, there is no such expansive language indicating that the statute sets forth a nonexclusive list.We also find that the board's reliance on Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 561 A.2d 429 (1989), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the court concluded that the legislature's use of the word “operational meeting,” without further providing criteria for determining what activities constituted “operational” or defining the term evinces legislative intent that the agency should define the parameters of the term.

  4. Domestic Violence Services v. F.O.I.C

    47 Conn. App. 466 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 89 times
    In Domestic Violence Servs. of Greater New Haven, Inc., the Freedom of Information Commission argued that a domestic violence services organization was governmentally controlled because the organization's employees were required to meet state certification and confidentiality requirements.

    The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted. See Cos Cob VolunteerFire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104, 561 A.2d 429 (1989); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). "`Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.

  5. Costco v. Department, Consumer Protection

    2004 Conn. Super. Ct. 9167 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    In addition, when the legislature intentionally uses a broad statutory term without definition, it evinces a judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis. Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "The practical construction placed on the statute by the agency, if reasonable, is highly persuasive."

  6. Costco Wholesale v. Department, Consumer

    2004 Conn. Super. Ct. 9473 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

    In addition, when the legislature intentionally uses a broad statutory term without definition, it evinces a judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis. Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "The practical construction placed on the statute by the agency, if reasonable, is highly persuasive."

  7. NEWTOWN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. FOIC

    1997 Ct. Sup. 9998 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)

    Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 165. In Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104 (1989), however, the Supreme Court noted that the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference on the interpretation and construction of a statute, "particularly where . . . the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations." Under either guideline, the court finds it appropriate to leave undisturbed the FOIC's construction of § 10-151c in this case.

  8. Ottochian v. F. O. I. C.

    1991 Ct. Sup. 1829 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991)

    Although neither party argues against this partial redaction, Section 10-151c on its face exempts "records", not material or portions of records. However, in Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co., No. 1 v. FOIC, 212 Conn. 100 (1989), the court upheld an FOIC decision labeling portions of an agency meeting operational, and therefore exempt from public attendance, thus allowing the public to attend those parts of the meeting not deemed operational. Applying the same logic as the Cob case, in the instant case, "records" should be recognized to include portions of records in the same manner that "meeting" can mean portions of a meeting.

  9. Celentano v. Rocque

    282 Conn. 645 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 35 times
    Granting “a drainage easement and right to grade and construct a water retention basin over and upon ... portion of property ... for the purpose of constructing, grading and maintaining a detention basin thereon and for all other purposes connected therewith to detain the flow of storm waters”

    Moreover, the legislature's use of a broad term in an administrative context, without attempting to define that term, "evinces a legislative judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis." Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . .

  10. Furhman v. Freedom of Information Commission

    703 A.2d 624 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 15 times
    In Furhman, the New Milford town council convened an executive session to discuss actions it could take to defeat a permit application that was pending before the Department of Environmental Protection that, if allowed, would have permitted a waste management company to dump 150,000 tons of dredged waste sediments in the New Milford landfill.

    See New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 205 Conn. 774. The commission also argues that defining these terms is best left to the proper administrative agency and cites Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "When the legislature uses a broad term . . . in an administrative context, without attempting to define that term, it evinces a legislative judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis.