Opinion
1:18-cv-0186
11-15-2021
JOHN L. CORBIN, Plaintiff v. DR. REKHA HALLIGAN, DANIEL STROUP, MS. BLAIR, MS. CHUZIE, MR. LOCK, JERRY SMOCK, MS. LINDER, MS. THARP, MS. GUNTHER, MR. CLARK, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
ECF NO. 90
ECF NO. 92
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
This matter is before the undersigned for Report and Recommendation on Defendant Jerry Smock's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 90) and Defendant Rekha Halligan's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 92). See ECF No. 14. It is respectfully recommended that both motions be GRANTED.
II. Introduction
Plaintiff John L. Corbin (“Corbin”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), asserted civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against ten members of the medical staff at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, Pennsylvania. Id. This Court dismissed Corbin's claims against seven of those Defendants, Blair, Chuzie, Lock, Linder, Tharp, Gunther, and Clark, with prejudice, and those Defendants have been terminated from this action. See ECF Nos. 44, 50, 52, 68. Corbin's claims against Defendants Smock, Halligan, and Stroup were also dismissed, but the dismissal of certain claims against these Defendants was without prejudice and with leave to amend. Id. Corbin filed an Amended Complaint on June 30, 2021. ECF No. 89. Defendants Smock, Halligan, and Stroup again have moved to dismiss the claims against them. See ECF Nos. 90, 92. Corbin has filed a Response in Opposition to the motions. (ECF No. 97). The matter is ripe for disposition.
II. Standard of Decision
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, a court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Corbin is representing himself, the allegations in his Amended Complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag, 454 U.S. At 354; United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d at 555. With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to its analysis and discussion of the Amended Complaint and the Defendants' motion.
III. The Amended Complaint
Corbin was granted leave to amend the following claims: his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Stroup and Halligan based on the failure to order an MRI scan (see ECF No. 50) and his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Smock, in his individual capacity (see ECF No. 68). According to the Amended Complaint, Halligan and Stroup are employees of Correct Care Solutions, a private company that provides medical care to inmates at Pennsylvania correctional institutions pursuant to a contract with the DOC. ECF No. 89, ¶ 3(A)-(B). Smock, an employee at SCI-Albion, is identified as a “C.H.C.A. (oversees all of medical).” Id., ¶ 3(C).
The factual allegations against these Defendants remain essentially unchanged from Corbin's original Complaint. Corbin suffered an unspecified arm injury on September 11, 2016, while he was working at his prison job in the dietary department at SCI-Albion. Id., ¶ 5(A), (E). Corbin does not describe his arm injury, but he acknowledges that the Defendants have examined him on multiple occasions since he sustained it. See, ¶ 6(B). As he did in his original Complaint, Corbin alleges that Halligan failed to order an MRI scan, which he contends was necessary “to determine the extent of damage to [his] injury.” Id., ¶ 5(D). He further alleges that “five other professionals” requested the MRI scan, but Halligan opted instead to order x-rays “to determine muscle damage.” Id. Corbin contends that Halligan's treatment decisions constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
Additionally, Corbin claims that Halligan “falsified medical records with a false report of kydney (sic) disease.” Id., ¶ 5(E). The Amended Complaint acknowledges that Corbin lost his right kidney in 1986 as the result of a motorcycle accident. Id., p. 5-6. It is unclear whether Corbin's allegation that Halligan “falsified medical records” to include a reference to kidney disease relates to the fact that he has only one kidney. In any event, Corbin alleges that Halligan's notation of kidney disease prevented him from receiving pain medication “for ANY injuries treated in medical... [f]ollowing his arm injury.” Id. (emphasis in original). Corbin also refers to “three different accidents in work related injuries” and the failure of the prison medical department to prescribe pain medication. Id. Corbin further alleges generally that Halligan “ignores and refuses to act on reports of staffs actions causing further damage, pain, and suffering to plaintiff and injury.” Id., ¶ 5(F). Without specifying a date or surrounding circumstances, Corbin newly alleges that corrections officers handcuffed him with his hands behind his back “for well over an hour causing great pain and suffering.” Id. He faults Halligan for this discomfort because she could have authorized him to be handcuffed with his hands in front but did not do so. Id. The Amended Complaint apparently attributes this failure to Defendants Stroup and Smock as well. Id. (“Defendant Halligan is one of said officials. As is defendants [S]troup and Smock.”).
In support of the claim against Stroup, the Amended Complaint alleges that “multiple times defendant Stroup repeatedly denied Plaintiff pain relief for injury sustained at work in dietary” and “directed Plaintiff to purchase his own pain relief.” Id., ¶ 6(B). It further alleges that “Stroup stated a minimum of three times; ‘an MRI test will not be done because of your age (I'm old) and it costs too much. Nothing more will be done because its been so long since accident and injury, you'll just have to live with it.'” Id., ¶ 6(C). Corbin contends that Stroup ordered him to “prove this a work related injury to get further treatment.” Id., ¶ 6(D).
The Amended Complaint appears to allege that Corbin attempted to obtain medical records from Smock but that his request went unanswered. Id. Corbin claims that Smock was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying him access to medical records he needed to prove his injury was work-related, by “knowingly and willingly ignoring] her responsibilities [as] director/supervisor of medical to stop abuse she is informed of, ” and by not authorizing him to be handcuffed with his hands in front as opposed to in the back, which caused him pain and additional injury. Id., ¶ 7.
