Opinion
2:15-cv-00491-JAD-NJK
10-18-2016
Alexander Cortez-Debonar, et al, Plaintiffs v. Betsy Fretwell, et. al, Defendants
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration
ECF No. 29
Former firefighter trainees Alexander Cortez-Debonar and Cal Henrie, Jr. sue the City of Las Vegas, City Manager Betsy Fretwell, and Fire Chief Scott Fuller for a due-process violation and breach of contract to redress their 2013 termination from the City's firefighter academy under suspicion of cheating, allegedly without a proper name-clearing opportunity. Plaintiffs now move me to reconsider my order granting in part and denying in part their motion for summary judgment. Because plaintiffs have given me no valid reason to reconsider my summary-judgment order, I deny the motion.
ECF No 1.
ECF No. 29.
I find this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. L.R. 78-1.
Background
Plaintiffs allege that they were fired after the City publicly accused them of cheating on an exam at the firefighter academy without giving them a pre-termination name-clearing opportunity, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's due-process clause and their union's collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, and defendants countermoved for summary judgment on both claims. I granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion and denied defendants' countermotion. I found that it was not genuinely disputed that plaintiffs were stigmatized and thus were entitled to a name-clearing opportunity, but because plaintiffs were at-will employees, that opportunity did not need to take place before the termination. And, because it was unclear from the record whether plaintiffs' post-termination meeting with city officials satisfied due process, I declined to grant plaintiffs summary judgment on the issue of liability.
See ECF No. 1.
ECF No. 20.
ECF No. 22.
ECF No. 27.
ECF No. 27 at 6-7.
Plaintiffs move me to reconsider that order. They re-urge their argument that a pre-termination hearing is always required as a matter of law and—for the first time—they now argue that, even if a pre-termination hearing was not required, the July meeting was not "reasonably prompt" and therefore failed to comport with due process regardless. For the reasons outlined in my summary-judgment order, I reject plaintiffs' argument that a pre-termination hearing is always required for public employees, and I decline to consider their new argument that the post-termination meeting was not reasonably prompt.
ECF No. 29 at 4-5.
Discussion
A. Standard of review for motions to reconsider
A motion to reconsider must set forth "some valid reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision" by presenting "facts or law of a strongly convincing nature." Reconsideration is appropriate if the court "is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." "A motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments upon which the court has already ruled."
Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2003).
Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1244, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
Brown v. Kinross Gold, U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005).
B. Plaintiffs have given me no valid reason to reconsider my summary-judgment order.
As they did on summary judgment, plaintiffs rely on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vanelli v. Reynolds School District No. 7. Plaintiffs overread Vanelli. Vanelli did not hold that public employees are always entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. Instead, the Vanelli court held that, although "[t]here is a strong presumption that a public employee is entitled" to a pre-deprivation hearing, "a court should analyze whether the timing of a hearing comports with due process given the exigencies and circumstances of any particular case, according to the three-part process outlined in Matthews v. Eldridge." The Vanelli court then applied the Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test to conclude that, on the facts of that particular case (which implicated both a liberty and property interest), a pre-termination hearing was constitutionally required.
Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1982).
Vanelli, 667 F.2d at 778 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319 (1976)).
Id. at 779.
This factual analysis is precisely what was missing from plaintiffs' motion and the record before me on summary judgment. As I noted in denying summary judgment on liability, "I cannot decide based on the thin record before me whether the [post-termination] meeting met the standards of fairness required by the due-process clause." Even if I were to consider plaintiffs' new argument that, even if a pre-termination hearing was not required, the post-termination hearing here was insufficient, I would still deny their motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs make no attempt to analyze the post-termination meeting in light of the Matthews v. Eldridge factors; they baldly argue that, "[r]egardless as to the nature of the meeting," it was not "reasonably prompt." This effort would be wholly insufficient even if it had been raised originally on summary judgment; it is wholly insufficient to persuade me to reconsider my summary-judgment order now.
ECF No. 27 at 8.
ECF No. 29 at 4. --------
Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to reconsider [ECF No. 29] is DENIED.
DATED: October 18, 2016
/s/_________
Jennifer A. Dorsey
United States District Judge