Forte v. Forte, 143 Vt. 518, 521, 468 A.2d 561, 563 (1983). We hold that a divorce decree which sets an undivided weekly sum to be paid for the support of two or more minor children is deemed to require payment of the entire sum until the youngest child attains majority or until the decree is otherwise prospectively modified by a court order. Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 392, 349 P.2d 812, 813 (1960). The support obligor is not automatically entitled to a pro rata reduction in the amount of an undivided award each time one of the children attains his or her majority. If the spouse paying support considers it unjust to be required to pay the full amount until the youngest child reaches the age of majority, the proper remedy is to seek modification of the decree in the trial court.

These courts require that the entire sum be paid until the yougest child attains majority, or until the decree is otherwise prospectively modified by a court order. (See, e.g., Becker v. Becker (1978), 39 Md. App. 630, 387 A.2d 317; Parsley v. Parsley (Mo.App. 1978), 563 S.W.2d 146; Halcomb v. Halcomb (La. 1977), 352 So.2d 1013; Redman v. Redman (Wyo. 1974), 521 P.2d 584; Rhodesv. Gilpin (D.C. 1970), 264 A.2d 497; Delevett v. Delevett (1968), 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402; Spivey v. Furtado (1966), 242 Cal.App.2d 259, 51 Cal. Reptr. 362; Cosgriff v. Cosgriff (N.D. 1964), 126 N.W.2d 131; Beaird v. Beaird (Tex.Civ.App. 1964), 380 S.W.2d 730; Jerry v. Jerry (1962), 235 Ark. 589, 361 S.W.2d 92: Taylor v. Taylor (1961), 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027; Cooper v. Matheny (1960), 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812; Schrader v. Schrader (1947), 148 Neb. 162, 26 N.W.2d 617; Estes v. Estes (1941), 192 Ga. 100, 14 S.E.2d 680. See also 2 W. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment sec. 14.91, at 127-28 (2d ed. 1961).

This rule has been adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question of whether the award of an undivided sum periodically for the support and maintenance of minor children is automatically reduced when the eldest child attains his majority. See e.g. Doty v. Doty, 45 Ill. App.3d 213, 359 N.E.2d 784 (1977); Halcomb v. Halcomb, 343 So.2d 1183 (La. App. 1977), aff'd., 352 So.2d 1013 (La. 1977); Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1974); Delevett v. Delevett, 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402 (1968); Cosgriff v. Cosgriff, 126 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1964); Gordon v. Ary, 358 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027 (1961); Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812 (1960); Kuyper v. Kuyper, 244 Iowa 1, 55 N.W.2d 485 (1952); Schrader v. Schrader, 148 Neb. 162, 26 N.W.2d 617 (1947); Miller v. Miller, 74 App. D.C. 216, 122 F.2d 209 (1941). But see Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956);Codorniz v. Codorniz, 34 Cal.2d 811, 215 P.2d 32 (1950).

Second, to regard an undivided child support order as equally divisible among the children is to ignore the fact that the requirements of the individual children may vary widely, depending on the circumstances. Cooper v. Matheny, [(1960), 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812, 813].' Delevett v. Delevett, [(1968), 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402, 404]." Becker, 387 A.2d at 320.

We have no reason to review that finding and on review we reach no issue regarding this obligation. The mother has made no contention under Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 392, 349 P.2d 812 (1960), perhaps because the decree orders support for each child rather than for both. Our references to a child are to the older child only.

See n. 3, supra. Cited as authority sustaining the severability of the support award are Ditmar v. Ditmar (1956), 48 Wn.2d 373, 293 P.2d 759, and Codorniz v. Codorniz (1950), 34 Cal.2d 811, 215 P.2d 32, holding that as children married or circumstances changed concerning their dependency the father was justified in reducing the support payment without previous order of court, but we are not convinced that they represent either the majority or better view. Severability was specifically considered and rejected in Cooper v. Matheny (1969), 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812; Schrader v. Schrader (1947), 148 Neb. 162, 26 N.W.2d 617; Cosgriff v. Cosgriff (N.D. 1964), 126 N.W.2d 131; Rhodes v. Gilpin (D.C.App. 1970), 264 A.2d 497; and Delevett v. Delevett (1968), 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402. In Rhodes, 264 A.2d at 499, it was said:

When, as part of a divorce decree, a parent is ordered to pay a specified amount periodically for the benefit of more than one child, the emancipation of one child does not automatically affect the liability of the parent for the full amount. Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589, 592, 361 S.W.2d 92; Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 145, 362 P.2d 1027; Schrader v. Schrader, 148 Neb. 162, 168, 26 N.W.2d 617; Cosgriff v. Cosgriff, 126 N.W.2d 131, 134 (N.D.); Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 392, 393, 349 P.2d 812; Beaird v. Beaird, 380 S.W.2d 730, 732, (Tex.Civ.App.). The proper remedy, if the full amount is deemed excessive, is to seek a modification of the decree.

But, where the provision for support is for a lump sum, we believe the better rule is that which is applied by those courts which require such sum to be paid, in the absence of modification, until the youngest child attains majority. Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812; Anderson v. Anderson, 129 Cal.App.2d 403, 276 P.2d 862; Application of Miller, 139 Neb. 242, 297 N.W. 91. In the Miller case, the court said:

The presumption, if any is appropriate at all, would be to the contrary in light of the fixed and indivisible costs of providing a home, and the varying requirements of the children. Compare Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975); Cosgrief v. Cosgrief, 126 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1964); Cooper v. Matheny, 220 Or. 390, 349 P.2d 812 (1960). We are not inadvertent to the statutory mandate that the court, when exercising its discretionary power to determine the appropriate amount of child support, shall consider the relative ability of the parties to provide support for dependent children.

However, the overwhelming weight of authority is otherwise. Taylor v. Taylor (1961), 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027; Delevett v. Delevett (1968), 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402; In re Application of Miller (1941), 139 Neb. 242, 297 N.W. 91; Cooper v. Matheny (1960), 220 Ore. 390, 349 P.2d 812. • 2 Appellant also argues that plaintiff-appellee's claim is barred by laches.