Opinion
5:22-cv-13-MTT-MSH
10-17-2023
CLIFFORD COOPER, Plaintiff, v. Doctor SPEIGHT, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Defendant Vernon Speight's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 62). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Speight's motion be granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The present action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and arises out of Plaintiff Clifford Cooper's confinement at Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) in Milledgeville, Georgia. Compl. 6, 13, ECF No. 1. In relevant part, Cooper alleges Speight-whom Cooper believed was a doctor at BSP-was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by refusing to provide pain relievers stronger than aspirin following surgery on Cooper's broken ankle. Id. at 15-16.
On July 15, 2022, Defendants Ronald Brawner, Sandra Burtch, Heather Dickson, Sharon Lewis, Athamese Robinson-Ross, Marcus Riner, Pretillion Whipple, and Speight moved to dismiss Cooper's claims. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 44. Following a Recommendation from this Court (ECF No. 54), the District Judge granted-in-part the motion to dismiss, such that only Cooper's claim against Speight remained (ECF No. 55). On March 18, 2023, Speight filed his answer (ECF No. 56). Following two extensions of time to complete discovery (ECF Nos. 58, 61), Speight filed a motion for summary judgment on August 16, 2023 (ECF No. 62). Despite being notified of his right to respond to Speight's summary judgment motion, Cooper did not file a response. Notice, Aug. 17, 2023, ECF No. 63. Speight's motion is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). In sum, summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
II. Plaintiff's Failure to Respond
Cooper did not respond to Speight's motion for summary judgment or his statement of facts. The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia provide:
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine dispute to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant's numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.M.D. Ga. L.R. 56. Because Cooper did not respond to the summary judgment motion, and thus did not specifically controvert any material facts set forth in Speight's statement of undisputed material facts (ECF No. 62-1), the facts set forth therein are deemed admitted where appropriate.
The Court, however, “cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). In considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, even an unopposed motion, a court must, at least, “review all of the evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 1101-02. In other words, the court cannot simply accept the facts stated in a moving party's statement of material facts as true but must also review the movant's citations to the record and confirm that there are no issues of material fact. Id. at 1103 n.6. Moreover, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to consider the entire record when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); see Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he court must consider the entire record in the case, not just those pieces of evidence which have been singled out for attention by the parties.”).
III. Statement of Facts
In February 2019, Cooper was working on a sidewalk at BSP as an orderly. Pl.'s Dep. 32:5, 11-12, ECF No. 62-5. When attempting to retrieve the cart he was using to pick up trash, Cooper slipped, and his ankle popped. Id. at 32:15-17. Cooper underwent surgery for his ankle. Id. at 34:10-13. For the first two weeks following his surgery, Cooper was given Tylenol with codeine while recovering at BSP. Id. at 39:11-23. After two weeks, Cooper received regular Tylenol without codeine. Id. at 39:25. Including emergency room visits, Cooper had some form of treatment related to his ankle on eight occasions-with a ninth visit being cancelled-over a nearly five-month period. Pl.'s Med. Hist. 1, ECF No. 62-4. Speight is the Health Services Administrator at BSP. Speight Decl. 1, ECF No. 62-3. He does not provide care to inmates because he is not a physician or nurse. Id. Speight does not recall a conversation with Cooper, and Cooper admits he did not speak with Speight. Speight Decl. 2; Pl.'s Dep. 38:11-14.
IV. Deliberate Indifference Standard
“The [E]ighth [A]mendment, which applies to the states through the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment .... [S]tates violate the [E]ighth [A]mendment if they are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs[.]” Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty. 774 F.2d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). In order to prove a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff “must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the [defendant's] deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). The first prong is an objective inquiry, requiring the plaintiff to prove an “objectively serious medical need.” Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1287 (11th Cir. 2022). “A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. In either case, the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The second prong is a subjective inquiry. Ireland, 53 F.4th at 1287. To establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the official was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, (2) the official actually drew that inference, (3) the official disregarded the risk of serious harm, and (4) the official's conduct amounted to more than gross negligence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]edical treatment violates the Constitution only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Dang ex rel. Dang, 871 F.3d at 1280 (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison's medical staff and the inmate as to the latter's diagnosis or course of treatment [does not] support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).
V. Claim against Speight
Cooper contends that Speight was deliberately indifferent by failing to provide something stronger than aspirin for his pain. Compl. 16. The Court recommends Speight be granted summary judgment for several reasons. While Cooper alleged in his complaint he spoke to Speight about his need for stronger pain medication, he admitted in his deposition he never spoke with Speight. Id.; Pl.'s Dep. 38:11-14. Further, while Cooper alleges that Speight denied him treatment, the only evidence before the Court at this time shows that Cooper received treatment, including Tylenol with codeine, rather than simple aspirin. As a result, there is simply no evidence that Speight caused Cooper's alleged injuries in this case.
Additionally, even if Cooper could show causation, the evidence does not show Speight deliberately disregarded the risk of serious harm. As noted, Cooper received treatment for his ankle on multiple occasions, and he received Tylenol with codeine. This was not a case where prison officials deliberately delayed treatment, but one where the treatment they rendered was not that which Cooper desired. See Ross v. Corizon Med. Servs., 700 Fed.Appx. 914, 916 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505) (affirming summary judgment where there was no objective signs or symptoms of pain to substantiate a request for stronger pain medication). Simply failing to provide “stronger medication is generally a medical judgment that is not an appropriate basis for imposing liability.” Id. (citing Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Finally, courts are reluctant to find violations of the Eighth Amendment when a prison inmate has received medical care, as Cooper did on numerous occasions. Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575). Finally, even if the treatment was poor, the Eighth Amendment does not require medical care to be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” Hoffer v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris, 941 F.2d at 1510).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Speight's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 62) be GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.