Opinion
Record No. 0933-94-1
Decided: January 31, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Edward W. Hanson, Jr., Judge
(Theresa B. Berry; Samford Berry, on brief), for appellant.
(Leslie L. Lilley, City Attorney; Teresa N. Hammons, Assistant City Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Koontz and Bray
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Angela Cooper appeals the decision of the circuit court terminating her residual parental rights to her three daughters. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Cooper asserts that the evidence did not support a finding that the Department of Social Services (DSS) provided her with appropriate rehabilitative services in order to reduce or eliminate the abuse and neglect suffered by Cooper's children. While DSS provided services, Cooper argues that DSS failed to tailor those services to her reduced mental resources.
Under Code Sec. 16.1-283(B), the residual parental rights to children found to be neglected or abused may be terminated if
the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by the child presented a serious and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so as to allow the child's safe return to his parent . . . within a reasonable period of time.
Prima facie evidence of the finding set out in subpart (B) (2) is established by proof that the parent, "without good cause, [has] not responded to or followed through with appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative efforts on the part of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or abuse of the child." Code Sec. 16.1-283(B) (2)(c).
When addressing matters concerning a child, including the termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests. On review, "[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child's best interests." Furthermore, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and its evidence is afforded all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. "In matters of a child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best interests." The trial court's judgment, "when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Logan v. Fairfax County, Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citations omitted).
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that demonstrated that Cooper's children were neglected, that the neglect presented a serious and substantial threat to their life, health, and development, and that it was not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in the children's neglect could be substantially eliminated or corrected to allow their return to their mother within a reasonable period of time.
The evidence indicated that the children were placed with DSS by Cooper in March 1992 because they were homeless. DSS provided Cooper with numerous services, including paying rent on an apartment, paying past due utility bills, offering to obtain furnishings, and providing transportation for appointments and visitation. Both DSS and the court assigned persons to assist Cooper. Despite the assistance, the conditions which led to the children's neglect had not improved in the two years since their placement in foster care.
Cooper failed to take advantage of the assistance offered through DSS and repeatedly missed scheduled appointments and visitations with her children without good reason. Cooper was uncooperative with DSS as well as with the counselors and social workers seeking to help her and the children. While psychological testing indicated that Cooper possessed reduced mental capacity, Cooper's lack of cooperation repeatedly hampered DSS's attempts to assist her. Cooper's refusal to acknowledge the problems faced by her children, particularly her oldest daughter, caused serious disruption in their lives.
When the children were taken into foster care, their condition demonstrated their neglect. The two younger daughters arrived into foster care scared and uncared for but are thriving in their foster home. The oldest daughter has serious emotional problems which require exceptional services. All three children require consistency and care, which Cooper remains unable to provide.
Based upon the record before us, we cannot say the trial court's decision to terminate Cooper's parental rights was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed