Opinion
Record No. 0070-93-4
July 20, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY J. HOWE BROWN, JR., JUDGE.
(Dorothy H. Clarke, on briefs), for appellant.
(Jeanne Swanick Lauer, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Ross E. Cory appeals an order of the trial court directing him to pay the full amount of child and spousal support for the month of September 1992. Cory argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hold that Cory was required only to pay a prorated amount of support through September 3, 1992, the date his younger child turned eighteen. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
The agreement required Cory to pay spousal and child support on the first day of each month. The child attained the age of eighteen on September 3, 1992. Cory contends that, under the terms of the agreement, his support obligation ended on the child's eighteenth birthday and did not extend to the end of the month. He argues that the payment due on the first day of September should have been prorated to reflect his liability for support for only three of the thirty days in September. The trial court found, however, that the support agreement, as incorporated into the final decree of divorce, was unambiguous in its requirement that full payment be made on the first of each month until the child reached eighteen. According to the trial court's ruling, the full monthly payment was due on the first of September. Thus, October 1992 was the first month in which support payments were not due.
"Payments required by the original decree of divorce become vested as they accrue and the court is without authority to make any change as to past due installments." Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Va. App. 681, 683, 394 S.E.2d 864, 865-66 (1990). The final decree affirmed, ratified and incorporated the agreement of the parties. Under that agreement, the obligation for the full final payment, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, accrued on September 1, 1992, while the child was still a minor. The trial court correctly held that the agreement was unambiguous, that the right to payment vested on the first day of each month until the child turned eighteen, and that the full payment was due on the first day of September.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's decision.
Affirmed.