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holding that false arrest and malicious prosecution claims are barred if the criminal proceedings were not terminated in the plaintiff's favor
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15 Civ. 1800 (KPF)
06-22-2015
ROYCE CORLEY, Plaintiff, v. CYRUS R. VANCE, JR., et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND :
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest and other claims arising out of his arrest on state charges. He further seeks to proceed under a pseudonym in this matter. Plaintiff is directed to amend his complaint (the "Complaint") for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York; that court transferred the matter here. See Corley v. Vance, No. 15 Civ. 232 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Royce Corley is currently incarcerated at F.C.I. Danbury, having been convicted in this District on federal charges involving sex trafficking of minors and possession of child pornography. See United States v. Corley, No. 13 Cr. 48 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014), appeal pending, No. 14-1709 (2d Cir.). In January 2015, Plaintiff filed the Complaint, alleging constitutional violations and violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), the Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA"), and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims over which he asks this Court to exercise diversity and supplemental jurisdiction. Named as defendants are: New York County District Attorney ("DA") Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., and DA's Office personnel David Stuart, John Temples, Greg Weiss, and Elizabeth Pederson; New York Police Department ("NYPD") officers Brian Conroy, Michael Daly, Mark Woods, Jessica Sterling, Giancarlo Cavallo, and Greg Smith; Mayor's Office of Special Enforcement ("OSE") counsel Shari C. Hyman; and various private individuals and entities, including Consolidated Edison ("Con Ed") employees Michael T. Haggerty and Walter Panchyn, Backpage.com, LLC, Sprint Nextel Corp., T- Mobile USA Inc., Facebook Inc., Google Inc., Time Warner Cable Inc. ("TWC"), Research in Motion Ltd. ("RIM"), the Municipal Credit Union ("MCU"), Capital One N.A., JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., and several John Doe defendants.
On April 21, 2015, following the death of United States District Judge Robert P. Patterson, Jr., the criminal case was reassigned to United States District Judge Alison Nathan. Pending before her is Plaintiff's pro se motion for bail pending appeal.
The Complaint sets forth the following facts: In 2007, Plaintiff "was informally doing business under the nom de guerre 'Ron Iron' providing advertising and web development services to escort, therapeutic and adult-oriented businesses." (Compl. ¶ 22). In 2008, Plaintiff began working as a technician for Con Ed. (Id. at ¶ 23). In 2009, an individual who had been convicted of promoting prostitution "vindictively" forwarded to law enforcement false information implicating Plaintiff in illegal activity. (Id. at ¶ 26). In consequence, law enforcement: (i) induced a minor to work as a confidential informant and prostitute to manufacture evidence against Plaintiff; (ii) tampered with advertisements appearing on Backpage.com by "altering 'AdOid' posted by other individuals, or created by the defendants"; and (iii) used fabricated evidence to obtain court orders, subpoenas, and warrants. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29, 39-41). Accordingly, "despite using a warrant, defendants had no probable cause" to obtain access to Plaintiff's accounts, search his apartment and Con Ed office, or seize his cell phones, electronic media, and credit cards. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47).
Plaintiff asserts that he "has not been provided with any court orders, subpoenas, warrants or notices in relation to any of these disclosures. (Complaint ¶ 26). Backpage.com is alleged to have "aided and abetted" law enforcement "by granting them unlimited access to password-protected accounts without the proper legal authority," and the other private entity defendants are alleged to have provided law enforcement with Plaintiff's records, e-mails, and instant messages. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 38, 60-62). Plaintiff was indicted in this Court on January 22, 2013. See No. 13 Cr. 48 (Dkt. #1). The state charges were dismissed on February 1, 2013, which Plaintiff characterizes as a favorable termination. (Id. at ¶¶ 46). Plaintiff was convicted in this District on April 21, 2014.
Transcripts filed in Plaintiff's criminal case indicate that the New York County District Attorney's Office obtained Plaintiff's records pursuant to court orders and gave the material to federal prosecutors before the state charges were dismissed. See United States v. Corley, No. 13 Cr. 48 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (Transcript of Pretrial Conference, Dkt. #5 at 3; Trial testimony, Dkt. #43 at 29-32 and 44-45, Dkt. #45 at 14).
