Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:03-CV-2811-G
April 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendants Correctional Services Corporation ("CSC"), Anthony King ("King"), Francisco Garcia (Garcia"), Jack Patton ("Pattern"), Paul Donnelly ("Donnelly"), James Slattery ("Slattery"), and Henry Wilson ("Wilson") to dismiss the claims of the plaintiff Harold Cornish ("Cornish") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The Lyle B. Medlock Treatment Center ("Medlock") is a juvenile correctional facility located in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff's Original Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint") ¶ 7. Dallas County owns Medlock. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Response") at 2. After Medlock was built, the Commissioners Court of Dallas County determined that Dallas County "should abrogate its government responsibilities, duties and functions to operate a jail for the incarceration of juvenile offenders and delegate this function to the Defendants." Complaint ¶ 7. CSC contracted with Dallas County to operate Medlock. Id.
Cornish was certified by the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission to work as either a juvenile detention officer or a juvenile correctional officer. Response at 2. Cornish also was certified to act as a Texas police officer. Id. at 2-3. On February 17, 2000, CSC hired Cornish to work at Medlock as a correctional officer. Response at 2.
The complaint states that CSC hired Cornish on February 20, 2002. See Complaint ¶ 8. However, the correct date is February 20, 2000. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2.
King, Wilson, Garcia, Patton, Donnelly, and Slattery were guards, supervisors, and wardens at Medlock. Complaint ¶ 6. Each of these individuals supervised Cornish. Id.; Response at 2.
On September 30, 2000, Cornish reported to the defendants and to the Texas Youth Commission that CSC, while operating Medlock during the preceding six months,
(a) [had] failed to provide adequate staffing for the juvenile facilities dedicated to the treatment of drug users and offenders housed and incarcerated at the Lyle B. Medlock facility;
(b) that the juvenile inmates were being administered medication(s) that had not been prescribed by physicians;
(c) that the inmates were not provided with adequate and/or appropriate medical care;
(d) that the inmate facilities were not been [sic] properly cleaned and maintained;
(e) that the inmates were not provided with appropriate educational materials and teachers; and,
(f) that numerous persons were permitted to work as correctional officers and supervisors when they were not legally qualified and/or before they were certified or trained or submitted evidence of their educational background.
Complaint ¶ 9.
On December 5, 2000, Cornish reported to CSC supervisors Sgt. Williams and Sgt. Singleton-Davis that a correctional officer named Tamesha Davis-Jackson ("Davis-Jackson") had assaulted Josiah Munoz, a juvenile inmate, without cause or justification. Id. ¶ 10. Davis-Jackson allegedly stabbed Munoz in the hand with a ballpoint pen. Id. Cornish subsequently reported this incident to CSC officers, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, or Child Protective Services ("CPS"), and the Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse. Id. On December 28, 2000, Cornish faxed a letter to King, a Medlock administrator employed by CSC, which outlined the assault on Munoz. Id. ¶ 11. On January 3, 2001, Davis-Jackson angrily confronted Cornish. Id. During that altercation, Davis-Jackson told Cornish that CPS had investigated her regarding her treatment of her own children. Id. Davis-Jackson warned Cornish that if CPS took her children from her, she would "do something" to Cornish. Id. Cornish reported this threat to CSC supervisors. Id. Shortly thereafter, Davis-Jackson left her job at CSC. Id.
On December 30, 2000, a correctional officer named Ford threatened another correctional officer named Roberson with a knife. Id. ¶ 12. Cornish and Roberson reported this attempted assault to Dallas County Juvenile Department supervisors, as well as to Donnelly and King. Id. No action was taken. Id.
On or about January 5, 2001, Wilson asked Cornish to meet with King and Wilson before Cornish left work. Id. ¶ 13. Cornish met with King, Garcia, and Wilson. Id. King told Cornish that he was displeased that Cornish had reported Davis-Jackson's conduct. Id. Wilson admitted that Davis-Jackson was his friend, and that he did not like the fact that Cornish had reported her actions to state authorities. Id.
On January 14, 2001, Cornish received a performance evaluation from Sgt. Williams. Id. Sgt. Williams rated Cornish as exceeding performance requirements. Id. ¶ 14. During his conference with Cornish, Sgt. Williams informed Cornish that Wilson was trying to find a way to terminate Cornish's employment. Id.
In September 2001, Cornish filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labor because CSC supervisors had failed to pay Cornish and three other CSC employees for overtime hours worked but not paid. Id. ¶ 15.
On or about October 19, 2001, Cornish learned that CSC was planning to rehire Davis-Jackson. Id. ¶ 16. Cornish reported this decision to a member of the Dallas County Commissioners Court. Id.
