Opinion
No. 10-05-00315-CV
Opinion delivered and filed October 18, 2006.
Appeal from the 220th District Court, Hamilton County, Texas, Trial Court No. 01-06-02599.
Affirmed.
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and, Justice REYNA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jay Sandon Cooper, brings this appeal contesting the trial court's judgment in favor of Appellees.
BACKGROUND
One year after conveying property in Hamilton County to Cooper, Jerolene Hubbard brought suit in Dallas County claiming ownership and requested a temporary injunction to prevent Cooper from selling the property. The temporary injunction was granted. William Cochran was named trustee and receiver to pay taxes which he failed to do.
Appellees, the Hamilton County taxing entities, brought suit in Hamilton County for the delinquent taxes and named Cooper, Hubbard, and Cochran as defendants. At the time, Cooper had filed for bankruptcy protection. An Agreed Order Conditionally Terminating the Automatic Stay was entered "with respect to [the] Hamilton [County Appraisal District] on the Property." Cooper filed cross-claims against Hubbard and Cochran seeking a declaratory judgment that he owned the property, damages for breach of warranty and fiduciary duty, and dissolution of the temporary injunction issued by the Dallas court. Cooper's claims were transferred to the Travis County Probate Court where guardianship proceedings for Hubbard were pending.
The delinquent tax suit proceeded in Hamilton County. Cooper filed a Motion for Sanctions against the judge of the Travis County Probate Court and a Motion to Transfer Venue back to Hamilton County on grounds he could not get a fair trial in Travis County. The court did not specifically rule on these motions. Final judgment was entered in favor of the taxing entities. Cooper appeals that judgment.
The judgment contains a "Mother Hubbard" clause denying all relief not granted.
Cooper brings seven issues on appeal. He challenges the following actions taken by the trial court: (1) the failure to exercise venue over his ownership claim and his request to terminate the temporary injunction issued by the Dallas court; (2) the failure to hear and rule on his Motions to Show Authority, for Sanctions, and to Transfer; (3) the failure to grant default judgment against Hubbard and Cochran; (4) giving deference to orders issued by the Travis County Court; (5) transferring his claims to the Travis County Court where he could not have a fair trial; (6) assessing an excessive supersedeas bond; and (7) granting final judgment against him personally for the unpaid taxes.
Jurisdiction
The Hamilton County suit was transferred to the Travis County Probate Court pursuant to Texas Probate Code Section 6.08. See TEX. PROB. CODE Ann. § 6.08 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The Probate Court later set aside that part of the order which transferred the property tax foreclosure suit. It thereby effectively severed Appellees' tax foreclosure action from Cooper's remaining causes of action.
A severance splits a single suit into two or more independent actions. Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex. 1970). If the order of severance did not result in a final judgment in the severed action, that action is still pending. Tanner v. Karnavas, 86 S.W.3d 737, 744 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied) (citing Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. 2001)). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the severed action in the Travis County Probate Court has been dismissed, discontinued, or otherwise terminated. Thus, the severed cause of action remains pending in that court, and we do not have jurisdiction over the issues raised as they pertain to Cooper's claims against Hubbard and Cochran. Therefore, we dismiss Cooper's first five issues.
Supersedeas Bond
In his sixth issue, Cooper challenges the amount of the supersedeas bond assessed by the District Court. Because Appellees have agreed to suspend enforcement of the judgment without Appellant's filing a supersedeas bond, we need not address this issue.
Sufficiency of the Judgment
In his final issue, Cooper challenges the sufficiency of the judgment in that it was entered against him personally although he was not responsible for the unpaid taxes. The judgment awards the Hamilton County entities foreclosure of the tax liens "as against the Defendants or any person claiming under the Defendants by any right acquired during the pendency of this suit." It further provides that "no personal money judgment is granted against any Defendant." Based on this language, we find that this judgment is in rem as it provides solely for the foreclosure of the tax lien. The effect of a judgment in rem is limited to the property that supports the jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability on the property owner. HMS Aviation v. Layale Enter., S.A., 149 S.W.3d 182, 187 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Accordingly, we overrule Cooper's seventh issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment.