Opinion
E083519
05-02-2024
CHRISTINA GLORIA CORREA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; HE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Civil Rights Corps and Katherine Hubbard, Carson White, and Salil Dudani, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Brent J. Schultze, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Super. Ct. No. FVI2300813 Melissa A. Rodriguez, Judge. Petition granted.
Civil Rights Corps and Katherine Hubbard, Carson White, and Salil Dudani, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and Brent J. Schultze, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Christina Correa is facing a charge of murder with an allegation that she used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Her bail was initially set at $1,000,000 per the bail schedule. Following the preliminary hearing, the trial court held a bail hearing, found by clear and convincing evidence that Correa should not be released, and left bail as previously set.
Correa filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court challenging the bail order. Correa contends the trial court violated In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135 (Humphrey) by failing to consider several available less restrictive alternatives to pretrial detention. We construed Correa's petition as a petition for writ of mandate, invited a response, and advised the parties we may issue a peremptory writ in the first instance under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178 (Palma). The People filed a response. They contend habeas corpus, not mandate, is the appropriate way to challenge a bail order; that the trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that Correa should not be released; and that the trial court properly kept bail as set because Correa provided insufficient information about the less restrictive alternatives she requested and did not address the amount of bail she could afford. The People also request that if we conclude the trial court did not make a sufficient record, we should provide guidance and explain what a sufficient record looks like.
We agree with Correa that the trial court did not make the necessary findings under Humphrey. A remand is necessary because the record does not allow for meaningful review, and we cannot say there was overwhelming evidence to support a conclusion that less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the government's interests in public or victim safety. We therefore grant the petition and issue a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the trial court to vacate its bail order, and to hold a new hearing that complies with Humphrey. We express no opinion as to the result the court should reach on remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts presented at the preliminary hearing were as follows: on December 11, 2023, Correa, Charles Malone, and V.R. were drinking alcohol at Correa's father's house. Malone drove V.R. home, and when he returned, Correa was taking a bath. Malone entered the bathroom. Correa got out of the bathtub and began hitting, kicking, and throwing items at Malone to get him to leave. Malone hit Correa in the head, put her on the ground, and began straddling and choking her. He also nibbled on her breast. Correa yelled at Malone to stop. Correa's father came inside from the garage and yelled at Malone to leave. Correa went to the kitchen and grabbed two knives, but then set down one of the knives because it was a bread knife and she wanted a knife with a sharp point. When Correa returned from the kitchen, her father was standing between her and Malone, still yelling at Malone to leave. Correa stabbed the couch and an armchair, and then stabbed Malone once in the chest. Correa's father walked Malone outside. Correa ran to a neighbor's house and called 911. Malone drove to the parking lot of a nearby drugstore where police officers found him in his car, unresponsive. Malone later died from the stab wound.
Following the preliminary hearing, Correa filed a motion for a bail hearing. She argued that pretrial release was appropriate because she was not a flight risk or a danger to the public. She is 37 years old, her only prior conviction was a misdemeanor theft conviction from 2005, and she has strong family ties, as demonstrated by the seven family members who attended the last court hearing. If released, Correa would stay with her brother A.C. and his family. As to the facts of the offense, Correa emphasized that she acted in self-defense, and the fact that she called 911 after the incident and waived her Miranda rights to tell the police what happened showed she was not a flight risk. She also asserted there were less restrictive alternatives available to pretrial detention, including wearing a GPS monitor, imposing a no alcohol or drug use condition, and being monitored by the Probation Department. Finally, she requested that if the court was going to set bail, it do so at a level she could afford.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
The People filed an opposition requesting the court deny bail because Correa committed a violent offense and was dangerous to the public. However, if the court chose to set bail, the prosecutor encouraged the court to leave bail at $1,000,000 per the bail schedule because Correa did not present any evidence of her inability to afford bail. Addressing the facts of the offense, the prosecutor emphasized that Correa was no longer in danger when she grabbed the knife, yet she continued to yell at Malone, then she stabbed a couch and an armchair, and despite her father being in between them, stabbed Malone in the chest. The prosecutor contended Correa's deliberate decision in choosing the weapon and unnecessarily stabbing Malone provides clear and convincing evidence there are no less restrictive alternatives available to protect the public.
The Probation Department prepared a pretrial assessment report which recommended Correa not be released because she was charged with a serious felony, her actions were severe, and public safety was a concern. The report went on to recommend specific conditions of release if the court decided to release Correa.
At the hearing on Correa's bail motion, both parties submitted on their briefing. The court found this was a "particularly difficult case" because Correa "does not appear to have any history of violence or anything along those lines and has a relatively minimal criminal history." However the court found, based on the preliminary hearing transcript, that Correa committed an act of violence, and that murder was "the most serious crime that involves violence to an individual." The court went on to "find[] by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant should not be released, and that bail should remain as set." The court explained that "[w]hile there is no particular section that the Court can rely on in terms of flight risk, the Court will note that in this particular case, the defendant did not have-and I know that you submitted some documentation about a brother that she could possibly reside with, but the Court doesn't have any information in terms of the brother's housing, the brother's history, or anything along those lines to ensure that the public safety factors would be met. [¶] And the Court will note also that probation did not recommend pretrial release. [¶] So at this time, the Court is going to deny pretrial release and keep bail as set."
DISCUSSION
A bail challenge can be raised by habeas corpus (Pen. Code, § 1490), but this is not an exclusive remedy. A bail challenge can also be raised by a petition for writ of mandate when, as here, the issue is purely legal in nature and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. (Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 883, fn. 2 (Yedinak); Gray v. Superior Court (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 636, fn. 3.)
