Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5677-11T1
07-21-2014
RICHARD A. COPLEY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and LORD AND TAYLOR, Respondents.
Richard A. Copley, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for the respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kelly Ann Lichtenstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Lord and Taylor has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Hayden and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 126,204.
Richard A. Copley, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for the respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kelly Ann Lichtenstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Lord and Taylor has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Richard A. Copley appeals from a November 16, 2011 final determination by the New Jersey Department of Labor ("Department"), Board of Review ("Board"), affirming an Appeal Tribunal's July 15, 2011 decision disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. The decision also required him to refund $3,329.99 in benefits he received for the period beginning December 17, 2005 through March 11, 2006.
Copley filed his appeal September 12, 2006. The Appeal Tribunal initially affirmed the Deputy Director's determination because Copley failed to participate in a scheduled hearing, which caused his appeal to be dismissed. His appeal was later reinstated, and a new hearing scheduled, four times. Each time Copley again failed to participate. In December 2007, the Appeal Tribunal denied another request by Copley to reopen the matter and dismissed his appeal. Copley appealed that decision and the Board remanded the matter back to an Appeal Tribunal for a hearing. Once again, after a hearing was in fact scheduled, Copley did not participate and again the matter was dismissed. The Board, however, gave Copley yet another chance and on July 13, 2011 he finally participated in a hearing that resulted in the determinations which are the subject of this appeal.
Copley argues that he should not be disqualified from receiving benefits because his employer, respondent Lord and Taylor (L&T), breached its alleged employment agreement with Copley by refusing to allow him to take time off from work. As a result, Copley claims that L&T's breach of that agreement warranted his leaving his employment. We disagree and affirm.
According to Copley's testimony during his July 13, 2011 (telephonic) hearing, L&T employed him from January to November 2005 as a part-time salesman in its women's shoe department, before transferring Copley to the men's shoe department where he worked until December 16. One of L&T's supervisors, "Amin," hired Copley. At the time he was hired, Copley had various family obligations outside of New Jersey. Copley explained to Amin that he would need time to go out of state to participate in these family matters. Essentially, Amin told Copley that they would try to work with him and arrange his schedule so he could be away, as long as it did not get "out of line." The arrangement worked for the period of January through November, during which Copley recalled taking two trips with Amin's consent.
In November, L&T transferred Copley to the men's shoe department. He no longer worked under Amin's supervision. Evidently a dispute arose between Copley and his new supervisor when he sought time off in December to leave the state. Copley had already purchased plane tickets for a trip scheduled for several days during the second half of December, before he requested the days off from work. When asked, his supervisor expressed concern about not having sufficient coverage during Copley's absence.
The trip was during the store's busy holiday season.
As a result of the supervisor's concern, L&T's personnel director called Copley into his office on December 16, 2005 to discuss the matter. The director explained the store's need for coverage during the time he requested. They discussed the matter for about twenty minutes but, according to Copley, the director never told him he could or could not have the time off. The meeting ended when the director told him "you are free to go." Copley did not understand "exactly what that meant" as it "could have meant many things," but from the director's "body language," he took it to mean that he should leave the room.
During his examination by his attorney, Copley stated he understood that the director was terminating him.
After the meeting, Copley took the time off and never returned to work, because he felt he was terminated and he didn't think the personnel director "wanted [him] around." Also, he no longer felt like he had the same working arrangement with regard to his need for time off as he did when he worked for Amin. However, there was never any communication from L&T, either written or oral, telling Copley he was in fact fired, either before or after his trip, and Copley never made any attempt to confirm either his continued employment or his termination.
After he left his employment, Copley filed for unemployment benefits, which he received for the period beginning December 17, 2005 and ending March 14, 2006 totaling $3,329.00. On September 7, 2006, the Department notified Copley that it deemed him disqualified from receiving benefits as of December 16, 2005, and that he was required to repay the benefits he received from December through March, because he left work for personal reasons. Copley filed an appeal of that determination to the Department's Appeal Tribunal. As noted, an appeals examiner ultimately conducted a telephonic hearing, in which Copley and his counsel participated, and subsequently issued a decision, denying Copley's appeal which the Board affirmed. This appeal followed.
In his application, he did not state a reason for his unemployment.
--------
Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (citing Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). We will not disturb the Board's action unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." Ibid.
As noted in its decision, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's reliance upon N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which disqualifies a person for benefits
[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate[.]The statute expresses the legislative intent that benefits be paid only to those who have become unemployed through no fault of their own, and the Board is obligated to preserve the fund "against claims of those not intended to share in its benefits." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 212 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A claimant seeking unemployment compensation benefits has the burden of establishing that he or she left work for good cause attributable to such work and not voluntarily. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). An employee has left work "voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute "only if 'the decision whether to go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone.'" Lord v. Bd. of Review, 425 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953)). "'[G]ood cause attributable to such work' means a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). Causes personal to a claimant that are not shown to be attributable to the work itself do not satisfy the statutory requirement. White v. Bd. of Review, 146 N.J. Super. 268, 270 (App. Div. 1977); Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 457-58 (App. Div. 1967).
In order to avoid disqualification, the claimant has the burden of establishing that his or her departure was for good cause related to the work. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218. In addition, he must demonstrate he has satisfied an "employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (citing Condo v. Review Bd., 158 N.J. Super. 172, 175 (App. Div. 1978)).
If a Board properly determines that a claimant is not entitled to benefits he received, he is required to repay those benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1). The obligation to repay is unaffected by the good faith of the claimant. Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997); see also Fischer v. Bd. of Review, 123 N.J. Super. 263, 266 (App. Div. 1973).
We are satisfied that Copley failed to meet his burden, and the Board's decision was legally correct, supported by undisputed facts and, therefore, not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Copley voluntarily left his employment with L&T for personal reasons as there is no evidence he was terminated by his employer. Rather, the evidence established that he chose not to return to work, based on his own interpretation of his conversation with the personnel director, without seeking any clarification or attempting to return to work. Moreover, even if Copley had, as he alleges, a contractual right to take time off whenever he wanted, there was no evidence that L&T breached the alleged terms of his oral employment agreement because Copley offered no proof that L&T denied his vacation request.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION