Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIC458540, Robert Schnabel, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Ian L. Cormier, in Pro. Per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Arthur K. Cunningham and Rosemary Koo for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Ian L. Cormier appeals after a judgment was rendered in favor of defendant and respondent County of Riverside (County). Plaintiff sued for alleged false arrest and violation of his civil rights; the court below granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s allegations failed to demonstrate any liability on the part of the County. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is a convicted sex offender who must register with the police agency where he lives. On August 30, 2006, plaintiff was arrested by police officers in Torrance, California, for failure to register. Plaintiff asserts that he told the arresting officers that he had registered with the Moreno Valley Police Department, but the Torrance officers arrested him anyway. Plaintiff was later released without apparent charges.
Plaintiff filed a complaint naming the Moreno Valley Police Department as the sole defendant. The complaint alleged that Torrance police officers arrested him and told him that he would be subject to felony charges for failure to register. The prosecutor allegedly dropped the charges “over 35 days” later, and plaintiff was released. Plaintiff asserted that these incidents constituted false arrest and violation of his civil rights. He sought $80,000 plus punitive damages.
The County answered, alleging it had been erroneously named and served as the Moreno Valley Police Department. The County noted that none of the operative allegations involved any conduct by the County or its employees.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment without, however, including any separate statement of undisputed facts, affidavits, evidentiary matters or points and authorities in support of the motion.
The County opposed plaintiff’s motion and filed its own motion for summary judgment. The County pointed out that plaintiff’s claims rested upon the actions of the Torrance Police Department in arresting plaintiff, holding plaintiff on charges in Los Angeles County, and the later decision of the Los Angeles County prosecutor to dismiss the charges without trial. In addition, to the extent plaintiff attempted to plead tort claims against the County, plaintiff had failed to file a claim under the tort claims act before filing suit. As to plaintiff’s purported federal claims for violation of his civil rights, plaintiff had failed to allege any particular conduct by the County. In any event, even if County employees had done some particular act—for example, following the procedures in place for registering sex offenders in the County—plaintiff had failed to show that the County employees had acted pursuant to some official policy which violated the constitution. (See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690 (Monell).)
The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment. The court therefore granted judgment in favor of the County. Plaintiff appeals.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
After a motion for summary judgment has been granted, an appellate court “examine[s] the record de novo and independently determine[s] whether [the] decision is correct. [Citation.]” (Colarossi v. Coty U.S. Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149.) In doing so, we use the same three-step process employed by the trial court. First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the moving party’s showing establishes facts sufficient to negate the opposing party’s claims, and to justify judgment in the moving party’s favor. If so, third, we determine whether the opposing party has raised a triable material issue of fact. (Dawson v. Toledano (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 387, 392.)
B. Step One—Issues Tendered by the Pleadings
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that his arrest and detention by Torrance police officers, and his release 36 days later when charges were dropped, constituted false arrest and a violation of his civil rights. The false arrest claim sounds in tort. The civil rights violation presumably is intended to state a cause of action under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (§ 1983).
The complaint named no individual defendants, but only a public entity, the Moreno Valley Police Department. Evidently, the County contracts to provide police services for the municipality of Moreno Valley. Plaintiff did not sue the Torrance Police Department or any of the officers who arrested him, nor the prosecuting agency in Los Angeles County which initially charged him (apparently resulting in pretrial incarceration) and then released him.
The complaint is very sparse; to the extent it alleges facts in support of a section 1983 claim, it must be predicated on a Monell theory, as no individual defendants are named. Under Monell, municipal liability may be established in one of three ways. First, a municipality may be liable when one of its employees commits a constitutional deprivation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or pursuant to a practice which is “standard operating procedure.” (Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. (1989) 491 U.S. 701, 737; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik (1988) 485 U.S. 112, 127.) Second, municipal liability may be established by showing an official with final policy-making authority expressly authorized an unconstitutional policy or gave an unconstitutional order. (Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469, 480; Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 694.) Third, municipal liability may be established by proof that the official with final policy-making authority had a policy of inaction and such inaction amounted to a failure to protect constitutional rights. (City of Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 388-389.)
C. Step Two—The County Was Entitled to Judgment in Its Favor
The County’s moving papers showed that the acts complained of were committed by Torrance police officers, not any employees of the County. In addition, plaintiff had failed to file a tort claim with the County.
Plaintiff was arrested for failure to register as a sex offender. The County’s moving papers indicated that, although plaintiff had requested an appointment in Moreno Valley to register, he had never followed through with the actual registration. The County’s records showed that plaintiff was not registered in Moreno Valley or anywhere else, from January 1, 2006, to August 30, 2006, the date of plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff finally completed his registration on October 17, 2006, well after the date of his arrest.
As to the federal civil rights claim, the County provided evidence of its policies and practices to demonstrate that there was no unconstitutional act committed as a matter of policy or practice of the County. All County law enforcement officers received strict training and supervision to ensure that they carried out their duties efficiently, promptly and competently. In terms of sex offender registration, the County’s policy was to require the registrant to make an appointment, as the registration itself is a fairly involved process, requiring a commitment of some time. The identity of the registrant must be verified, a face-to-face interview is conducted, forms must be completed, admonitions and warnings must be given and acknowledged or initialed, and the registrant is photographed, fingerprinted and palm printed. Making an appointment to register is not registration, “just as making an appointment to take a driving test does not constitute the issuance of a driver’s license.”
This showing was sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff’s complaint did not state a cause of action against this defendant, that plaintiff would be unable to show compliance with the required procedures before filing a state law tort claim, and that the County had no unconstitutional policy or practice that violated plaintiff’s civil rights. Thus, the County was entitled to judgment in its favor on the sole causes of action purportedly stated in the complaint.
D. Step Three—Plaintiff Failed to Raise a Triable Issue of Material Fact
Plaintiff’s opposition to the County’s motion for summary judgment (as well as the papers supporting his own motion for summary judgment) effectively admitted that plaintiff had never filed a tort claim with the County (plaintiff stated that he could not find a form to file). Plaintiff submitted no evidence or any statement of facts to dispute that he had not completed his registration before October 2006. In fact, he blamed a Moreno Valley police detective for not completing his registration on time. Plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence of an unconstitutional policy or practice on the part of the County which resulted in the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights (arrest and detention for over 35 days).
DISPOSITION
Plaintiff failed to raise any triable issue of material fact to show that this defendant was liable in any manner for the alleged wrongs. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and appellant County of Riverside. The judgment in favor of the County is affirmed. The County is awarded its costs on appeal.
We concur: RICHLI, Acting P. J., GAUT, J.