Cornell v. Superior Court

24 Citing cases

  1. Barber v. Municipal Court

    24 Cal.3d 742 (Cal. 1979)   Cited 90 times
    Finding a violation of the right to counsel and prejudice from the violation; see fn. 8, ante

    To afford him those benefits it is essential that he should be allowed to consult with his counsel, not only during the actual trial, but prior thereto, in order to prepare for his defense. . . . It is equally essential to the enjoyment of this constitutional guarantee that the accused should have the right to a private consultation with his counsel. . . . `If the right of defense exists, it includes and carries with it the right of such freedom of action as is essential and necessary to make such defense complete. In fact, there can be no such thing as a legal trial, unless both parties are allowed a reasonable opportunity to prepare to vindicate their rights. . . . It therefore necessarily follows that it is the absolute right of parties charged with crime to confer privately with their attorneys. . . .'" ( In re Rider (1920) 50 Cal.App. 797, 799-800 [ 195 P. 965]; accord In reJordan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 930, 941 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 849, 500 P.2d 873]; Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99, 102-103 [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116]; In re Qualls (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 330, 331 [ 136 P.2d 341]; In re Snyder (1923) 62 Cal.App. 697, 699-700 [ 217 P. 777].) The right to counsel, which embodies the right to private consultation with counsel, is violated when a state agent is present at confidential attorney-client conferences.

  2. People v. Lopez

    60 Cal.2d 223 (Cal. 1963)   Cited 162 times
    In Lopez, this court rejected the contention, explaining that " in special circumstances [the state may] have cogent reasons for keeping confidential in order to give some assurance that the truth can be presented the names of prospective witnesses.

    In addition one accused of the commission of crime has the right to private consultation with his counsel before trial. ( Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99, 102 [2] [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116].) [4] But these rights to counsel in pretrial stages are granted primarily to insure early representation and adequate preparation for trial.

  3. People v. Guerra

    37 Cal.3d 385 (Cal. 1984)   Cited 161 times
    Listing "common examples of decisions that do not establish a new rule of law"

    Over 60 years passed before hypnosis was again at issue in a decision of this court. In Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99, 102 [ 338 P.2d 447], the counsel for a defendant awaiting trial sought a writ of mandate to compel the sheriff to allow an expert hypnotist to examine his client in jail for the purpose of learning his whereabouts on the night of the crime. This court granted the writ on the ground that the defendant's constitutional right to counsel includes the right to consult before trial with his attorney and the latter's right to a reasonable opportunity to discover facts in order to prepare a defense.

  4. People v. Mabry

    71 Cal.2d 430 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 32 times

    An accused's right to counsel, of course, includes the right to consult with his counsel. ( Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [77 L.Ed. 158, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527]; Cornell v. SuperiorCourt, 52 Cal.2d 99, 102 [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116]; People v. Miller, 185 Cal.App.2d 59, 77 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 91].) Here it does not appear that defendant was denied that right. Rather it appears that defendant and the public defender differed on trial tactics and that the judgment of the public defender was fully vindicated when defendant, after discharging the public defender, recross-examined several prosecution witnesses and indicated the nature of the testimony he expected to elicit from other witnesses who were subpoenaed at his request.

  5. People v. Superior Court (Howard)

    69 Cal.2d 491 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 164 times
    Approving of section 1385 dismissal due to "[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"

    "[1a] Is mandate permissible to review the determination made under this section? We think not. Generally speaking, the writ of mandate is issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, duty, or station where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1086; Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross, 61 Cal.2d 199, 203 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 425, 390 P.2d 193]; Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 99, 103-104 [ 338 P.2d 447].) Ordinarily the granting of this relief lies in the discretion of the court (see Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross, supra, 61 Cal.2d 199, 203; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) pp. 2472 et seq.).

