Finally, we must consider whether Ague's concerted activity should lose the protection of the Act because it was otherwise "unlawful, violent, in breach of contract or `indefensible.'" Coors ContainerCo. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980), citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962). We have reviewed the record, and we agree with the ALJ that Ague's conduct does not fall into any of these unprotected categories, nor does it "amount to egregious misbehavior that should rob this effort to assist fellow employee Beal of its protected character," rec., vol. III, doc. 4, at 3.

Even concerted actions that are assumed to be protected by the Act may forfeit such protection if they are "egregious or flagrant." Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996) (quoting Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 1980)). The Tribune contends, and the ALJ found, that even if McMillen's statement was made in the context of concerted activity, he forfeited the protection of the Act because he engaged in "vulgar, profane, and obscene language directed at . . . [an] employer," Care Initiatives, 321 N.L.R.B. at 151, in responding to his employer's legal acts.

The Board argues that if an employee's misconduct occurs simultaneously with any sort of concerted activity, the employer must tolerate the conduct unless it is "flagrant" and "opprobrious", and cites instances of equally bad behavior that the Board has protected in the past. The Board also cites several cases in which United States courts of appeals enforced Board orders: Keokuk Gas Service Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 335 n. 17 (8th Cir. 1978); Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 675-76 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1970); J. P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1976); and Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 1980). The first four cases involved grievance proceedings, captive audience speeches, or strikes, all of which we discuss infra at 11-12.

There is an exception to that rule, however: supporting a boycott is protected § 7 activity if it (1) is related to an ongoing labor dispute and (2) does not disparage the employer's product. See, e.g., Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1989); Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980); Community Hosp. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 833 (1987); Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 230, enf'd 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980). This case turns upon the question whether the Board properly determined that Robert Langemeier did not support the consumer boycott of Hormel products after the end of the labor dispute between Local 9 and Hormel at the Austin plant. If he did not, then, as the Board held, Hormel committed an unfair labor practice by discharging him. Cf. NLRB v. Burnup Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23, 85 S.Ct. 171, 172, 13 L.Ed.2d 1 (1964) (employer's good faith belief that employee engaged in misconduct unprotected by § 7 is not a defense to § 8(a)(1) charge but does shift burden of proof to General Counsel). If he did, then his actions were not protected by § 7 and Hormel lawfully discharged him.

See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-05, 65 S.Ct., 982, 987-89, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945); NLRB v. Malta Constr. Co., 806 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (11th Cir. 1986). It has also been held permissible to display signs endorsing union activity or a position in an intraunion election on a private vehicle on an employer's property. See District Lodge 91, 814 F.2d at 879 (campaign sign); Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980) (sign supporting union boycott of employer's products). These cases fall far short of what the Election Officer directed here — that IBT members be allowed "to place or affix stickers and similar campaign items on the vehicles, both cabs and trailers, driven by IBT members while they are performing services for [Commercial Carriers]."

The Board correctly ruled that employee Gallagher was engaging in protected activity when he displayed the campaign sign on his van. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 1102, 39 L.Ed.2d 358 (1974) (ban on distribution of literature by anti-union employees seriously dilutes those employees' rights); id. at 327, 94 S.Ct. at 1103 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803, 65 S.Ct. 982, 987, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) (wearing union insignia on work clothes is protected); Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980) (displaying boycott sign in company lot protected). The Board also properly concluded that Gallagher's section 7 rights are not absolute, but instead must be balanced against the employer's managerial interests.

This is so because a refusal to cross the picket line "based on fear and nothing else," does not constitute action in concert with other employees. N.L.R.B. v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826, 92 S.Ct. 58, 30 L.Ed.2d 55 (1971); see also Coors Container Co. v. N.L.R.B., 628 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 1980); Virginia Stage Lines v. N.L.R.B., 441 F.2d 499, 502 n. 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856, 92 S.Ct. 105, 30 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971). Unlike the situation under the National Labor Relations Act, where employee action is protected only if it is concerted but not if it is individual, the opposite situation exists for federal employees, who engage in strike action (which is a crime) only if they withhold service in concert with others but not individually.

Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that the Center violated section 8(a)(1) by interrogating employees concerning their union activities. Such questioning, though not per se violative of the Act, is prohibited by section 8(a)(1) if accompanied by coercion, threat, or restraint. Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 1980); Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 137, 144 (10th Cir. 1976). The test is not whether employees were actually coerced, but whether the questioning tended to be coercive.

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We previously have held that interrogating employees about their, or their co-workers', union sympathies, e.g., Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 1980); Groendyke Transport v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 137, 143-44 (10th Cir. 1976), and threatening employees during an organizational campaign with loss of benefits, e.g., NLRB v. Merrill, 388 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1968); J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479, 480-82 (10th Cir. 1967), plant closure, e.g., Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1976); Singer Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1973), and physical violence, e.g., Bill's Coal Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 243, 245 (10th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. McBride, 274 F.2d 124, 127 (10th Cir. 1960), may violate § 8(a)(1). The ALJ found that "[b]y interrogating employees concerning their union activities and sympathies and about the union activities and sympathies of their fellow employees, by threatening plant closures, loss of existing benefits and having to bargain from scratch should employees select a collective-bargaining representative, and by threatening to punch an employee in the nose for having initiated the organ

NLRB v. Max Factor Co., 640 F.2d 197, 89 CCH Lab. Cas. ¶ 12, 232 (9th Cir. 1980). See also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962); Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 1980); Dreis Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Cement Transport, Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Owners Maintenance Corp., 581 F.2d 44, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1978). This analysis may obscure a consideration that is important in some cases: The purpose of the remedy is not merely to vindicate or punish a particular employer or employee, but to protect the public interest.