If the plaintiff was the procuring cause of that sale, he was entitled to the commission. Farmers Union CoOperative Gin v. Hollis, 151 Okla. 134, 2 P.2d 951; Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Dowdy, 177 Okla. 386, 60 P.2d 757; Artlin Realty Co. v. Glass, 170 Okla. 588, 41 P.2d 471; Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243. Defendant Association would not permit plaintiff to offer for sale the property at a lower price, but it completed the sale through Carlock to plaintiff's client at a lower price, $16,500, together with some improvements agreed by it to be made.
We are of the opinion, and hold, that there is competent evidence of an agreement to sell the property and to pay the plaintiff 5 per cent. commission on any amount of $7,500 or over. In Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243, the court stated: "In an action for commission as agent on sale of real estate, where the plaintiff alleges the contract of agency in his petition, but such petition does not allege a contract as to the amount of the commission to be paid, but says that he is entitled to the customary fee paid in that community, and the evidence shows the value defendant placed on his land when he traded the same, and that the ordinary and customary commission, as shown by the evidence, based on said valuation of defendant's land, is the amount for which the court rendered judgment, such judgment was proper."
There are numerous cases of this court holding the same. See Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243; Rosenfield et al. v. Nelson, 102 Okla. 81, 226 P. 1032; Stuart et al. v. Mathews, 104 Okla. 105,230 P. 696; Treese v. Shoemaker, 80 Okla. 235, 195 P. 766; Kerr et al. v. Parris, 115 Okla. 268, 242 P. 170. 2.
Defendant cites decisions of this court in support of said proposition, but upon consideration of said cases we do not consider the same to be squarely in point. However, in the case of Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243, this court had under consideration a case very similar to the one at bar, and in passing upon said case, announced the following rule: "Where an owner of real property lists the same for sale with an agent, and such agent by his efforts brings a purchaser to the seller, with whom he begins negotiations, which at no time are entirely discontinued until a sale is consummated, and during which time the agent informs the seller that he will assist him at any time in closing the trade, and, though at all times during the negotiations said introducing agent was easily accessible to the seller, he never at any time requested any assistance from such agent, but called on another agent, who assisted him in making the sale and to whom the seller paid a commission, held, that under these facts the introducing agent is entitled to receive his commission."
It is also proved that the sale was consummated. In order to entitle plaintiffs to a commission, it is necessary that plaintiffs show that through their exertions the buyer and seller were brought together and that negotiations for the sale of the property were begun. Roberts v. Markham, 26 Okla. 387, 109 P. 127; Cantrell v. McLemore, 119 Okla. 176, 249 P. 417; Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243; J. L. Lemmon Co. v. Oppenheimer, 155 Okla. 209, 8 P.2d 679. The plaintiffs contend that they were the efficient and procuring cause of the sale, and after reviewing the record it appears that there is some merit in this contention.
Whether or not the plaintiff was authorized to sell the property at the time she began negotiations for the sale with Hill and Jackson, whether or not the plaintiff was the first to bring the proposition of the sale of the property to the attention of Hill and Jackson, whether or not the sale was made to Hill and Jackson, and whether or not the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale of the property, were questions of fact to be determined by the jury from the evidence presented. See Roberts v. Markham, 26 Okla. 387, 109 P. 127; Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243; Harris v. Owenby, 58 Okla. 667, 160 P. 596, and Stuart v. Mathews, 104 Okla. 105, 230 P. 696. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in the giving of instruction No. 9, in that the jury was thereby led to assume that the court meant thereby that the facts showed that the defendant had not acted in good faith with the plaintiff.
The issue raised as to whether or not there was a contract of employment was settled by the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs. Stroup, Guardian, v. Brittian, 105 Okla. 276, 232 P. 814; Stewart v. Ludlow, 127 Okla. 144, 259 P. 835; Cornell v. Howe, 131 Okla. 299, 269 P. 243. The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court thereon established the contract.