Opinion
A122156.
6-26-2009
STARLA COOPER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GOLDEN GATE REPORTERS, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
After a bench trial, respondent Golden Gate Reporters, LLC (Golden Gate) prevailed in appellant Starla Coopers appeal of an adverse Labor Commissioner ruling on her complaint for overtime and vacation pay. The trial court also awarded Golden Gate $10,000 in attorney fees. Cooper appeals, contending inter alia that (1) undisputed evidence established that her former employer waived its contractual requirement that she present her overtime claim to its principal; (2) the trial court erroneously considered an unnegotiated check for overtime pay; (3) it failed to consider evidence supporting her claim for vacation pay; and (4) it erred in awarding attorney fees. We affirm the judgment and the attorney fees award.
Cooper filed a timely June 2, 2008 notice of appeal from the trial courts April 11, 2008 judgment. She filed an amended notice of appeal on June 20, 2008, from the trial courts April 11, 2008 judgment and its June 13, 2008 attorney fees order. The amended notice of appeal was untimely as to the judgment, but her earlier notice of appeal brings that judgment before us on appeal. The June 13, 2008 attorney fees order referenced in the amended notice of appeal was a minute order, which is not an appealable order. A minute order is not a judgment, but merely a basis on which a judgment may be made. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1121, fn. 3; see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); see also 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 8, pp. 552-553.) However, as the record on appeal contains a formal June 19, 2008 order awarding attorney fees to Golden Gate, we will construe the June 20, 2008 amended notice of appeal to be from the appealable order and will proceed to determine the merits of the appeal. Thus, we deem this amended notice of appeal to constitute a separate and timely notice of appeal from the attorney fees order, properly bringing that order before us on appeal, as well. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [liberal construction of notice of appeal].)
I. FACTS
Respondent Golden Gate has been in operation since 1989. Jill Perkins was Golden Gates principal. In December 1998, appellant Starla Cooper began working for Golden Gate as an office assistant, eventually rising to the position of office manager. As office manager, one of her tasks was to report employee hours—including her own overtime hours—to the company that issued Golden Gates paychecks. In November 2003, a new written employment agreement was entered for an annual salary of $45,000. It set an eight-hour work day for Cooper and required that she be paid at a time-and-a-half overtime rate for any work in excess of 40 hours per week.
The contract provided for an average work week of 36 hours per week, as Cooper took one day off without pay every two weeks. Thus, she worked 40 hours one week and 32 hours the next.
The agreement required that Cooper submit a claim for her overtime hours every week to Perkins, to allow Golden Gate to "get a handle on how all employees hours are best used." Overtime was paid on a quarterly basis. In 2004, Cooper earned three weeks vacation each year. By March 2005, she was earning $25 per hour. She was paid for overtime work in a separate check, often several months after she claimed earning it. In 2006, Golden Gate paid Cooper an $8,600 bonus. She was paid in July for her overtime claims through February, although she failed to cash the check she received for the first two months of 2006.
All subsequent dates refer to the 2006 calendar year unless otherwise indicated.
Early in 2006, Perkins asked Cooper if she wanted to purchase Golden Gate, but they did not reach an agreement to do so. Perkins arranged to sell the company to a third party, whom Cooper met in late July. Cooper decided to start her own court reporting business with two other coworkers from Golden Gate. She provided financial backing for this new venture and she signed articles of incorporation, but did not take any action in connection with her new business until after she left for vacation in August.
On August 9, Cooper was on vacation and was not due back to work at Golden Gate until August 22. On August 9, West Coast Reporters—the competing court reporting company—filed for incorporation in California. Perkins learned from a client of the existence of West Coast and learned that Cooper owned it. West Coast was soliciting Golden Gates clients. On August 15, Golden Gate terminated Coopers employment, sending her a letter of termination and a check for the $1,950 in wages that it believed was due to her as of that date. Perkins advised Cooper that she had taken all three weeks of her 2006 vacation by August 8.
On August 27, Cooper sent a letter to Perkins seeking a total of $8,049 from Golden Gate—$6,581.25 for overtime worked from March through August 2006, $1,400 for seven unused 2005 and 2006 days, and $67.75 in miscellaneous expenses. Golden Gate sent a check for $67.75, but otherwise denied Coopers request on August 31.