On November 2, 2001, a correctional officer named Ruiz was removed from the Medlock chemical dependency dorm before Cornish's shift ended. Id. ¶ 17. By law, three staff members are required for a 24-member juvenile residence while the chemical dependency dorm inmates are awake. Id. Ruiz's departure resulted in an insufficient number of staff on duty in the chemical dependency dorm. Id. On November 6, 2001, Cornish filed a written complaint with the Texas Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse alleging that he was punished "for trying to prevent a violation of law because the chemical dependency unit, by law, cannot be understaffed." Id. On November 7, 2001, the defendants reprimanded Cornish for remaining on duty on November 2, 2001. Id.
On November 20, 2001, King terminated Cornish's employment with CSC "because of [Cornish]'s reports of misconduct to the appropriate State and local officials that had been committed by the individual Defendants and/or employees and supervisors of [CSC]." Id. ¶ 18. Cornish counters that he "had complied with his obligations as a correctional officer and/or juvenile detention officer by reporting the violations of law that he had observed while he was charged with the duty to guard, protect and supervise juvenile offenders." Id. ¶ 20. Specifically, Cornish had reported various acts of criminal misconduct, including child abuse, child neglect, criminal assault, insufficient jail staffing, and failure to pay overtime. Response at 3-4.
On November 19, 2003, Cornish filed the instant case, in which he seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. Cornish contends that the defendants' termination of his employment was an act of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Complaint ¶ 21. Cornish further maintains that the defendants violated these rights while acting under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 19, 21.
II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standards Applicable On Motion To Dismiss
A motion under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Norman v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). The court should also give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint, rather than dismiss it, if it appears that a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597-99 (5th Cir. 1981).
B. Claims Under § 1983
To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986), and Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)).
The defendants maintain that because each defendant is a private party not acting under the color of state law, Cornish has failed to state a valid claim under § 1983. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint at 2-4. Thus, the defendants assert that, as private parties, they "can not [sic] suppress `First Amendment' rights or violate the `due process' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 2. Moreover, the defendants maintain that Cornish has failed to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law with regard to any of the employment decisions complained of by Cornish. Id. at 4. The defendants conceded, in their reply to Cornish's response to their motion to dismiss Cornish's claims against them, that
in providing a traditional state function for the Dallas County Juvenile Probation Department ("DCJPC") (namely, correctional and rehabilitative services for juveniles in the custody of the DCJPC), they are subject to suit under Section 1983 for civil rights violations that arise out of the performance by the Defendants of those services. However, the relevant inquiry . . . is not whether the Defendants acted under "color of state law" in providing services to DCJPC, but rather, whether the Defendants acted under "color of state law" in their role as Plaintiff's former employer in making the decision to discharge Plaintiff from employment in November, 2001.
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Reply at 3 (emphasis in the original).
Generally, the fact that CSC is a private entity contracted to operate a government-owned correctional facility does not preclude § 1983 liability of CSC or its employees. See Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) ("We have . . . said many times, that actions of private entities can sometimes be regarded as governmental action for constitutional purposes."); Rosborough v. Management Training Corporation, 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("We agree with the Sixth Circuit and with those district courts that have found that private prison-management corporations and their employees may be sued under § 1983 by a prisoner who has suffered a constitutional injury.") (emphasis added); see also Roberson v. Thomas, No. 3:00-CV-2326-M, 2001 WL 391598, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2001), report and recommendation adopted by, 2001 WL 493139 (N.D. Tex. May 07, 2001); Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and Center, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 498, 501-02 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
As noted, under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive him of the rights he asserts were violated. West, 487 U.S. at 48. Thus, in the instant case, the alleged wrongful activity — termination of Cornish's employment — is not actionable under § 1983 unless it was taken with state action. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1081 (1997).
The Supreme Court has outlined various tests to determine if a private party has become a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 938-39 (1982). The Fifth Circuit has summarized these tests as follows:
According to the public function test, a private entity acts under color of state law when the entity performs a function which is "exclusively reserved to the state." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-58, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (internal quotations omitted); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989). The state compulsion (or coercion) test holds the state responsible "for a private decision only when [the state] has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the nexus or state action test finds state action where the state has "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private actor] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974); see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982).Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Rosborough, 350 F.3d at 461.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that state action will not be attributed to a private enterprise unless the government actually compels the private action or unless it has vested in the private group the right to exercise a function that is an exclusive prerogative of sovereignty. See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 155-61; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 350-54 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972). Cornish has not pled that the government compelled the defendants to act or that the state had any involvement in CSC's decision to terminate Cornish's employment. Nor Cornish has alleged that the defendants engaged in any behavior that is exclusively reserved to the state or that they acted to assist the state in any land of arranged manner. A private corporation such as CSC, even if performing a public function by running a correctional facility, is not liable for its employment decisions under § 1983. George, 91 F.3d at 1230-31.
Accordingly, in the absence of state action which can be attributed to the decision to terminate Cornish's employment, Cornish has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the defendants' motion to dismiss Cornish's claims against them is GRANTED, and this case is therefore DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.