Plaintiff asserts federal claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure, malicious abuse of process, conspiracy to violate due process, fabrication of evidence, and violations of the rights to a speedy trial and to privacy, as well as state law claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. (Compl. ¶¶ 72-84). Plaintiff alleges that the private defendants conspired with state actors to violate his constitutional rights and also failed to train their employees properly with respect to releasing customer information. Plaintiff further asserts that the private defendants violated federal statutes that limit disclosure of electronic records and communications. (Id. at ¶¶ 60-63). Plaintiff seeks money damages. Plaintiff has also moved to proceed under a pseudonym, "[g]iven the highly sensitive and personal nature of this suit" involving "the prostitution of minors" and the "risk identification poses for retaliation and further personal embarrassment to Plaintiff and innocent non-parties." (Dkt. #6 at ¶¶ 4-5).
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's complaint does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires a plaintiff to make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." It is not enough for a complaint to state that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). A complaint must include "factual enhancement" of the plaintiff's legal claims; in other words, a complaint must include some background information about how the defendant harmed the plaintiff. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Supreme Court has held that this rule requires a plaintiff to plead a claim that is "plausible" in light of the facts alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "[T]o present a plausible claim at the pleading stage, the plaintiff need not show that [his or her] allegations . . . are more likely than not true." Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 184 (2d Cir. 2012). Instead, a complaint must include sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544).
The Complaint is not a "short and plain" statement of his claims. Any amended complaint that Plaintiff files must include specific facts explaining what each defendant did or failed to do and how those actions violated his rights. Additionally, Plaintiff must address the substantive deficiencies set forth below.
B. Section 1983 Claims Implicating the Invalidity of Plaintiff's Conviction
As pleaded, Plaintiff's speedy trial, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims are barred because his criminal proceedings were not terminated in his favor. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 486-87. Thus, the putative plaintiff's § 1983 claim must be evaluated on the following basis:
[The Court] must consider whether a judgment in favor of plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the [Court] determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,
the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to suit.Id. at 487; see also Duamutef v. Morris, 956 F. Supp. 1112, 1115-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Plaintiff asserts that the dismissal of the state charges brought against him constitutes a favorable termination. However, Plaintiff was prosecuted federally for the same conduct, and later convicted. Where, as here, "the Federal and State actions are inextricably intertwined and substantially related to one another," the Heck rule applies to bar Section 1983 claims based on the dismissed state charges. Bogle v. Melamed, No. 09 Civ. 1017 (RJD), 2012 WL 1117411, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting Thompson v. Delvalle, No. 07 Civ. 4691 (BSJ), 2010 WL 2505638, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010)); cf. Thompson v. Grey, No. 08 Civ. 4499 (JBW), 2009 WL 2707397, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 26, 2009) (finding false arrest claim barred where second grand jury shown new evidence from subsequent investigation of same crime scene indicted after first grand jury refused to indict); Peros v. Castano, No. 01 Civ. 4457 (JG), 2002 WL 603042, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2002) (holding that termination is favorable to plaintiff if court's reasons for dismissing the criminal charges are not inconsistent with innocence of the accused, citing Cantalino v. Danner, 96 N.Y.2d 391, 395 (2001)). In this case, Plaintiff was arrested on federal charges arising out of the same events and conduct underlying the state charges. In this context, the dismissal of the state charges is not a favorable termination. Thompson, 2010 WL 2505638, at *3.
Given that there has not been a favorable termination, the Court now examines whether any of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims might be able to proceed notwithstanding the conviction because they do not implicate the validity of that conviction. Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim necessarily implicates the validity of his conviction. See Montane v. Pettie, No. 10 Civ. 4404, 2012 WL 1617713 (ARR), at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012); Davis v. New York, No. 90 Civ. 6170 (MBM), 2003 WL 1787151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (dismissing speedy trial claim where plaintiff could not show that his conviction had been invalidated); see also Zarro v. Spitzer, 274 F. App'x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of claims raising questions about plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because such claims implicate the validity of conviction). That claim is therefore dismissed.
Favorable termination is a prima facie element of a malicious prosecution claim. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-86. Accordingly, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim is dismissed.
Plaintiff may, however, be able to assert certain of his Fourth Amendment claims. In narrow circumstances, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7. "Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery ... and especially harmless error, ... such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful." Id. (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991)).
To determine if a Section 1983 claim alleging an unlawful search would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, the Court must "ascertain whether plaintiff could have been convicted even if the ... evidence [from the allegedly illegal search were] suppressed[.]" Bibbins v. Nextel Comm., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5075 (CM), 2010 WL 4503120, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2010); see also Zarro, 274 F. App'x at 35-36 (reversing in part the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims on Heck grounds and holding that plaintiff's illegal search claims would not imply the invalidity of his conviction); Bogle, 2012 WL 1117411, at *3; Jean-Laurent v. Hennessey, No. 05 Civ. 1105 (JFB), 2008 WL 3049875, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) ("Heck does not bar plaintiff's claim for ... unreasonable search and seizure"); Powell v. Scanlon, 390 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Conn. 2005) (claims for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, such as where the "conviction is obtained by independent evidence untainted by the wrongful arrest").
