¶ 103 Although we concluded that the Pierce Deeds unambiguously conveyed the subsidence rights in all of the parcels, even assuming, arguendo that those rights were not expressly conveyed in the Pierce Deeds, the rights were automatically conveyed as a matter of law because the Source Deeds—which are in the chain of title to the Pierce Deeds—conveyed the subsidence rights in all the parcels. See Corcoran v. Franklin County Coal Co. , 249 Ill. App. 551, 553 (1928) (release from liability for damages for injury to surface set forth in a deed runs with the land and is binding on subsequent surface owners); see also Rocking M. Ranch, Inc. v. Sahara Coal Co. , 217 Ill. App. 3d 162, 164-65, 160 Ill.Dec. 166, 576 N.E.2d 1120 (1991) (waivers of subjacent support by predecessors in title are recognized and upheld); Beloit Foundry Co. v. Ryan , 28 Ill. 2d 379, 388, 192 N.E.2d 384 (1963) (rights appurtenant to real estate are transferred automatically by conveyance of the land, even if not expressly mentioned, and the servient estate continues to be subject thereto until the right is terminated or abandoned); Parrish v. City of Carbondale , 61 Ill. App. 3d 500, 504-05, 18 Ill.Dec. 779, 378 N.E.2d 243 (1978) (covenants concerning land and enjoyment thereof run with the land, pass with ownership, and are binding on subsequent owners). Notably, the Pierce Deeds reference the chain of title by adding information from the Source Deeds at the end of every lega
Plaintiff contends defendant had no standing to raise the affirmative defense of the restrictive covenant since it was not a party to that covenant. (See Corcoran v. Franklin County Coal Co. (4th Dist. 1928), 249 Ill. App. 551.) Further, plaintiff argues the intervenors' counterclaim must be dismissed because they failed to appear by their counsel in the second trial.