Plaintiffs argue that the above definition should apply in this case also. Copass v. Illinois Power Co. (1991), 211 Ill. App.3d 205, is on point. A suit was brought in that case by a widow whose husband had been killed while working on a gas pipeline for his employer, Illinois Power Company. The husband had joined two sections of a 12-inch gas pipeline with a mechanical sleeve and was testing the joints for leaks when an explosion occurred, killing him.

The majority characterizes United's payments of benefits to Steve as "voluntary." The concept of "voluntary" payments excepting a plaintiff from the exclusivity provision of the Act arose in Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1991). In Copass, the plaintiffs husband was killed while working on an Illinois Power gas pipeline.

The plaintiff filed her complaint on August 11, 1994. The relevant allegations of the complaint, which we take as true for purposes of this appeal ( Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App.3d 205, 20910, 569 N.E.2d 1211 (1991)), are as follows. On August 23, 1992, the day she was injured, the plaintiff was employed as a "laborer" by the defendant at its Carol Stream, Illinois, plant. That day she was operating a "Signode Power Strapping Machine," manufactured by the defendant Signode Corporation. The machine contained a "plunger," which apparently compressed items placed inside the machine.

In the context of the Act, to show that an injury is not accidental, the employee must establish that his employer or co-employee acted deliberately and with specific intent to injure the employee. Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill.App.3d 205, 214, 155 Ill.Dec. 600, 569 N.E.2d 1211 (1991); see also Limanowski v. Ashland Oil Co., 275 Ill.App.3d 115, 120, 211 Ill.Dec. 666, 655 N.E.2d 1049 (1995) (employee seeking to recover against employer must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer specifically intended to injure the plaintiff). The Copass court quoted Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation law as follows:

Illinois appellate courts have unanimously held that in order for an employee to overcome the exclusivity bar of either the WCA or ODA, an employee must show that the employer had the specific intent to harm the employee. See, e.g.,Limanowski v. Ashland Oil Co., Inc., 655 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (Ill.App. 1st District 1995); Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1214-16;Hartline, 651 NE.E.2d at 584. In doing so, such courts have specifically stated "that the defendant was `substantially certain,' or knew with a `strong probability,' that the injury would result from its actions is not sufficient to escape the strictures of the Act's exclusivity provisions."

Nevertheless, "the voluntary acceptance of workers' compensation payments, without any affirmative act to seek those benefits, does not necessarily operate to bar the recovery of civil damages against the employer or coemployee." Wells, 282 Ill. App.3d at 597, 669 N.E.2d at 376, citing Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App.3d 205, 569 N.E.2d 1211 (1991). In Copass plaintiff's husband was killed while working on a gas pipeline.

Meerbrey v. Marshall Field Co. (1990), 139 Ill.2d 455, 564 N.E.2d 1222. In Copass v. Illinois Power Co. (1991), 211 Ill. App.3d 205, 569 N.E.2d 1211, the court addressed the standard for determining whether an employee's injury was accidental for the purposes of escaping the exclusive remedy provided under the Act. In Copass, a suit was brought by a widow whose husband had been killed while working on a gas pipeline for his employer, Illinois Power Company. The husband was killed in an explosion while testing the pipeline for leaks. The widow alleged that the power company committed an intentional tort against her husband when it allowed him to test the pipeline without proper training and without being warned of the danger of the work to be performed.

An employee alleging that his or her employer committed an intentional tort is not subject to the IWCA's exclusivity provisions because “one who intentionally injures an employee should not be permitted to claim the injury was ‘accidental' and use the Act as a shield from liability.” Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. App. 1991) (citations omitted). However, the standard an employee must meet to bring an intentional tort claim is substantial, because the employee must allege adequate facts to show that the employer acted “deliberately with the specific intent to injure.” Hartline,

Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, willfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, or even willfully and unlawfully violating a safety statute, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character. 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (citing 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 68.13, at 13-36 through 13-44). Other courts have followed suit.

The Illinois Supreme Court has not weighed in on the definition of intent for purposes of exclusivity. However, given that Illinois appellate courts consistently have held that the purpose sense of intent is required to bypass IWCA exclusivity, see, e.g. , Dale v. S. Cent. Ill. Mass Transit Dist. , 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, 384 Ill.Dec. 656, 17 N.E.3d 229, 234 ; Garland , 2013 IL App (1st) 112121, 374 Ill.Dec. 741, 996 N.E.2d at 199 ; Copass v. Ill. Power Co. , 211 Ill. App. 3d 205, 155 Ill.Dec. 600, 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (4th Dist. 1991), it seems likely that, if faced with the issue, the Illinois Supreme Court would find that the intentional-tort exception is limited to the purpose prong, seeAllstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc. , 285 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[A] federal court, exercising its authority to hear diversity cases, must make a predictive judgment as to how the supreme court of the state would decide the matter if it were presented presently to that tribunal."). Several jurisdictions take a broader view and permit employees to bring suit under the knowledge prong as well.