"'In addition to the attorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award,' including, for example, 'affidavits of other local lawyers who are familiar both with the skills of the fee applicants and more generally with the type of work in the relevant community.'" Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 713 (D.Md. 2015) (quoting Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244). Here, Plaintiff submits an affidavit from her attorney, Bryan Chapman, in support of his requested rate of $300 per hour.
(1) [T]he time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 712-13 (D. Md. 2015) (citing McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 n.5). Next, courts "subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones," and, finally, award "some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at 244).
In Corral v. Montgomery Co., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 713 n. 4 (D. Md. 2015), Judge Chasanow noted that the Supreme Court seemed to question the Johnson approach in Perdue, 559 U.S. at 551-52, describing it as an “alternative” to the lodestar method and explaining that it provides too little guidance for district courts and places too much emphasis on subjective considerations. The Supreme Court said, id. at 551: “[T]he lodestar method is readily administrable, and unlike the Johnson approach, the lodestar calculation is objective, and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results.”
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fee awards in similar cases. Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702,712-13 (D.Md. 2015).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (“In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee.”) (emphasis added); Corral v. Montgomery County, 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 721 (D. Md. 2015) (“the terms of Section 1988 do not permit compensation for expert witness fees” in § 1983 action).
McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 n.5. As Judge Chasanow noted in Corral v. Montgomery Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 n. 4, the Supreme Court seemed to question the Johnson approach in Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551-52 (2010), describing it as an "alternative" to the lodestar method and explaining that it provides too little guidance for district courts and places too much emphasis on subjective considerations. The Supreme Court said, id. at 551: "[T]he lodestar method is readily administrable, and unlike the Johnson approach, the lodestar calculation is objective, and thus cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results."
, with Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 721 (D. Md. 2015) (“[T]he terms of Section 1988 do not permit compensation for expert witness fees[ ]” in a Section 1983 action).
(1) [T]he time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 712-13 (D. Md. 2015) (citing McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88, n. 5). Once the undersigned determines the lodestar amount, it “must ‘subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones
This reduction is recommended in view of the time expended on the pre-litigation EEOC proceeding for which the Court recommends compensation, which was work during which counsel developed a factual record and the federal legal theories advanced in this litigation, and in view of the similarity of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims to the evidence and analysis developed before the EEOC. See, e.g., Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 706, 717 (D. Md. 2015) (awarding attorneys' fees for 25 hours expended preparing the complaint in a Section 1983 case).
(1) [T]he time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Corral v. Montgomery Cnty., 91 F.Supp.3d 702, 712-13 (D. Md. 2015) (citing McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88, n. 5)