This standard appears to be the majority rule. See Akins v. Glens Falls City School District (1981), 53 N.Y.2d 325, 330, 424 N.E.2d 531, 533, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648; see also Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd. (1992), 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 737 (referring only to the "most dangerous part of the grandstand"). An opinion in the Coronel case was initially filed on November 19, 1991. That opinion was the subject of plaintiff's motion for supplemental authority in this case, which was filed on January 10, 1992.

See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Liability to Spectator at Baseball Game Who Is Hit by Ball or Injured as Result of Other Hazards of Game, 91 A.L.R.3d 24, 39-42 (1979) [hereinafter Rigelhaupt]. The area behind home plate is generally conceded to be the most dangerous area of a ball park. Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 171 Ill.Dec. 917, 919, 595 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1992); Bellezzo, 851 P.2d at 852; Clapman v. City of New York, 63 N.Y.2d 669, 479 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516, 468 N.E.2d 697, 698 (1984); Akins, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 646, 424 N.E.2d at 533. Other jurisdictions have followed variations of the majority rule.

597 N.W.2d 517 (1999) (quoting with approval Justice Cardozo's observation that a baseball spectator accepts the danger of possibly being hit by a ball); Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 45, n 6; 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965) ("[a] spectator's suit is barred . . . by a lack of negligence on the part of the park owner . . . in the ordinary instance of a batted ball flying into unscreened stands"); Blakely v White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 638; 118 N.W. 482 (1908) ("It is knowledge common to all that in these [baseball] games hard balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness; that they are liable to be muffed or batted or thrown outside the lines of the diamond, and visitors standing in position that may be reached by such balls have voluntarily placed themselves there with knowledge of the situation, and may be held to assume the risk."). Plaintiffs argue that two Illinois cases, Yates v Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc, 230 Ill. App.3d 472; 172 Ill Dec 209; 595 N.E.2d 570 (1992), and Coronel v Chicago White Sox, Ltd, 230 Ill. App.3d 734; 171 Ill Dec 917; 595 N.E.2d 45 (1992), have rejected the limited duty rule. However, those cases have been superseded by more recent legislation granting baseball owners limited immunity from liability for spectator injuries.

745 ILCS 80/1(e) (West 2002). In 1992, two cases, Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 734 (1992), and Yates v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 230 Ill. App. 3d 472 (1992), were decided, holding that owners and operators of major league baseball parks owed a duty of reasonable care to protect spectators from injury caused by foul balls, including a duty to construct adequate screening and to warn of the danger. Coronel, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 736-37; Yates, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 482; see also Jasper v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127 (1999).

{19} Some courts have declined to adopt the baseball rule as a per se delineation of reasonable care in baseball cases, or they have adopted the rule with limitations. In Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 171 Ill.Dec. 917, 595 N.E.2d 45 (1992), the plaintiff was seated three seats away from the edge of the protective screen when she looked down into her lap and was stuck by a foul ball. Id. at 46.

See Maloney v. Elmhurst Park District, 47 Ill.2d 367, 370, 265 N.E.2d 654 (1970) (approving of limiting liability as a way to encourage the development and maintenance of parks for recreational purposes). Plaintiff suggests that the Baseball Act was a legislative response to Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 595 N.E.2d 45 (1992), and Yates v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 230 Ill. App.3d 472, 595 N.E.2d 570 (1992). Both cases held that owners and operators of major league baseball parks owed a duty of reasonable care to protect spectators from injury caused by foul balls, including a duty to construct adequate screening and to warn of the danger.

In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that the determination of a breach of duty is a question for the trier of fact and is therefore subject to the manifest weight standard. Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 736 (1992), appeal denied, 146 Ill.2d 625 (1992). Nonetheless, in this case, the jury's finding that defendant inadequately warned plaintiff or otherwise failed to satisfy his duty to the plaintiff is wholly unsupported by the evidence.

( Vesey, 145 Ill.2d at 411; Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill.2d 203, 215.) Whether a duty has been breached, however, is a question of fact best left to the determination of the trier of fact. Curtis v. County of Cook (1983), 98 Ill.2d 158, 163; Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd. (1992), 230 Ill. App.3d 734, 736. • 1 We will first dispose of plaintiff's secondary arguments since those are the only arguments to which defendant has directly responded.

The plaintiff cites the following cases in support of its argument for the court to adopt a broader liability for baseball stadium owners. See Lowe v. California League of Prof. Baseball, 56 Cal.App. 4th 112 (1997) (imposing duty to not increase inherent risks of baseball game involving mascot distraction); Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1992) (holding question of fact whether area behind home plate adequately screened); Jervolino v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., Inc., 212 Pa.Super. 330 (1968) (holding that case should not go to jury when plaintiff does not prove by preponderance of evidence defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in erecting stadium and jury may not speculate); Maytnier v. Rush, 225 N.E.2d 83 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1967) (holding owner of a ballpark does not release himself of liability because there is adequate fenced-in area for the most dangerous part of the stadium); The Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, CT Page 13658 112 Ohio St. 175 (1925) (holding a jury question existed as to whether defendant breached its duty to plaintiff by allowing players to practice near the grand stand during an intermission); Blakely v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635 (1908) (land owner owed duty to plaintiff when plaintiff stuck by ball from throw and catch game on landowner's property). For the most recent case on the i