¶ 10. A trial judge has “broad discretion in passing on the extent and propriety of questions that are addressed to the venire.” Corner v. State, 744 So.2d 793, 796 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 651 (Miss.1996)). However, this broad discretion is not without limit.

See, e.g., Morris v. State, 204 Md.App. 487, 42 A.3d 83, 85 (2012) (approving inquiry as to prospective jurors’ ability to be fair and impartial notwithstanding their expectations, based on media depictions of court proceedings, regarding the evidence to be presented); Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 990 N.E.2d 528, 536-37 (2013) (approving a voir dire question about jurors’ attitudes toward the prosecution's failure to present DNA or fingerprint evidence, but cautioning that such inquiry should be used "sparingly"); Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 652-53 (Miss. 2009) (holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it allowed voir dire about prospective jurors’ ability to "listen to the evidence and not speculate" about the absence of DNA or fingerprint evidence); Corner v. State, 744 So. 2d 793, 794-96 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the trial court properly allowed voir dire questioning as to whether prospective jurors "could not even consider finding a defendant guilty in an armed robbery case unless and until the State actually showed [them] the weapon that was used"). In this case, the State charged defendant with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).