Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. TEC10006104. F. Paul Dickerson III, Judge. Affirmed.
The Gonzalez Law Group and J. J. Gonzalez for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Michael L. Guisti and Michael L. Guisti for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Plaintiff and respondent Quiana Cooper filed an order to show cause (OSC) for a restraining order, restraining defendant and appellant Robin Green from harassment against Cooper. At the OSC hearing, plaintiff moved to add a coworker as a protected person. Defendant appeals, asserting it was improper to add the coworker as a protected person under the restraining order. The coworker assertedly had previously sought a similar order, which had been denied; defendant argues the instant order was an impermissible “second bite at the apple” for the coworker’s rejected claim of harassment. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The record on appeal consists of the restraining order to stop harassment (issued after hearing), defendant’s notice of appeal, defendant’s designation of the record on appeal, defendant’s amended designation of the record on appeal, and the register of actions. The register of actions indicates that plaintiff filed request for restraining order on June 4, 2010. A hearing on the OSC was set for June 18, 2010. On the date set for hearing, plaintiff testified, the coworker testified, defendant testified, and other witnesses also testified. The trial court granted the injunction prohibiting harassment. There was a separate hearing on plaintiff’s oral motion, to include the coworker as a protected person under the restraining order. The court granted the motion and filed the restraining order, naming both plaintiff and the coworker as protected persons. The restraining order states that it is based on a credible threat of violence.
Significantly, the record does not contain plaintiff’s moving papers, defendant’s opposition, if any, or any of the hearing testimony.
Defendant’s opening brief on appeal recites that plaintiff and a coworker, Angel Anderson, were employed in the oncology unit at Riverside Medical Center in March 2010. At that time, defendant was assertedly the supervisor of the oncology unit. On March 16, 2010, some sort of incident allegedly occurred between Anderson and defendant, which led Anderson to file for a civil harassment restraining order against defendant. After a hearing on April 23, 2010, the court denied Anderson’s application for a restraining order. (Plaintiff filed a similar petition for restraining order in March 2010, which plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed.) None of these “facts” appear in the record of the case before us, and defendant’s brief makes no record citations to support these asserted “facts.”
Defendant also states that in April 2010, she was reassigned so that she had no ongoing or repetitive daily contact with either Anderson or plaintiff, although defendant did still go into the oncology unit occasionally as part of her job duties. Again, defendant provides no record citations to support these factual statements.
Defendant asserts that she responded to plaintiff’s current OSC for harassment restraining order, contending that the petition filed in June related to the March incident, which did not involve plaintiff, and which did not involve ongoing conduct. Defendant purportedly also urged that the substance of the harassment allegations has been previously denied on the merits with respect to Anderson’s petition. Defendant denied any allegations of harassment, although she admitted that she did sometimes go to the oncology unit in the performance of her job duties.
Defendant, in her brief, “adamantly asserts that [plaintiff] and Anderson conspired to pursue the petition for a civil harassment restraining order.... In other words, [plaintiff] re-filed her petition so that both she and Anderson could get a ‘second bite at the apple’ and have the restraining order tried before a different tribunal in a concerted effort to bring about what [defendant] would deem a SLAPP suit.”
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
What this court actually has before it is the propriety of the issuance of the permanent restraining order, naming both plaintiff and Anderson as protected parties. “As a general matter, the grant or denial of a permanent injunction rests within the trial court’s sound discretion, which we do not disturb on appeal absent a showing of clear abuse. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 390 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644].)” (Classis of Central California v. Miraloma Community Church (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)
II. Defendant Has Failed to Show the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Issuing Injunctive Relief
As noted, defendant has failed to provide a record adequate to evaluate her claims of error. We have no record of the evidence presented at the hearing, nor even the moving papers and response. Whatever “facts” defendant may have recited in her briefs, there is no record to substantiate any such factual matters or allegations.
An appealed judgment is presumed correct. It is the affirmative burden of the appealing party to demonstrate error. (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) This defendant has failed to do so, by failing to provide any record sufficient for review. There is certainly nothing of record to support the “facts” upon which defendant relies. We therefore have no basis upon which to determine that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the restraining order, or in adding Anderson as a named protected party. The presumption of correctness prevails.
DISPOSITION
As the appealing party, it was incumbent upon defendant to demonstrate error. Defendant failed to make any such showing. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Plaintiff and respondent is awarded her costs on appeal
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., MILLER J.