Cooper v. Territory of Oklahoma

3 Citing cases

  1. LaPena v. State

    92 Nev. 1 (Nev. 1976)   Cited 12 times
    In LaPena v. State, 92 Nev. 1, 6, 544 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1976), this Court held that although the accomplice's "participation in the crimes may have warranted a more serious charge than second-degree murder, plea bargaining is permissible."

    Enunciating the test to be utilized in applying NRS 175.291, this court has declared, consistently with authority elsewhere: "Under statutes such as NRS 175.291 it is commonly held that `corroborative evidence is insufficient when it merely casts a grave suspicion upon the accused.' Peope v. Shaw, 112 P.2d 241, 255 (Cal. 1941), and cases there cited; Cooper v. Territory, 91 P. 1032 (Okla. 1907). As the California Supreme Court said in People v. Shaw, supra, citing numerous authorities:

  2. Austin v. State

    87 Nev. 578 (Nev. 1972)   Cited 34 times
    Observing that in determining if sufficient evidence corroborates accomplice's testimony, that testimony must be eliminated and remaining evidence examined to ascertain if there is inculpatory evidence tending to connect defendant to offense

    Under statutes such as NRS 175.291 it is commonly held that "corroborative evidence is insufficient when it merely casts a grave suspicion upon the accused." People v. Shaw, 112 P.2d 241, 255 (Cal. 1941), and cases there cited; Cooper v. Territory, 91 P. 1032 (Okla. 1907). As the California Supreme Court said in People v. Shaw, supra, citing numerous authorities:

  3. State v. Fichtner

    226 N.W. 534 (N.D. 1929)

    There must be some substantial evidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice and tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offense to constitute "corroborating evidence," and where the corroborating evidence is of such a slight, uncertain, and unsatisfactory character as not to warrant a reasonable inference of the guilt of the accused, the court should not permit a verdict to stand. Cooper v. Territory, 19 Okla. 496, 91 P. 1032. "It is well established that, however atrocious in good morals, the reception of a present after the act may be, the acceptance of a gift without corrupt prior understanding is not bribery."