Opinion
Civil No. 00-2425 (JAF).
December 20, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Antonio Cordova-Gonzalez brings this action against Defendant Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, a United States District Court Judge for the District of Puerto Rico, in his personal capacity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993). Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights and seeks compensatory damages.
Given the nature of the accusations in the pleadings, we review, sua sponte, the jurisdictional basis of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (1994 Supp. 1999). See White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[A] court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no further if such jurisdiction is wanting.").
In 1996, Congress amended the code provision governing in forma pauperis proceedings. Although the amendment significantly modified the section and changed its enumeration from 1915(d) to 1915(e), those elements relevant to this Opinion and Order remained unaltered. We, thus, will refer to section 1915(e) throughout our discussion.
I. Factual and Procedural Synopsis
On June 1, 1995, Plaintiff pled guilty to four counts of drug-trafficking related charges. Subsequently, on October 20, 1995, Defendant sentenced Plaintiff to 108 months of imprisonment, a fine of $15,000, and a Special Monetary Assessment of $200.
On April 30, 1997, Plaintiff filed a habeas corpus petition to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994).
On November 8, 2000, Plaintiff filed the present complaint in forma pauperis contending that Defendant's failure to rule on Plaintiff's section 2255 petition in a timely fashion violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. V and VIII. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's personal animus against him motivates Defendant's alleged unlawful inactivity. Thus, Plaintiff concludes that judicial immunity does not protect Defendant from this suit.
Defendant dismissed Plaintiff's section 2255 petition on November 30, 2000.
II.
A. The Standard to Dismiss Under Section 1915(e)
Pursuant to section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code, a court should dismiss a complaint proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A court which is determining whether to dismiss a pro-se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) should liberally construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor by applying "less stringent standards than [those utilized for] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). As part of a section 1915(e) assessment, a district court must give "the plaintiff the benefit of all the suggested facts and must indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Rodriguez, 943 F.2d at 107. Nevertheless, for a plaintiff's claim to survive even under these less stringent standards, he should supply sufficient information about the asserted facts and the asserted legal basis of the claim to enable the court and opposing parties to identify them. Feliciano v. DuBois, 846 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D. Mass. 1994); see also Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) that Conley (noting dismissal of complaint is appropriate if "it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief'"); Rodriguez, 943 F.2d at 107 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)) ("If the complaint . . . reveals `arguably meritorious legal theories whose ultimate failure is not apparent at the outset,' . . . then the court should permit the action to proceed.").
The section provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that — (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (1994 Supp. 1999)
The Supreme Court has held that "courts may dismiss in forma pauperis complaints sua sponte without notice under § 1915[(e)] if the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual allegations that are clearly baseless, e.g., ones that describe `fantastic or delusional scenarios.'" Forte v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28) The Court has declined to define precisely what are "fantastic or delusional scenarios," Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (noting, however, that facts alleged should be irrational or wholly incredible to be considered "fantastic or delusional"), deferring instead to the judgment of lower courts. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328.
The First Circuit generally permits pro-se litigants wide berth in drafting and amending complaints. See, e.g., Futura Dev. of P.R. v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 144 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1998) (complaint alleging numerous violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, federal civil rights statutes, and tortious interference with contractual relationships under Puerto Rico law merited notice and opportunity to respond); Fredyma v. ATT Network Sys., Inc., 935 F.2d 368, 370 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (claim alleging wrongful discharge in breach of employment contract not fantastic or delusional scenario);Forte, 935 F.2d at 3 (alleged section 1983 claim for altering trial transcript not indisputably meritless); Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 826 (1st Cir. 1991) (alleged Eighth Amendment claim based on purported deliberate indifference to plaintiff's need for protection from other inmates' threats and assaults not "hard-core frivolousness"); Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1990) (alleged Eighth Amendment claim not sufficiently frivolous and deserved notice and opportunity to cure);cf. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d at 110 (claim alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act necessarily fruitless and frivolous because belatedly filed).
B. Absolute Judicial Immunity
The United States Supreme Court has held that "`[f]ew doctrines [are] more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.'" Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989). This exemption applies regardless of the reasons motivating a judge's actions in the course of performing his judicial duties. See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871)). "Only judicial actions taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction will deprive a judge of absolute immunity." Cok, 876 F.2d at 2.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant did not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's section 2255 petition. Rather, Petitioner contends that Defendant's delay in resolving the application violated Petitioner's constitutional rights. We find that such a complaint falls clearly within the absolute immunity doctrine. Cf.,e.g., Abdurrahman v. Reno, No. 92-5516, 1993 WL 403992, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 1993) (finding that judge's consideration of habeas corpus petition is immune from damages suit); Presley v. Glyn, No. 86-6668, slip op. at 1 (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 1987) (same); Turner v. Fuerst, No. 86-3911, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 1987) (same).
III. Conclusion
Although we are cognizant of First Circuit case law encouraging district courts to dispose of cases on their merits, see Ortiz-Anglada v. Ortiz-Perez, 183 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1999), we find that there is no set of facts in this case which Plaintiff could plead that could pierce the formidable shield of absolute judicial immunity. Hence, this court does not have federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) to entertain this kind of claim against a sitting federal district court judge protected by judicial immunities principles.
In accordance with the foregoing, we DISMISS Plaintiff's complaint,Docket Document No. 1. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (encouraging district courts to dismiss complaints against immune defendants pursuant to section 1915(e) so as to "discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits")
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 20th day of December, 2000.
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE U.S. District Judge