Opinion
SA-04-CA-0804-RF.
April 4, 2005
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Docket No. 4) and Defendants' Response. After careful consideration and a hearing on this matter on January 26, 2005, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Remand should be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 29, 2004, Plaintiff filed this case in the 408th Judicial District, Bexar County, Texas. Plaintiff filed her First Amended Original Petition on August 17, 2004, alleging that she sustained an injury that resulted in the amputation of some of her lefthand fingers while she was employed by Defendants and acting within the scope of her employment. Plaintiff alleged that she was operating a punch press that had been altered and/or modified by Defendants such that it created an unsafe condition that proximately caused her in jury. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were negligent in modifying the punch press and in failing to provide a safe working environment for Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were liable due to their nonsubscriber status under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act ("TWCA").
Defendants removed Plaintiff's cause of action to this Court based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 (a) as well as 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendants assert that the negligence claims were governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between Defendants and the Industrial Division of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 86780. Defendants further maintain that removal is appropriate because § 301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act ("LMRA") completely preempts Plaintiff's state law negligence claims.
Plaintiff brings this Motion to Remand asserting that removal is improper because there is no evidence that the CBA may properly invoke the preemption provisions of the § 301 of the LMRA. Plaintiff further contends that her negligence claim does not require an interpretation of the CBA and that the CBA is not the exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries to employees.
DISCUSSION
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff's negligence claims is covered by the CBA and preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Article XIV, § 2 of the CBA between the Defendant Friedrich and the employee union AFL-CIO-CLC provides that, "Injury arising out of and in the course of employment will be administered under the provisions of the Friedrich Air Conditioning Company Work-Related Injury Program dated May 15, 1991, Revised July 1, 1993." At the time Plaintiff sustained her injury on April 20, 2004, an amended and restated Program or Plan effective September 2003 had been put in place. The affidavit of Friedrich Safety Manager Chris Iungerich helps clarify the discrepancy between the Program or Plan referenced in Article XIV of the CBA and the Plan in effect at the time Plaintiff was injured. According to Iungerich:
Article XIV, Section 2 of the CBA references a prior version of the Plan, dated May 15, 1991, and revised on July 1, 1993. The current Plan, which was in effect at the time of Ms. Coronel's injury, states that it was `Amended and restated effective September 8, 2003.' The present Plan was amended and restated after the current CBA went into effect on January 15, 2003, which is why the former Plan is identified. The revisions to the Plan from the former to the current related to the appeal procedure; there were no changes made in terms of benefits to injured employees.
The Court finds that the terms of benefits in the two plans remain the same and that the CBA's reference of the outdated July 1993 plan was a minor administrative error. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the uncertainty concerning which plan was in effect is fatal to Defendants' preemption argument. Texas Courts have long recognized that "in the interpretation of contracts the primary concern of courts is to ascertain and to give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument." The parties here in their collective bargaining agreement intended for workplace injuries to be administered by the disability insurance plan, and the error in referencing the expired but substantially similar July 1993 Plan does not render the September 2003 Plan inoperative. The Court, thus, rules that the restated Plan effective September 2003 (the "September 2003 Plan") governs the claims in this matter.
RP Enter. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex. 1980).
In Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the extent to which state law claims are pre-empted by the § 301 of the LMRA. The Supreme Court recognized that Congress' goal to establish uniform federal labor law required that "the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations." The Allis-Chambers Court reasoned that "questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions a rise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort." The decision concluded, "We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law."
471 U.S. 202 (1985).
Allis-Chambers, 417 U.S. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 220 (internal citations omitted).
Two years later in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, a case similar to the matter before this Court, the U.S . Supreme Court again addressed the preemptive force of § 301 of the LMRA. The Court found that a state-law tort claim alleging that the union had breached its duty of care to provide a union member with a safe workplace was not sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand § 301 preemption.
481 U.S. 851 (1987).
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Allis-Chambers and Hechler, this Court recognizes that parties other than the employer may assume a responsibility towards employees by accepting a duty of care through a contractual agreement. In this matter, Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article XV, Safety, §§ 1 and 2 establish that responsibility for workplace safety is shared among employees, the Union, and the Company. In order to determine the Defend ants' liability, the Court would have to interpret the CBA and insurance Plan to ascertain the nature and scope of the duty of care upon the Companies. Because the CBA provides grievance and arbitration procedures and cites provisions in the Plan concerning the benefits available to injured employees such as Plaintiff, it is clear that questions of contract interpretation underlie any finding of tort liability. The Court holds that both Plaintiff's negligence and TWC A claims are inextricably linked to the CBA and that Plaintiff is precluded from evading the preemptive force of LMRA § 301.
Hechler, 481 U.S. at 860.
See CBA Articles VII and VIII; September 2003 Plan p. 1-4.
See id. at 861-62; see Allis-Chambers at 218.
In addition, the Court finds that even though Plaintiff did not sign the Release in order to be a Participant under the Plan, her decision to accept the Plan's benefits constituted her acceptance of the terms of the CBA and the Plan.
See Tigrett v. Heritage Bldg. Co., 533 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court holds that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by LMRA § 301. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Docket No. 4) is DENIED.It is SO ORDERED.