In September, Cooper filed a complaint with the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. She sought unpaid overtime wages, vacation pay, interest and penalties. Specifically, she claimed $6,581.25 in overtime wages, including work conducted during her lunch hour and telephone work completed each weekday and weekend. Cooper claimed that she was still owed $1,400 pay for seven days accrued but unused vacation time—three days carried over from 2005 and four days earned in 2006.
In March 2007, a hearing was conducted by a hearing officer designated by the Labor Commissioner. Cooper testified that she worked an average 9.5-hour day, including working through her lunch hour. For 30 minutes each day and two hours each weekend, she monitored Golden Gates answering machine during her overtime hours. She testified that she verbally reported her overtime to Golden Gate every two weeks and had been paid for all overtime earned through March. Golden Gate had asked her to wait for payment of overtime wages due to her since that time. It was Coopers intention to be on vacation through August 15 and to give Golden Gate notice when she returned from vacation. She denied soliciting any of Golden Gates clients before her discharge, but admitted that some of her current clients had once been Golden Gate customers.
Perkins testified that Cooper would notify the paycheck company directly of any overtime she has worked. She testified that she was not aware that Cooper was working through lunch, but later admitted that she sometimes saw Cooper eating lunch at her desk. There was no agreement that an employee was entitled to a full years vacation time if the employee was not there for the entire year. Perkins believed that Cooper had been overpaid $672 for 3.36 days of vacation time. Cooper spent about 20 percent of the evening and weekend time she claimed for monitoring the company answering machine.
In April 2007, the Labor Commissioner awarded Cooper only $400 in damages. (See Lab. Code, § 203 [waiting time penalty].) It concluded that Cooper was not due any vacation wages. The Labor Commissioner found that, under the terms of Coopers employment agreement, she had accrued almost 13 days of vacation by August. She used and was paid for 17 days of vacation. It concluded that Golden Gate had no obligation to pay Cooper—who was an exempt employee—for overtime hours. (§ 515.) It did find that Golden Gate owed Cooper a penalty equivalent to two days pay for failure to pay in full wages due by the date that her final wages were mailed to her.
All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.
In May 2007, Cooper exercised her right to appeal the Labor Commissioners ruling to the trial court. She sought $9,172.07 in unpaid overtime pay, $1,400 in unpaid vacation pay and $5,493.95 in liquidated damages. (§ 227.3, 510, subd. (a); see tit. 29, U.S.C. § 216 [liquidated damages].) The overtime pay claim included the $6,581.25 sought before the Labor Commissioner, another $450 for a days work that was not included in her previous request, and an amount to replace a $2,140.82 check for January and February overtime that Cooper had failed to cash.
Golden Gate opposed Coopers overtime request on several grounds, including her failure to make a timely request for overtime pay. It claimed that she owed them $253 for excess overtime payments. It also challenged her right to any additional compensation for vacation pay, claiming that Cooper had in fact been overpaid $672 for vacation pay. Golden Gate also asserted that Cooper had been overpaid $15,000 for her regular wages during a three-year period. Finally, it argued that it was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs in the event that Coopers appeal was unsuccessful. (See § 98.2, subd. (c).)
This provision took effect in January 2008. (See Stats. 2007, ch. 738, § 40; see also Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (a).) Golden Gate provided Cooper with notice of its intention to seek attorney fees and costs in its March 2008 trial brief.
At trial, Cooper testified she reported to Golden Gate all her overtime hours for the first half of 2006, and that her claim was approved but never paid. She told the trial court that she reported these hours to Golden Gate every week in writing on a Post-it Note. However, before the Labor Commissioner, Cooper testified that she made a verbal report of her overtime hours.
Perkins testified that Cooper never informed her of Coopers overtime hours, either verbally or in writing. Perkins knew that Cooper was claiming and being paid for overtime, but did not realize that her claimed overtime included lunch hours and weekend telephone monitoring hours. Perkins monitored the answering machine on the weekends, so it was not necessary for Cooper to do so. Cooper was a trusted employee. When she claimed overtime pay owed to her, Perkins always paid them. Perkins also testified that Cooper took all the vacation to which she was entitled every year.
