Opinion
No. 12–P–1144.
2013-05-2
Anthony COPPOLA v. SALITSKY ALLOYS, INC.
By the Court (KATZMANN, MEADE & SULLIVAN, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff (Coppola) appeals from the entry of summary judgment for the defendant (Salitsky Alloys) on the grounds that Coppola's tort claim for personal injury was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, G.L.c. 152(Act). We affirm.
“The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991), citing Mass.R.Civ. P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The central issue here is whether a direct employment relationship existed between Coppola and Salitsky Alloys, thus rendering Salitsky Alloys a general employer that is both liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits and immune from suit. Coppola claims that Metz Personnel, a staffing agency which leased Coppola to Salitsky Alloys, was the general employer. Relying on Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., 71 Mass.App.Ct. 223 (2008), the judge found for Salitsky Alloys. See G.L.c. 152, §§ 15, 18.An employer is immune from liability pursuant to G.L.c. 152, § 18, when (1) a direct employment relationship exists between the parties, and (2) the employer is an insured person liable for the payment of compensation. See Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., supra at 226–227. Under the first prong of the test, “the finder of fact must identify ‘who has direction and control of the employee and to whom does he owe obedience in respect of’ the performance of his work.” Id. at 227, quoting from Patterson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 586, 591 n. 13 (2000). See Chisholm's Case, 238 Mass. 412, 419 (1921). The right to control defines the direct employment relationship. Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., supra.
Here, the facts are undisputed that Salitsky Alloys is Coppola's direct employer. Salitsky Alloys interviewed, hired, and trained Coppola. During the parties' six-month employment relationship, Coppola worked under the exclusive control and direction of Salitsky Alloys personnel on its premises. Salitsky paid Metz Personnel, a temporary staffing agency, to provide payroll services and to purchase workers' compensation insurance for the employees. The facts were also undisputed that Metz Personnel exercised no control over the day-to-day work of Coppola, who had no contact with Metz Personnel. Salitsky Alloys was the general employer under the Act, because it alone had a direct employment relationship with Coppola. See id. at 228–229 (performing payroll functions does not amount to a working relationship), and cases cited.
The fact that Metz Personnel purchased the policy that paid Coppola's workers' compensation benefits is of no legal consequence. With respect to the second prong of the test, the insured employer need only be “liable for the payment of compensation”; it need not have been the entity that actually paid the insurance premiums. Id. at 229, quoting from Lang v. Edward J. Lamothe Co., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 231, 232 (1985). Only the general employer bears the “burdens and immunities” of the Act. Fleming v. Shaheen Bros., supra at 228 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, because Salitsky Alloys was the general employer, summary judgment was properly entered on its behalf.
Judgment affirmed.