A trial court's bail decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under this standard, the court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. (In re White (2020) 9 Ca1.5th 455, 469-470.)
In Humphrey, the California Supreme Court established a "general framework" for the trial court to follow in making a bail determination. (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 152.) Along with the primary considerations of victim and public safety, the court must consider the seriousness of the charged offense, the arrestee's previous criminal record and history of compliance with court orders, and the likelihood that the arrestee will appear at future court proceedings. (Id. at pp. 152-153.) Where the arrestee does not pose a risk of flight or harm to others, the court may release the arrestee on his or her own recognizance with appropriate conditions. (Id. at p. 154.) "Where the record reflects the risk of flight or a risk to public or victim safety, the court should consider whether nonfinancial conditions of release may reasonably protect the public and the victim or reasonably assure the arrestee's presence at trial. If the court concludes that money bail is reasonably necessary, then the court must consider the individual arrestee's ability to pay, along with the seriousness of the charged offense and the arrestee's criminal record, and-unless there is a valid basis for detention-set bail at a level the arrestee can reasonably afford." (Ibid.) Finally, "if a court concludes that public or victim safety, or the arrestee's appearance in court, cannot be reasonably assured if the arrestee is released, it may detain the arrestee only if it first finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that no nonfinancial condition of release can reasonably protect those interests." (Ibid.) Nonfinancial conditions of release are also referred to throughout the opinion as "less restrictive alternatives." (E.g., id. pp. 143, 152, 156.)
As a matter of procedural due process, Humphrey requires the court to "set forth the reasons for its decision on the record and to include them in the court's minutes." (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 155.) An adequate statement of reasons in the context of a bail determination is one in which the trial court "articulate[s] its evaluative process and show[s] how it weighed the evidence presented in light of the applicable standards." (In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189, 198 (Pipinos).) A statement of reasons is inadequate where "it does not identify the specific facts which persuaded the court that bail would be inappropriate." (Ibid.) "It is insufficient for a trial court to merely state conclusions of ultimate fact which, at best, indicate a check-list approach to the [applicable] standards ....[A] trial court's statement should clearly delineate the basis for its utilization of the applicable standards." (Id. at p. 202.)
Here, the trial court failed to make the necessary findings under Humphrey to support its bail order. As addressed, when a court concludes that money bail is reasonably necessary, Humphrey requires the court to set bail at a level the arrestee can reasonably afford unless there is a valid basis for detention. (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154.) The trial court did not address whether Correa could afford the bail it set, nor did it make the necessary findings to support a detention.
To issue a detention order, Humphrey requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence, that "no nonfinancial condition of release" can reasonably protect the government's interests in public safety and assuring the arrestee's appearance in court. (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154.) In Yedinak, we explained that to comply with this requirement, the trial court "must consider each alternative, less restrictive condition and 'articulate its analytical process as to why such alternatives could not reasonably protect the government's interests.'" (Yedinak, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 885.) Although the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Correa should not be released based on her violent conduct, it did not address the less restrictive alternatives Correa suggested, including GPS monitoring, imposing a no alcohol or drug use condition, and being supervised by the Probation Department, nor did it make a finding that no nonfinancial condition of release could reasonably protect the government's interests.
A review of the record reflects that Correa does not have a history of violence or a significant criminal history. She was drinking alcohol on the night of the offense, and her criminal conduct, though undoubtedly violent, occurred after Malone assaulted her and refused to leave. Correa also called 911 that night, waived her Miranda rights, and admitted to the police that she stabbed Malone. There is a clear basis for the court's finding that Correa committed a violent act, but without an assessment as to why the less restrictive alternatives Correa suggested were insufficient, we are left to speculate why the court believed that no nonfinancial conditions of release could reasonably protect the government's interest in public or victim safety.
The purpose of the requirement that the court provide an adequate statement of reasons to support a bail determination is to afford the defendant the opportunity to challenge an arbitrary decision and to allow the reviewing court "to engage in meaningful review upon being apprised of the analytical process by which the trial court arrived at its conclusions." (Pipinos, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 202; see Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 155-156.) The reviewing court cannot meaningfully review a bail decision when, as here, the trial court's failure to provide an adequate statement of reasons prevents the reviewing court from "determin[ing] with certainty whether or not the court abused its discretion." (Pipinos, at p. 205; see In re Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1105, review granted Mar. 9, 2022, S272632 (Harris) [record does not permit meaningful review when "the court's failure to articulate its evaluative process requires that we speculate as to why the court believed that no nonfinancial conditions could reasonably protect the interests in public or victim safety"].)
There is an "apparent tension" in the law as to whether the failure to provide an adequate statement of reasons is subject to harmless error analysis. (Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.) Like Harris, we need not resolve this apparent tension because the current record does not permit meaningful review and we cannot say there was overwhelming evidence to support a conclusion that the less restrictive alternatives Correa suggested could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. (Ibid.)
Finally, because the court never assessed Correa's ability to pay or the full extent of the less restrictive alternatives she suggested, we decline to reach the People's claims that Correa provided insufficient information about the amount of bail she could afford and the less restrictive alternatives she requested. The People are free to raise these claims with the trial court on remand.
Having followed the procedures and given the notice described in Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 178, we deem this an appropriate matter for issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.) Accordingly, we will remand for the trial court to hold a new bail hearing and make the required findings under Humphrey. (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 154.) We express no opinion as to the result the court should reach on remand.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the respondent court to vacate its January 22, 2024, order setting bail at $1,000,000, and to hold a new bail hearing consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. This decision shall be final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
We concur: MILLER J. CODRINGTON J.