The trial court found Coopers testimony was not credible, specifically finding that Cooper did not inform Golden Gate of her overtime hours every week and that Golden Gate did not approve overtime for the first and second quarters of 2006, but then fail to pay it. It found that she was obligated to advise Golden Gate of her overtime on a weekly basis, but did not do so. Finding that Cooper failed to prove her claim by a preponderance of evidence, it entered judgment in favor of Golden Gate on Coopers appeal from the Labor Commissioners ruling.
Having obtained judgment in its favor, Golden Gate sought $17,367 in attorney fees and costs, pursuant to statute. (§ 98.2, subd. (c).) Cooper opposed the motion, finding that the costs and attorney fees claimed by Golden Gate were both excessive. She asserted that $5,000 in attorney fees and $335 in costs would be more reasonable. In its reply, Golden Gate reiterated its earlier claim that its fee request was reasonable. In June 2008, the trial court awarded Golden Gate $10,000 in attorney fees and $1,696 in costs.
In January 2009, we denied Golden Gates motion to dismiss this appeal and thus rejected its claim that we lack jurisdiction to consider the issues before us.
II. OVERTIME PAY
A. Waiver
Cooper raises several challenges to the trial courts finding that she is not entitled to recover for overtime pay. (See § 510, subd. (a).) She contends that undisputed evidence established that she worked overtime during the relevant time period. Preliminarily, she argues that undisputed evidence established that Golden Gate had waived its contractual requirement that she present a weekly overtime claim to its principal, Jill Perkins. The waiver issue is crucial to Coopers claim of error on appeal.
The November 2003 contract required that Cooper provide Perkins with a weekly report of overtime hours. Cooper testified that she provided this report in various ways. Perkins denied that any report had ever been provided. The trial court found that Coopers evidence that she provided a weekly report to Perkins lacked credibility. It then found that Cooper had not complied with the contractual requirement of making a weekly claim, and thus was not entitled to any overtime pay.
Typically, an attack on the sufficiency of evidence supporting a trial courts findings would be reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence. In these circumstances, our power begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence to support the trial courts findings. We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence. We may not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve any conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. (Overton v. Vita-Food Corp. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370, disapproved on another point in Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 866, fn. 2; see Bravo v. Buelow (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 208, 211.)
Cooper seeks to avoid application of this normal standard of review by urging us to find instead that the trial court failed to address the issue of whether Perkins waived the contractual requirement of a weekly overtime report by paying her overtime even without a weekly report. We disagree with her interpretation of the trial courts ruling. By its finding that Cooper had failed to meet the contractual requirement of a weekly report of overtime hours, the trial court impliedly rejected her argument that Golden Gate had waived this requirement.
Even though the trial court found it unbelievable, Coopers testimony that she complied with the contractual requirement by reporting her overtime hours tended to undermine her argument that Golden Gate had waived this requirement.
Thus, the normal substantial evidence test applies on appeal. Applying that test, we conclude that the November 2003 contract required that Cooper provide a weekly report of overtime hours to Perkins. The trial court made a factual finding that Cooper did not do so. Perkinss testimony provides substantial evidence in support of that factual finding. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that Coopers failure to comply with the requirements of the contract precluded any award for additional overtime pay.
B. Check
Cooper also challenges the trial courts rejection of her claim for January and February overtime pay. At trial, Cooper placed into evidence an unnegotiated check for $2,140.82 that she received from Golden Gate for overtime for this period. Perkins testified that she did not believe that the check was outstanding because her statements balanced, but admitted that the check did not appear to have been cashed.
On appeal, Cooper contends that the unnegotiated check was invalid, that she was entitled to a replacement check, and that the trial court erred by not entering a judgment in her favor for its face value. The trial court found that Golden Gate had met its obligation to pay Cooper for the January and February overtime. We agree with this assessment. Golden Gate breached no duty to Cooper, who is not entitled to judgment simply because she failed to negotiate a check that it paid to her.