IV. Discussion and Analysis
A. The Eighth Amendment claims against Halligan and Stroup, as repleaded, should be dismissed.
Although Corbin acknowledges that Halligan ordered an x-ray as part of the evaluation of his arm injury, he claims that both Halligan and Stroup acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs when they failed to order an MRI. Id., ¶ 5(D). He bolsters this claim by alleging that multiple unnamed medical “professionals” requested the MRI and by alleging that Stroup advised him that the MRI was denied because of his age and its cost. This claim remains in essence a disagreement over Halligan's treatment decision to order an x-ray rather than an MRI. Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, the federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgment and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law. See Ellison v. Scheipe, 570 F.Supp. 1361, 1363 (E.D.Pa.1983); Inmates of Allegheny Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir.1979). “The key question is whether the defendant has provided the plaintiff with some type of treatment, regardless of whether it is what the plaintiff desired.” Robinson v. Tennis, 2011 WL 2938374, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2938379 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2011). An inmate's disagreement with his treatment and even differences in medical judgment between medical professionals do not constitute deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that “mere disagreement” as to proper medical treatment does not support a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment). Corbin's allegations regarding Halligan's decision not to order an MRI remain insufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
This claim fares no better against Stroup notwithstanding Corbin's allegation that Stroup referred to his age and the cost of the scan as grounds for its denial. As the Court previously explained, “the mere assertion that defendants considered cost in treating Corbin's injury is insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference because prisoners do not have a constitutional right to limitless medical care.” Corbin v. Halligan, 2019 WL 4454364, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2019 WL 3024465 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2019), appeal dismissed, 2019 WL 7985353 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2019). Here again, Corbin alleges nothing beyond Stroup's statement and alleges no facts to support that Stroup or Halligan considered cost to the exclusion of other factors. Id. (citing Chimenti v. Wetzel, 2018 WL 388305, at *9 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 2018)). And, as the Court previously held, considering an inmate's age as a factor in determining the appropriateness of a medical procedure does not constitute deliberate indifference. Id. (citing Leger v. Jaimet, 2017 WL 5069334, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2017) (taking an inmate's age into consideration in not ordering a procedure was not deliberate indifference)). Thus, this claim should now be dismissed with prejudice against both Halligan and Stroup.
Corbin's claim that Halligan acted with deliberate indifference by inaccurately recording that he had kidney disease also should also be dismissed. Here again, Corbin's Amended Complaint alleges no facts beyond those he included in his original Complaint. Although the Court will assume at this stage that Halligan made a notation of kidney disease in Corbin's medical record and that such a notation precluded him from receiving pain medication, the claim that the notation was false is belied, as before, by Corbin's own allegations. The Amended . Complaint acknowledges that Corbin lost his right kidney in 1986 and that he was told to purchase his own pain medication should he need it. Id., pp. 9-10. Corbin's disagreement with that instruction does not amount to deliberate indifference. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346.
The only new factual allegations in the Amended Complaint relate to the Defendants' failure to act to prevent Corbin from being handcuffed with his hands behind his back. In essence, Corbin claims that Halligan and Stroup should have entered a medical order requiring that he be handcuffed with his hands in front of his body and not behind his back. While medical personnel's failure to order that an inmate with an arm or shoulder injury or condition be handcuffed only in front of his body may result in some additional discomfort, the facts alleged here do not support an inference of deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. See Robinson, 2011 WL 2938374, at *4 (medical personnel's decision not to order in-front handcuffing for inmate with a shoulder injury was not deliberate indifference to a serious medical need despite increased discomfort caused by cuffing behind the back). See also Whitehead v. Rozum, 2010 WL 3885651, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2010) (Plaintiffs allegation that his wrists were “swollen” and bruised does not state a facially plausible claim that he was suffering from a serious medical condition, and his claim against Defendant Kline should be dismissed), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3843749 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2010). Deliberate indifference is a “high threshold” and “an inmate's dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Woodson v. Sheesley, 2021 WL 5040464, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2021) (citations omitted). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint support only that Corbin believes the Defendants could have done more to accommodate or reduce the discomfort associated with his injury. These facts fall far short of supporting a plausible inference of deliberate indifference. This claim should also be dismissed with prejudice.
B. The claim against Defendant Smock should be dismissed with prejudice.
Corbin's Amended Complaint alleges no new facts in support of his claim against Smock. The Amended Complaint identifies Smock as a “CHCA, ” which the Court takes to indicate her position as a correctional health care administrator. See, e.g., Nichols v. Smock, 2020 WL 5215424, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5203621 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020). As such, she is not a physician or health care provider. See Whitehead v. Thomas, 2017 WL 2664490, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 23, 2017) (“Courts in the Third Circuit have recognized that CHCAs are ‘undisputedly administrators, not doctors'”) (quoting Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 Fed.Appx. 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005)). As frequently noted by the Court of Appeals, prison officials who are not physicians cannot be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they fail to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who is already in the care of the prison's physician. Durmer v. O 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement or deliberate indifference.”). Rather, they “will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands” if the “prisoner is under the care of medical experts.” Thomas, 142 Fed.Appx. at 39. Thus, because Corbin was under the care of medical providers, including Halligan and Stroup, his allegations that Smock, a healthcare administrator, did not respond properly to his complaints fail to state a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment. Further, the facts alleged do not support an inference that Smock knew or had reason to believe that Halligan or Stroup were mistreating Corbin. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Accordingly, Corbin's claim against Smock should now be dismissed with prejudice.
V. Conclusion
Because Corbin's Amended Complaint fails to cure the deficiencies of his original Complaint relating to his claims against Halligan, Stroup, or Smock, the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss should be granted. Furthermore, given the lack of any meaningful difference between the original Complaint and the Amended Complaint, there is no reason to believe that further amendment would allow Corbin to state a viable claim against any of the Defendants; thus, further amendment would be futile. Therefore, it is also recommended that no further opportunity to amend be granted.
VI. Notice Regarding Objections
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the Parties have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.