Here, the factual record is insufficient to determine whether evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly unlawful arrest was essential to plaintiff's conviction. See, e.g., Fifield v. Barrancotta, 353 F. App'x 479, 481 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (remanding to the district court to determine the applicability of Heck to the appellant's Fourth Amendment claims). However, in this context, "to recover compensatory damages, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that a search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, does not encompass the 'injury' of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned)." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)). Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered an actual, compensable injury beyond his conviction and imprisonment. At this early stage, however, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims cannot be dismissed based on Heck.
A review of the criminal docket reveals no litigation regarding the validity of warrants or subpoenas or the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to court orders.
C. Other Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants, several of whom are private actors, conspired to violate his constitutional rights. A plaintiff asserting constitutional violations under Section 1983 must allege a deprivation of federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). The Court may dismiss a complaint that fails to allege state action. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir.) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to include allegations of state action in complaint), modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition, to obtain damages, Plaintiff must allege facts showing each Defendant's personal involvement in violating his constitutional rights. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] plaintiff must establish a given defendant's personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.").
To state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (i) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity (ii) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and (iii) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages. See Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002) ("A merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity."); see also Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A private individual may be subject to liability under [Section 1983] if he or she willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the deprivation of the federal right."); Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 894 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Conspiracy claims are "so easily made and can precipitate such protracted proceedings with such disruption of governmental functions" that detailed fact pleading is required. Bender v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (quoting Angola v. Civiletti, 666 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1981)). "Assertions lacking factual foundation ... are merely conclusory allegations and are insufficient to state a claim." See Jackson v. County of Rockland, 450 F. App'x 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (quoting Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)); Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy were "baseless" where plaintiff "offer[ed] not a single fact to corroborate her allegation of a 'meeting of the minds' among the coconspirators."); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing complaint in part because claims were "unsupported, speculative, and conclusory" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff wholly fails to allege specific facts that would plausibly show the existence of an agreement or concerted action among the named Defendants. The Complaint does not describe either the nature of the purported agreement or the specific acts in which Defendants allegedly engaged in furtherance of an agreement. See Martinez v. Queens Cty. Dist. Atty., No. 12 Civ. 6262 (RRM), 2014 WL 1011054, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (dismissing Section 1983 conspiracy claims against Verizon N.Y. and T-Mobile). Indeed, Plaintiff's allegations against private defendants consist primarily of conclusory accusations that they provided law enforcement with records in response to allegedly invalid court orders, subpoenas, or warrants, or that they illegally ("without proper legal authority") provided access to his account information.
Mere compliance with court orders does not constitute action under color of state law. See, e.g., Martinez, 2014 WL 1011054, at *15 ("Plaintiff's bald assertions that there was a conspiracy between state actors and Verizon N.Y. and T-Mobile to illegally wiretap him, without more, are insufficient to plausibly allege that these private defendants were acting under the color of state law."); Barroga-Hayes v. Susan D. Settenbrino, P.C., No. 10 Civ. 5298 (RJD), 2012 WL 1118194, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (noting that pro se plaintiff "suggests erroneously that the issuance of and compliance with" a subpoena transforms private defendants into state actors); Melnitzky v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 06 Civ. 13526 (JGK), 2007 WL 1159639, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2007). Moreover, there are no allegations suggesting that the private defendants knew the subpoenas or other court orders were invalid or had reason to question their validity. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) ("A search warrant that has been issued by a neutral magistrate is presumptively valid."). Accordingly, these allegations do not state a claim for relief.
Additionally, Plaintiff's allegations that the private defendants failed to train their employees properly regarding the release of customer records do not state a claim. As just discussed, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting the private defendants had reason to question the legality of the court orders under which Plaintiff's information was released. In any event, failure to train is a theory of municipal liability under Section 1983, not of private liability; a "municipality can be liable for failing to train its employees where it acts with deliberate indifference in disregarding the risk that its employees will unconstitutionally apply its policies without more training." Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-90 (1989)); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). There is no analogous failure-to-train theory that would apply to the private defendants and, in any event, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the private Defendants violated his constitutional rights by releasing his data.