III. VACATION PAY
Noting that the judgment contains no specific findings on vacation pay, Cooper contends that the trial court failed to consider the evidence she offered in support of her claim for vacation pay. She construes the judgment to be silent on the vacation pay issue. Again, we disagree with her interpretation of the trial courts ruling. The judgment recites that Cooper sought both overtime and vacation pay, making it clear that the trial court was aware that this issue was before it for resolution. The trial court found that she had not proven her claim and ruled that she would recover nothing. Impliedly, the trial court found against Cooper on her claim for vacation pay, as well as on the overtime pay issue about which it included findings in its judgment.
Having found that the trial court resolved the vacation pay issue, we consider whether its implied findings of fact against Cooper were supported by substantial evidence. When an employment contract provides for paid vacation and an employee is terminated without having taken all of his or her vested vacation time, all unpaid vacation time must be paid to the employee as wages at the final rate of pay in accordance with that contract. (§ 227.3.) Cooper testified that she was entitled to 15 days of vacation in both 2005 and 2006. She claimed that three of the 2005 vacation days were carried over to 2006 but unused, and that she still had 2006 unused vacation days at the time that she was terminated. Golden Gate countered this evidence by Perkinss own testimony that Cooper had taken all vacation time to which she was entitled.
While Cooper argues that the trial court wholly failed to consider her evidence, we are satisfied that the trial court considered it, but found it to lack credibility. The evidence on the issue of vacation pay was conflicting. The trial court found Perkinss testimony on this issue to be more believable than Coopers testimony. The trial court has the exclusive authority to resolve credibility issues and on appeal, we have no power to overturn that determination. (See Overton v. Vita-Food Corp., supra, 94 Cal.App.2d at p. 370.) We must accept the trial courts view of the credibility of the evidence it heard.
Cooper also contends that Golden Gates failure to present documentary evidence to contradict the personal calendar that she offered at trial precludes her former employer from contesting her calculation of vacation pay. In so doing, she ignores Golden Gates other evidence—Perkinss testimony—tending to support the trial courts finding against Cooper on this issue. (See Evid. Code, § 140 [evidence includes testimony and writings].) As the plaintiff, Cooper had the burden of proving her right to vacation pay. (See Evid. Code, § 500.) Golden Gate did not have any obligation to provide any particular form of evidence to counter Coopers claim. Perkinss sworn testimony alone was sufficient to defeat Coopers claim for vacation pay and to support the trial courts judgment on this issue. Thus, we find substantial evidence supports the trial courts judgment on the vacation pay issue.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
Finally, Cooper argues that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney fees to Golden Gate, for two reasons. We necessarily reject her first claim of error, as it is based on her claim that the underlying judgment against her was in error. (See pts. II. & III., ante.) In her alternative argument, Cooper reasons that the attorney fees award was "patently excessive" because, as she sees it, the issues presented were not complex and were duplicative of those presented in the underlying Labor Commissioner proceeding.
Cooper does not appear to challenge the cost award.
When an employee unsuccessfully appeals from a Labor Commissioners ruling to a trial court, the employer is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees, in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (§ 98.2, subd. (c).) A trial court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Mustachio v. Great Western Bank (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1151.) An experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court. While that judgment is subject to review, it will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095; Ciani v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 563, 571.)
An abuse of discretion arises if the record establishes no reasonable basis for the trial courts ruling. (Ciani v. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 571.) An attorney fees order is unreasonable if it is manifestly excessive under the circumstances. (Childrens Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 782.) In this matter, Golden Gate provided the trial court with ample evidence in support of its request for attorney fees. A reasonable attorney fee is not padded by inefficient or duplicative efforts. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) In a declaration filed under penalty of perjury, counsel for Golden Gate specifically disputed Coopers charge that his efforts duplicated those undertaken before the Labor Commissioner. The evidence on this issue was contradicted and it would appear that the trial court found Golden Gates evidence more persuasive.
We find it significant that the trial court did not rubber stamp Golden Gates requested amount of attorney fees. Its $16,000 attorney fees claim—although supported by a specific breakdown of dates, activities, hours and rates—was reduced to a $10,000 award. On this record, we find nothing to support Coopers claim that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amounts it did for reasonable attorney fees.
The judgment and the attorney fees award are affirmed.
We concur:
Ruvolo, P.J.
Rivera, J.