  6. In re Ketchel

    68 Cal.2d 397 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 28 times

    ( Id. at p. 231.) Our ruling in Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99 [ 338 P.2d 447], also supports defendant's position. When an attorney there sought to compel the prison authorities to allow examination of his client by a hypnotist, the prosecution resisted on the basis that the hypnotist's testimony would be inadmissible at trial.

  7. Maine v. Superior Court

    68 Cal.2d 375 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 158 times
    In Maine v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d 375, prosecuting attorney and defense counsel were opponents in an upcoming election.

    We deemed mandate a proper procedure to require a trial court to give a defendant before trial an opportunity to inspect and copy statements made by him to law enforcement officers ( Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407]; Powell v. Superior Court (1957) 48 Cal.2d 704, 707 [ 312 P.2d 698]) and to have the benefit of discovery of other prosecution evidence ( Funk v. SuperiorCourt (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423 [ 340 P.2d 593]). Mandate has been considered appropriate to compel a trial court to permit hypnotic examination of a defendant in order to adequately prepare for trial ( Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99 [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116]); to compel dismissal of a criminal action not brought to trial within the time required by law ( Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55 [ 285 P. 699]); to compel dismissal where a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial ( Zamloch v. MunicipalCourt (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 260 [ 235 P.2d 25]); and on two occasions reviewing courts have employed mandamus to require transfer of a case from one court to another ( Gomez v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 640 [ 328 P.2d 976]; Smith v. Municipal Court (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 534 [ 334 P.2d 931]). [1] The common thread woven through the foregoing examples of mandamus antedating trial is the responsiveness of appellate tribunals when initiative is required to protect a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.

  8. People v. Maddox

    67 Cal.2d 647 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 76 times
    In People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 371, 433 P.2d 163], a pre- Faretta and - Windham case, we held that a defendant who was granted the right to represent himself was entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for trial if necessary.

    [3] In short, just as a defendant may not be brought to trial too late (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, §§ 686, 1382; Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) 386 U.S. 213 [18 L.Ed.2d 1, 87 S.Ct. 988]), he may also not be brought to trial too soon, i.e., without adequate opportunity for preparation of his defense (see, e.g., In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 790 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116]; Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99, 102-103 [ 338 P.2d 447]; In re Ochse (1951) 38 Cal.2d 230, 231 [ 238 P.2d 561]; People v. Sarazzawski (1945) supra, 27 Cal.2d 7, 17; cf. People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 434 [38 Cal.Rptr. 384, 392 P.2d 964]). Implementing this rule, the Legislature has provided that "After his plea, the defendant is entitled to at least five days to prepare for trial."

  9. In re Poe

    65 Cal.2d 25 (Cal. 1966)   Cited 7 times

    We disapprove of this practice, which jeopardizes a prisoner's right to private consultation with his attorney without the presence of law enforcement officers, even though within the confines of a jail. (See Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99, 103 [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116], and cases cited.) [4] Petitioner testified that during the preliminary hearing on August 3, 1962, he asked Mr. Miller whether the confession would be valid if it had been made unwillingly, and that the latter replied, "It wouldn't be wise to question it or for you to take the stand and deny it being voluntary."

  10. Ballard v. Superior Court

    64 Cal.2d 159 (Cal. 1966)   Cited 224 times
    Stating that the jury should not hear a sex offense charge until a qualified physician testifies as to his examination of the female victim's mental state and social history

    " ( People v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 195.) [3] Although this court may issue a writ of mandamus to enforce the right to counsel or the right to consult with counsel (see Cornell v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 99 [ 338 P.2d 447, 72 A.L.R.2d 1116]; Vasquez v. District Court of Appeal (1963) 59 Cal.2d 585 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 467, 381 P.2d 203]), petitioner does not now suffer deprivation of counsel. At this juncture we are no more called upon to review the trial court's refusal to suppress petitioner's statements upon the ground that its ruling violated his constitutional right to counsel than we are required to resolve any other issue as to the admissibility of evidence.