D. Statutory Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims for civil damages under federal statutes governing access to wire, oral, and electronic communications. But the cited statutes contain defenses for releasing records pursuant to a court order and/or explicitly provide that such releases do not state a cause of action. The Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520, contains an exception for service providers that assist law enforcement pursuant to a court order, id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii), and also provides that a good faith reliance on a court order is a complete defense to civil or criminal charges, id. § 2520(d)(1). Both the DPPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), and the RFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 3402, contain law enforcement exceptions, and the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), provides that a governmental entity seeking information from a service provider must comply with specific legal process or obtain the subscriber's consent.
Plaintiff alleges not that the private Defendants turned material over without a warrant or subpoena, but that they did so in response to allegedly invalid court orders. However, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts suggesting that the private Defendants either violated the cited statutes or would not be protected under the statutory defenses. Without supporting facts, these allegations do not state a claim for relief.
E. State Law Claims
Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims under both the Court's diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and its supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. To establish diversity jurisdiction under Section 1332, the plaintiff must allege to a "reasonable probability," that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000 — the statutory jurisdictional amount. See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, diversity of citizenship must be complete; in other words, "no plaintiff and no defendant [may be] citizens of the same State." Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998).
For purposes of determining the Court's diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction, a prisoner retains his pre-incarceration domicile, rather than establishing a new domicile where he is incarcerated. See LoCurto v. LoCurto, No. 07 Civ. 8238 (NRB), 2008 WL 4410091, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008); Poucher v. Intercounty Appliance Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 926 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (noting prisoner is allowed an opportunity to show that he has satisfied the prerequisites for establishing domicile in his place of incarceration).
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Connecticut, but it is not clear where Plaintiff was domiciled before his incarceration or that he intended to change his domicile. All Defendants appear to be citizens of New York. If Plaintiff was domiciled in New York before his incarceration, and he has not manifested an intention to change his domicile, diversity is lacking in this case.
The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2000) (directing dismissal of supplemental state-law claims where no federal claims remained). Plaintiff's original pleading fails to state federal claims against the private Defendants. Should Plaintiff's amended complaint fail to remedy the deficiencies discussed in this Order, the Court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims against the private Defendants and dismiss them from the action entirely.
F. Motion to Proceed Pseudonymously
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties[.]" "This requirement ... serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2008). The use of a pseudonym by a plaintiff in civil litigation "must be balanced against both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 189. When determining whether a litigant can proceed under a pseudonym, the following nonexhaustive list of factors should be considered:
[i] whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and [of a] personal nature[;] [ii] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the ... party [seeking to proceed
anonymously] or even more critically, to innocent non-parties[;] [iii] whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of those harms, including whether the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity[;] [iv] whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in light of his age[;] [v] whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of private parties[;] [vi] whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press his claims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at any particular stage of the litigation, and whether any prejudice can be mitigated by the district court[;] [vii] whether the plaintiff's identity has thus far been kept confidential[;] [viii] whether the public's interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his identity[;] [ix] whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants' identities[;] and [x] whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff.Id. at 190 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted (alterations in original). "[T]his factor-driven balancing inquiry requires a district court to exercise its discretion in the course of weighing competing interests[.]" Id.
Plaintiff's conviction is a matter of public record. While arguments may be made as to some of the factors mentioned above, figuratively speaking, the cat is already out of the bag. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that government officials and entities violated his rights and contributed to an unjust conviction and a miscarriage of justice. Such allegations are a matter of public concern. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circumstances here are not sufficiently extraordinary to outweigh the presumption in favor of public access. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is denied, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate docket entry 6.
On May 19, 2015, before the Court ruled on Plaintiff's motion to proceed under a pseudonym, Plaintiff submitted a "complaint supplement" containing personal data. (Dkt. #13). The Clerk of Court docketed that document as "court view only." The Court will either consider restricting access to individual documents or revisit this issue as needed. --------
G. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Complaint to detail his claims. In the statement of claim, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant named in the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any "John Doe" defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any "John Doe" defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the Complaint; therefore, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. The motion to proceed under a pseudonym is denied without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate docket entry 6. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 15-CV-1800 (KPF). An Amended Complaint for Civil Rights is attached to this order for Plaintiff's convenience. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED. Dated: June 22, 2015
New York, New York
/s/_________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
A copy of this Order was mailed by Chambers to:
Royce Corley
06811-054
FCI Danbury
33 1/2 Pembroke Rd.
Danbury, CT 06811 __________ (In the space above enter the full name(s) of the plaintiff(s).)
