Opinion
23-CV-10551 (LTS)
01-29-2024
CAROLINE CORTES, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM GOTTLIEB MANAGEMENT CO. LLC, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Caroline Cortes, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against Defendant William Gottlieb Management Company, asserting that the company discriminated against her based on a prior unrelated charge and her criminal history.
By order dated December 8, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action by submitting her charge of discrimination, filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“DHR”), as her complaint. The following facts are taken from the DHR charge.
The Court quotes from the charge verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original.
In December 2022, Plaintiff applied for a staff accountant position with Defendant William Gottlieb Management Company, LLC (“William Gottlieb”), located in New York County. Plaintiff and an employee of William Gottlieb negotiated a salary, and a human resources employee, Sandra Droste, offered her a position. After the offer, Plaintiff disclosed to Droste that she had a 2020 conviction for driving under the influence and that her license had been revoked. Upon learning of this information, “Droste became very nervous and scare[d] and excused herself and stated that she was going to call an attorney and she walked out.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Droste returned and stated to Plaintiff, “I dont think this would be a problem, right? I think that people could have those charges.” (Id.) Plaintiff stated that she would provide William Gottlieb with any documents related to her conviction, and Droste stated that she would request a background check. Following this meeting, Plaintiff “never heard from anyone again in the entity and I was obviously discriminated against because of my previous conviction record.” (Id. at 2.)
In Plaintiff's DHR charge, she asserts that William Gottlieb discriminated against her based on a “prior charge unre[ ]lated to position,” and that the company violated Title VII. (Id. at 1.) She does not provide any additional information regarding this prior charge and whether it involves William Gottlieb, or is a reference to her conviction.
DISCUSSION
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This discrimination includes “‘not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation' - that is, practices that have a ‘disparate impact'” on members of a class of people protected by the statute. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
Individuals with a prior criminal history are not protected under Title VII because having a conviction is not a protected characteristic under Title VII, see e.g., Booker v. City of New York, 2017 WL 151625, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017) (collecting cases), but an employer's denial of employment based on an applicant's prior criminal history may be the basis of a disparate impact claim if an employer's use of such history has a disparate impact on an employee who is a member of a protected class, see Mandala, 975 F.3d at 208 (dismissing action, filed by African American applicants asserting that the use of criminal history had a disparate impact on them, for failure to state a claim).
Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under Title VII. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in a Title VII employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Still, the plaintiff need only provide “minimal support for the proposition that the [defendant] was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. at 85 (quotation marks omitted). “In making the plausibility determination, the court must be mindful of the ‘elusive' nature of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
In Plaintiff's DHR charge, she asserts that William Gottlieb discriminated against her based on her conviction for driving under the influence and for her “prior charge unre[ ]lated to position.” (ECF 1, at 1.) These two allegations do not state a claim under Title VII. First, Plaintiff's criminal history is not a characteristic protected under Title VII, and therefore, Defendant's alleged use of this history during Plaintiff's application process does not violate Title VII. Second, the complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff can assert a disparate impact claim under Title VII because she does not assert that she is a member of a class protected under Title VII and that the use of her criminal history disparately affects members of her protected class. Third, Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant discriminated against her based on a prior charge does not include any facts describing the nature of this prior charge or suggesting that Defendant was aware of her prior charge and then retaliated against her by not hiring her.
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to plead facts in support of her Title VII claims. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a disparate impact claim, she must plead facts describing her protected characteristics and the disparate impact caused by the use of criminal history on her protected class. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging retaliation based on her filing a prior charge, she must describe the prior charge and allege facts connecting the charge to Defendant's decision not to hire her.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid Title VII claims, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10551 (LTS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A copy of NYLAG'S flyer with details of its clinic is attached to this order.
Plaintiff may receive court documents by email by completing the attached form, Consent to Electronic Service.
If Plaintiff consents to receive documents by email, Plaintiff will no longer receive court documents by regular mail.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.