Copley Press, Inc. v. Springfield

8 Citing cases

  1. Margolis v. Director of Dep't of Revenue

    536 N.E.2d 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    In Margolis the First Appellate District expressly rejected the per se exemption rule of Copley Press and held that the courts were to apply a balancing test in construing section 7(b).

    Accord Minnis v. United States Department of Agriculture (9th Cir. 1984), 737 F.2d 784, 786, cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1053, 85 L.Ed.2d 477, 105 S.Ct. 2112 (names and addresses of all persons applying to travel federally protected river in 1983); DiPersia v. United States R.R. Retirement Board (D. Conn. 1986), 638 F. Supp. 485, 489 (names and addresses of all Connecticut residents contributing to Federal Railroad Retirement Fund); MultnomahCounty Medical Society v. Scott (9th Cir. 1987), 825 F.2d 1410, 1413 (names and addresses of all medicare beneficiaries in Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Inc. v. Hodel (D.D.C. 1988), 680 F. Supp. 37, 38 (names and addresses of persons visiting seven national parks since January 1986). Defendant asserts that the information which plaintiff requested is per se exempt from disclosure under section 7(b). ( Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127.) Copley Press held that once a determination is made that information falls within one of the specifically enumerated categories of section 7(b) there is no need to show that its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ( Copley Press, 143 Ill. App.3d at 372-73.)

  2. Healey v. Teachers Retirement System

    200 Ill. App. 3d 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    In Healey, a union sought the names and addresses of teachers in its bargaining unit in order to disseminate union literature and collective bargaining information.

    This court has consistently recognized that the exemptions contained within the subsections of section 7(b) are per se exemptions and do not require courts to determine whether disclosure of the information described in each exemption would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." ( Staske v. City of Champaign (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 1, 5, 539 N.E.2d 747, 750; Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 372-73, 493 N.E.2d 127, 128.) The information plaintiffs seek constitutes "files and personal information maintained with respect to * * * individuals receiving * * * financial * * * services" directly from a public body, and is therefore per se exempt from disclosure under the plain language of section 7(b)(i).

  3. Local 1274 v. Niles Townships High Schools

    678 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The Fourth District Appellate Court has concluded that, once the court determines that one of the exemptions applies, information is per se excluded from disclosure. See Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127 (1986); see also Healey, 200 Ill. App.3d 240. The first and third districts, on the other hand, go on to apply a four-pronged balancing test derived to determine whether disclosure amounts to a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," as stated under section 7(1)(b). Blumenfeld, 263 Ill. App.3d at 986, citing City of Monmouth v. Galesburg Printing Publishing Co., 144 Ill. App.3d 224, 494 N.E.2d 896 (1986), and Margolis, 180 Ill. App.3d 1084, 536 N.E.2d 827. For purposes of this case, we need not determine which of the two approaches provides the proper analysis under FOIA; the material sought by the plaintiff is exempt from disclosure under either test.

  4. Schessler v. Department of Conservation

    627 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    ) The Department maintains that the permits sought here by the various applicants were licenses to engage in the occupation of holding a pigeon shoot. It cites this court's decision in Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 372-73, 493 N.E.2d 127, 128. There we held that a city license to operate a tavern at a particular location was an occupational license within the meaning of section 7(b)(iii) of FOIA. We do not agree that the status of the applicants for licenses here is analogous to that of the applicant in Copley Press. The word "occupation" when used other than in regard to possession of property has been defined as follows:

  5. David Blumenfeld, Ltd. v. Department of Professional Regulation

    636 N.E.2d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 5 times

    Margolis, 180 Ill. App.3d at 1089-90, 536 N.E.2d at 830, citing Minnis, 737 F.2d at 786, and Multnomah County Medical Society v. Scott (9th Cir. 1987), 825 F.2d 1410, 1413. The second approach, first advanced in Copley Press, Inc. v. Cityof Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127, and further clarified in Staske v. City of Champaign (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 747, appeal denied (1989), 127 Ill.2d 642, 545 N.E.2d 131, and Healy v. Teachers Retirement System (1990), 200 Ill. App.3d 240, 558 N.E.2d 776, appeal denied (1990), 135 Ill.2d 556, 564 N.E.2d 837, holds that the specific information set out in sections 7(1)(b)(i) through 7(1)(b)(v) is per se precluded from disclosure under Illinois' version of FOIA. Healy recognized that the enumerated exemptions evidence a legislative determination that some types of information will, in every situation, constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" and that the exemptions demonstrate also a legislative intent to relieve our courts of the burden of making case-by-case analyses of such information. Plaintiff maintains that Margolis provides the correct analytical framework we should employ to resolve this dispute.

  6. CBS, Inc. v. Partee

    198 Ill. App. 3d 936 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 12 times

    We are aware that some appellate districts disagree on whether any exemption under section 7(b) may be considered a per se exemption. (Compare Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (4th Dist. 1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127, and Staske v. City of Champaign (4th Dist. 1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 747, with City of Monmouth v. Galesburg Printing Publishing Co. (3d Dist. 1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 224, 494 N.E.2d 896, and Margolis v. Director of Department of Revenue (1st Dist. 1989), 180 Ill. App.3d 1084, 536 N.E.2d 827.) In Margolis the First Appellate District expressly rejected the per se exemption rule of Copley Press and held that the courts were to apply a balancing test in construing section 7(b).

  7. Pecora Oil Co. v. Johnson

    509 N.E.2d 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    " (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 207(b)(iv).) The Director maintains that any records falling within any of the five subsections of section 7(b) are automatically exempted from disclosure under the FOIA, citing the Appellate Court for the Fourth District's holding in Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127. Pecora disagrees, citing the Appellate Court for the Third District's holding in City of Monmouth v. Galesburg Printing Publishing Co. (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 224, 494 N.E.2d 896, for the proposition that, even if records fall within one of the subsections of section 7(b), the governmental entity must still show that disclosure of the records would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy in order to justify any refusal to disclose the records. 144 Ill. App.3d 224, 228.

  8. Carrigan v. Harkrader

    496 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 3 times
    Applying Illinois Freedom of Information Act to protect a sheriff's "opinionated recommendation" letter regarding plaintiff's application for a liquor license

    Those findings were not publicly cited by either the Peoria County liquor commissioner or the Illinois Liquor Control Commission. Thus, we recognize the dilemma caused by an applicant for an occupational license, but find that we must honor the plain language of one of the many exceptions carved by the legislature to whittle away a person's right to access to information about his government's affairs, even if they pertain to him. (See Copley Press, Inc. v. City of Springfield (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 370, 493 N.E.2d 127.) Therefore, the court appropriately found the requested document exempt from disclosure.