Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-2368-G.
March 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the second motion of defendant, Lancaster Independent School District ("Lancaster I.S.D."), to dismiss some of the claims asserted against it by the plaintiff, Harold B. Cornish ("Cornish"). For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is the second motion to dismiss filed by Lancaster I.S.D. in this action. This case arises out of allegations of employment discrimination made by Cornish against Lancaster I.S.D., his former employer. In his original complaint, Cornish asserted claims of racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; retaliation, in violation of Title VII; age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"); a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII; and defamation. See generally Original Complaint. On the motion of Lancaster I.S.D., this court dismissed Cornish's hostile work environment and defamation claims. See generally Memorandum Order, filed January 24, 2005. In that order, the court granted Cornish leave to replead his hostile work environment claim to correct, if he could do so, the deficiency in his original complaint. Id.
On January 31, 2005, Cornish filed his first amended original complaint ("Amended Complaint"). The amended complaint addressed the hostile work environment claim but also added two new defendants and a new cause of action. On January 31, 2005, this court ordered that the portions of the amended complaint that added the new defendants and the new cause of action be stricken, because Cornish did not have leave to file an amended complaint, other than to replead his hostile work environment claim. Lancaster I.S.D. filed the instant motion on February 10, 2005. Cornish has not filed a response.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal — Failure to State a Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." There are two primary principles that guide the court's determination of whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted. First, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir.) (motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995 (2001). Second, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002); Brown v. Nationsbank Corporation, 188 F.3d 579, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000).
B. Cornish's Amended Hostile Work Environment Claim
As stated in this court's January 24, 2005 memorandum order, "[a] prima facie case of racial harassment alleging hostile work environment normally consists of five elements: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term condition or privilege of employment; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action." Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuela SA, 266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment, the harassment complained of must "be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While "a complaint need not outline all the elements of a claim," a complaint "which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice." Walker, 904 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added). Furthermore, conclusory allegations alone do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8; instead, the pleader must plead specific facts. See Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989).
Lancaster I.S.D. argues that Cornish's amended complaint "still fails to provide . . . notice of the grounds upon which his hostile work environment claim is based and upon which [Cornish] claims to be entitled to relief." Defendant Lancaster Independent School District's Second Motion for Partial Dismissal for Plaintiff's Failure to State a Claim and Brief in Support ¶ 4. The court agrees.
In the amended complaint, Cornish makes only conclusory allegations of harassment, and nowhere in his complaint does he describe with any level of specificity a single event in which the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe. Moreover, the factual allegations laid out in the amended complaint provide that the alleged harassment was based upon a discrimination action he filed against his former employer, and not his race. Amended Complaint ¶ 2.07 ("Over the period [Cornish] was employed by the LISD Police Department, Chief Headen and notably Nannette Vick, President of the LISD Board of Trustees, harangued [Cornish] regarding his suit against the Dallas Police Department and continually demanded that Plaintiff redress his issue with his former employer."); Id. ¶ 2.13(4) ("Over the period of [Cornish's] employment with [Lancaster I.S.D., Cornish] was continuously harassed by [Lancaster I.S.D. and its employees] to redress [Cornish's] suit against his former employer, the Dallas Police Department. . . ."); Id. ¶ 5.02 (same).
Even if the amended complaint is construed liberally, and all facts pleaded therein are viewed as true, Cornish still fails to adequately allege that he suffered "sufficiently severe and pervasive" harassment during his term of employment. Moreover, the amended complaint specifies that the alleged harassment was based, not upon Cornish's race, but upon his failure to redress his legal dispute with his former employer. Therefore, Lancaster I.S.D.'s motion to dismiss should be granted, and Cornish's claim of a hostile work environment is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Lancaster I.S.D.'s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Cornish's claim of a hostile work environment based on Title VII is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.