Opinion
6:21-cv-00148-SB
07-20-2023
JOSE L. CORONADO, Plaintiff, v. KATE BROWN et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jose L. Coronado (“Coronado”), a self-represented litigant formerly in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), filed this action on January 28, 2021, against (former) Governor Kate Brown, ODOC, and several ODOC officials (together, “Defendants”), alleging claims related to Defendants' handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. (See ECF No. 2.)
The Court certified a federal class action alleging similar claims in Maney et al. v. Brown et al., Case No. 6:20-cv-00570-SB. The Court stayed this action pending its class certification decision in Maney, but lifted the stay after certifying the Maney class action. (See ECF Nos. 9, 12.)
Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Coronado's claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). (See Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”), ECF No. 34.) The Court has jurisdiction over Coronado's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, but not all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Coronado pleads these facts in his complaint and the Court assumes they are true for the purpose of deciding this motion. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”).
In his complaint, Coronado alleges that while incarcerated, he was “in constant fear due to knowing people were dying because of C[OVID]-19” and he tested positive for COVID-19 “in June of 2020.” (See Compl. at 5.) Coronado further alleges that ODOC was “not conducting proper [COVID-19] testing before transferring AICs” and that Defendants were “not maintaining proper procedures” (Id.)
Based on the allegations in his complaint, Coronado alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that Defendants were negligent in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See generally Compl.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
I. FAILURE TO OPT OUT OF CLASS ACTION
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Coronado's claims because, inter alia, “his complaint establishes that he is a member of the Damages Class certified in Maney” and he did not opt out of the class action. (Defs.' Mot. at 4-5.) Coronado failed to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss. However, taken as true, Coronado's allegations confirm that he is a member of the Damages Class in the Maney class action. See Maney v. State, No. 6:20-cv-00570-SB, 2022 WL 986580, at *26 (D. Or. Apr. 1, 2022) (granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and defining the “Damages Class” as “[a]ll adults incarcerated in [ODOC] facilities who: (1) were incarcerated on or after February 1, 2020; (2) while incarcerated, tested positive or were otherwise diagnosed with COVID-19; and (3) if they became incarcerated after February 1, 2020, tested positive or were otherwise diagnosed with COVID-19 at least fourteen days after they entered Oregon Department of Corrections custody”).
Coronado also failed to respond to Defendants' attempts to confer prior to filing their motion. (See Defs.' Mot. at 2, noting that Defendants “attempted to confer with Coronado concerning this motion by mailing a draft of the motion to Coronado at his address of record on March 20, 2023, and requesting that he contact Defendants' counsel to confer[ but a]s of the date of this motion, Defendants' counsel has received no communication form Coronado”).
Based on Coronado's status as a Maney class member, the Court should not allow this individual case to proceed because it would lead to “concurrent litigation and potentially inconsistent results.” Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] district court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a[n AIC's] claim . . . where the allegations and relief sought are duplicative of” a related class action because “[i]n that situation, the avoidance of concurrent litigation and potentially inconsistent results justifies dismissal”) (citation omitted); see also Melnichuk v. Wolf et al., No. 120CV00654JLTHC, 2020 WL 4193458, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) (granting the defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiff “invoked[d] the same cause of action and requested relief” and “allege[d] the same facts” related to, inter alia, conditions of confinement and “other health and safety precautions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19” as those in a related class action); Allen v. Crandel, No. C 95-0673 VRW, 1995 WL 392525, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1995) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims related to his conditions of confinement because the plaintiff was a class member of a “pending class action lawsuit” addressing the same issues).
Based on Coronado's status as a Maney class member and because his claims are duplicative of those raised in Maney, the Court recommends that the district judge dismiss Coronado's claims.
II. FUTILITY OF AMENDMENT
Defendants argue that amendment of Coronado's complaint would be futile. (Defs.' Mot. at 9-10.) “In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the district court considers the presence of any of the following four factors: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) futility.” Tadros v. Wilmington Tr., Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. to Citibank, N.A., No. 3:17-cv-01623-AA, 2018 WL 5298144, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2018) (citing Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp.,Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts should weigh the relevant factors “with all inferences in favor of granting the motion”). “Futility of amendment, however, ‘can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.'” Id. (citing Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)). “A proposed amendment is futile if it would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court agrees that amendment would be futile here because, as discussed above, Coronado's claims are duplicative of those raised in Maney and the deadline to opt out of the Maney class action has now expired. See, e.g., Dinkins v. United States, No. 221CV06991CASKES, 2022 WL 15526472, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022) (dismissing the plaintiff AIC's COVID-19 related claims “as duplicative of the [pending] class action” and finding that “th[e] action raises the same claims and seeks the same relief as the [pending] action” and that the plaintiff, “identified as a member of the [pending] class [] will litigate his claims in that action”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 221CV06991CASKES, 2022 WL 15525741 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2022); see also Bennett v. Asuncion, No. 116CV1749AWIMJSPC, 2018 WL 1392894, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (“If the allegations and relief sought are duplicative of the class action, ‘avoidance of concurrent litigation and potentially inconsistent results justifies dismissal.'” (quoting Pride, 719 F.3d at 1137)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that amending Coronado's complaint would be futile.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34), and dismiss Coronado's claims without leave to amend but without prejudice to membership in the Maney class action.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendation to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.