"[T]he inclusion of that requirement renders it virtually certain that the legislature would have foreseen that many of those injuries would be inflicted by the use of firearms." Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no double jeopardy violation occurred, and we reject Smith's contention that his sentence enhancement must be set aside.
[¶40] Johnson relies on Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied, and Malone v. State, 191 N.E.3d 870 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022), in arguing that his sentence is inappropriate. In Cooper, the defendant suspected his wife of having an affair.
Id.; see Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (affirming jury's determination that defendant intentionally used shotgun in committing reckless homicide), trans. denied.
We have previously held that, because the firearm enhancement statute establishes only an additional penalty, it does not implicate double-jeopardy concerns with respect to an underlying conviction. Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011). [¶17] Thus, Miller's new argument on appeal that the amendment imperiled his defense strategy
We observe that a firearm enhancement is not a consecutive sentence. SeeCooper v. State , 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a sentencing enhancement to be cumulative punishment rather than a penalty for a separate offense), trans. denied. [33] Brabson also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for her failure to challenge trial counsel's performance.
[¶11] The State points out that the sentencing order incorrectly labels the firearm enhancement as a "Habitual Offender Sentencing Enhancement" that runs "consecutive" to the battery sentence. Appealed Order at 3; cf. Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (explaining that a firearm enhancement is an additional penalty and not a separate offense), trans. denied. The State suggests, and we agree, that remand is "appropriate to correct these technical errors, although they do not have any impact on the length or validity of [Ocampo's] sentence."
We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
See Ind.Code § 35–42–1–5 (Class C felony reckless homicide occurs when a person “recklessly kills another human being”); and see Ind.Code § 35–50–2–11 (permitting court to enhance sentence if defendant “knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense”). However, as Barnett himself notes, we rejected that factual argument in Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In essence, Cooper's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is that the offense of reckless homicide only requires the State to prove that he acted recklessly, while the firearm enhancement requires proof of intentional or knowing conduct.
Therefore, considering the nature of the offense and Knight's character, we cannot say that Knight's sentence is inappropriate or is an outlier. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (affirming a thirteen-year aggregate sentence for reckless homicide with the five-year sentencing enhancement over an Appellate Rule 7(B) challenge). We affirm his sentence.