Aronow and the commission do claim, however, that the commission's interpretation of the phrase “record of the performance and evaluation” in § 10a–154a should be entitled to some degree of deference because the commission has consistently applied a reasonable construction to similar language found in § 10–151c and the commission applied that same construction to § 10a–154a in the present case. In support of this claim, the commission cites to Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989), and Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398—99, 604 A.2d 351 (1992). In the first of these two cases, this court upheld the commission's interpretation of the term “operational meeting” contained within a statute that, at the time, provided an exemption to the act's open meeting requirement for “[a]ny operational meeting of active members of a volunteer fire department....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
"The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183(j) and is very restricted. See Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104, 561 A.2d 429 (1989); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). . . . [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant. C H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 176 Conn. 11, 12, 404 A.2d 864 (1978); DiBenedetto v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 168 Conn. 587, 589, 362 A.2d 840 (1975); see General Statutes § 4-183 (g). New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 773.
Here, however, there is no such expansive language indicating that the statute sets forth a nonexclusive list.We also find that the board's reliance on Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 561 A.2d 429 (1989), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the court concluded that the legislature's use of the word “operational meeting,” without further providing criteria for determining what activities constituted “operational” or defining the term evinces legislative intent that the agency should define the parameters of the term.
The scope of permissible review is governed by § 4-183 (j) and is very restricted. See Cos Cob VolunteerFire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104, 561 A.2d 429 (1989); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988). "`Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.
In addition, when the legislature intentionally uses a broad statutory term without definition, it evinces a judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis. Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "The practical construction placed on the statute by the agency, if reasonable, is highly persuasive."
In addition, when the legislature intentionally uses a broad statutory term without definition, it evinces a judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis. Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "The practical construction placed on the statute by the agency, if reasonable, is highly persuasive."
Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 165. In Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 104 (1989), however, the Supreme Court noted that the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference on the interpretation and construction of a statute, "particularly where . . . the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations." Under either guideline, the court finds it appropriate to leave undisturbed the FOIC's construction of § 10-151c in this case.
Although neither party argues against this partial redaction, Section 10-151c on its face exempts "records", not material or portions of records. However, in Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co., No. 1 v. FOIC, 212 Conn. 100 (1989), the court upheld an FOIC decision labeling portions of an agency meeting operational, and therefore exempt from public attendance, thus allowing the public to attend those parts of the meeting not deemed operational. Applying the same logic as the Cob case, in the instant case, "records" should be recognized to include portions of records in the same manner that "meeting" can mean portions of a meeting.
Moreover, the legislature's use of a broad term in an administrative context, without attempting to define that term, "evinces a legislative judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis." Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . .
See New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 205 Conn. 774. The commission also argues that defining these terms is best left to the proper administrative agency and cites Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). "When the legislature uses a broad term . . . in an administrative context, without attempting to define that term, it evinces a legislative judgment that the agency should define the parameters of that term on a case-by-case basis.