-against-
__________ (In the space above enter the full name(s) of the defendant(s). If you cannot fit the names of all of the defendants in the space provided, please write "see attached" in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed in the above caption must be identical to those contained in Part I. Addresses should not be included here.) AMENDED COMPLAINT
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jury Trial: [ ] Yes [ ] No
(check one)
___ Civ. __________ ( )
I. Parties in this complaint:
A. List your name, identification number, and the name and address of your current place of confinement. Do the same for any additional plaintiffs named. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. Plaintiff's Name__________
ID#__________
Current Institution__________
Address__________ B. List all defendants' names, positions, places of employment, and the address where each defendant may be served. Make sure that the defendant(s) listed below are identical to those contained in the above caption. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. Defendant No. 1 Name __________ Shield #__________
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 2 Name __________ Shield #__________
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 3 Name __________ Shield #__________
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 4 Name __________ Shield #__________
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________ Defendant No. 5 Name __________ Shield #__________
Where Currently Employed __________
Address __________
II. Statement of Claim:
State as briefly as possible the facts of your case. Describe how each of the defendants named in the caption of this complaint is involved in this action, along with the dates and locations of all relevant events. You may wish to include further details such as the names of other persons involved in the events giving rise to your claims. Do not cite any cases or statutes. If you intend to allege a number of related claims, number and set forth each claim in a separate paragraph. Attach additional sheets of paper as necessary. A. In what institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ B. Where in the institution did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ C. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claim(s) occur?
__________ D. Facts:__________
III. Injuries:
If you sustained injuries related to the events alleged above, describe them and state what medical treatment, if any, you required and received. __________ IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Administrative remedies are also known as grievance procedures. A. Did your claim(s) arise while you were confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility?
Yes ___ No ___If YES, name the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where you were confined at the time of the events giving rise to your claim(s). __________ B. Does the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose have a grievance procedure?
Yes ___ No ___ Do Not Know ___C. Does the grievance procedure at the jail, prison or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose cover some or all of your claim(s)?
Yes ___ No ___ Do Not Know ___D. Did you file a grievance in the jail, prison, or other correctional facility where your claim(s) arose?
If YES, which claim(s)?
__________
Yes ___ No ___E. If you did file a grievance, about the events described in this complaint, where did you file the grievance?
If NO, did you file a grievance about the events described in this complaint at any other jail, prison, or other correctional facility?
Yes ___ No ___
__________F. If you did not file a grievance:
1. Which claim(s) in this complaint did you grieve?
__________
2. What was the result, if any?
__________
3. What steps, if any, did you take to appeal that decision? Describe all efforts to appeal to the highest level of the grievance process.
__________
1. If there are any reasons why you did not file a grievance, state them here:
__________
2. If you did not file a grievance but informed any officials of your claim, state who you informed, when and how, and their response, if any:
G. Please set forth any additional information that is relevant to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.__________
__________Note: You may attach as exhibits to this complaint any documents related to the exhaustion of your administrative remedies.
V. Relief:
State what you want the Court to do for you (including the amount of monetary compensation, if any, that you are seeking and the basis for such amount). __________
VI. Previous lawsuits:
A. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this action?
Yes ___ No ___B. If your answer to A is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another sheet of paper, using the same format. )
1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:__________3. Docket or Index number __________ __________4. Name of Judge assigned to your case__________
Plaintiff __________
Defendants __________
2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county) __________
5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit __________
6. Is the case still pending? Yes ___ No ___
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition__________
C. Have you filed other lawsuits in state or federal court otherwise relating to your imprisonment?
7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?) __________
Yes ___ No ___D. If your answer to C is YES, describe each lawsuit by answering questions 1 through 7 below. (If there is more than one lawsuit, describe the additional lawsuits on another piece of paper, using the same format. )
1. Parties to the previous lawsuit:__________3. Docket or Index number __________ __________4. Name of Judge assigned to your case__________
Plaintiff __________
Defendants __________
2. Court (if federal court, name the district; if state court, name the county) __________
5. Approximate date of filing lawsuit __________
6. Is the case still pending? Yes ___ No ___
If NO, give the approximate date of disposition__________
7. What was the result of the case? (For example: Was the case dismissed? Was there judgment in your favor? Was the case appealed?) __________
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signed this ___ day of __________, 20___.
Signature of Plaintiff __________
Inmate Number __________
Institution Address __________ Note: All plaintiffs named in the caption of the complaint must date and sign the complaint and provide their inmate numbers and addresses. I declare under penalty of perjury that on this ___ day of __________, 20___, I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities to be mailed to the Pro Se Office of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Signature of Plaintiff: __________