Opinion
39262.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 1962.
Libel, etc. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge McWhorter.
Aaron Kravitch, for plaintiff in error.
Hitch, Miller, Beckmann Simpson, Luhr G. C. Beckmann, Jr., contra.
A petition for damages for alleged libel, based on a letter written by the general manager of the corporate defendant to the Employment Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor, which does not affirmatively or by necessary implication negative the fact that the letter was written in connection with the administration of the laws which the agency is charged with administering is subject to general demurrer.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 1962.
Cameron Cornell sued Coastal Broadcasting, Inc., and Donald K. Jones, its general manager, to recover damages allegedly due by reason of a letter written for the corporation by Donald K. Jones as agent for the corporation which was alleged to be libelous. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of plaintiff's petition alleged: "9. That immediately after his discharge your petitioner received a letter from Donald K. Jones in which said defendant stated: `We regret that you will no longer be with us.' That on the day following receipt of said letter, petitioner received carbon copy of a report by Donald K. Jones, on behalf of Coastal Broadcasting, Inc., to the Employment Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor, to the effect that petitioner had been discharged for the following reasons: `Dismissed due to failure to come to work on time . . . refusal to follow instructions, and general carelessness.' That said report to the Georgia Department of Labor, was false and untrue, altogether contradictory to the previous letter to the petitioner, was malicious and libelous, and of great and personal damage to the petitioner. 10. That on August 12, 1960, four and one-half months after the discharge of petitioner, Donald K. Jones, on behalf of Coastal Broadcasting, Inc., again wrote to the Employment Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor, without cause, solicitation or inquiry, and without having any further personal contact with petitioner, stating that petitioner had been discharged because of: `a. His refusal to follow instructions, which in the opinion of the management was detrimental to the company's position in the community. b. His repeated failure to come to work on time. c. His complete disregard of company policy.' Petitioner submits that this unsolicited and uncalled-for letter was even more malicious and untrue than the previous report to the Georgia Department of Labor, and that it amounted to an overt act, and an effort not only to further damage petitioner's reputation and professional standing and future, but was an additional effort to deprive him of the financial assistance due him because of his past regular payments from his own earnings to the Employment Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor. 11. Said letter and previous report by Donald K. Jones to the Georgia Department of Labor did result in delay of payment to petitioner of unemployment security funds due him during his unemployment, said delay resulting in harm and deprivation to him and to his family." The court sustained the defendants' general demurrer to the petition and the plaintiff excepted.
The act of 1941 (Ga. L. 1941, p. 548), and the act of 1945 (Ga. L. 1945, pp. 331, 332), ( Code Ann. § 54-642.1) provide: "All letters, reports, communications or any other matters, either oral or written, from the employer or employee to each other or to the Employment Security Agency or any of its agents, representatives or employees which shall have been written, sent, delivered, or made in connection with the requirements of the administration of this Chapter, shall be absolutely privileged and shall not be made the subject matter or basis for any suit or slander or libel in any court of the State of Georgia." This law gives absolute privilege to employer and employee for communications made "in connection with the requirements of the administration" of the pertinent provisions of law. There are no express allegations in the petition that the communication alleged to be libelous was not made in connection with the administration of the law and the allegations in paragraph 10 of the petition that the communication was made "without cause, solicitation or inquiry" do not necessarily mean that the communication was not made in connection with the administration of the law, especially in view of the allegation in paragraph 11 that the communication by Donald K. Jones to the Georgia Department of Labor did result in delay of payments to petitioner of unemployment security funds due him during his unemployment. In cases of absolute privilege malice and bad faith are immaterial. Atlanta News Publishing Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714 ( 51 S.E. 756, 3 LRA (NS) 1139). See also Brantley v. Heller, 101 Ga. App. 16 ( 112 S.E.2d 685).
The court did not err in sustaining the defendants' general demurrers to the petition.
Judgment affirmed. Bell and Hall, JJ., concur.