Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS110070, James C. Chalfant, Judge.
Morrow & Morrow and Lawrence F. Nelson, Jr. for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Alan L. Manning, Assistant City Attorney, and Mary Jo Curwen, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
KITCHING, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Gary D. Cooper, formerly employed as a City of Los Angeles police officer, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking a writ directing the Department of Fire and Police Pensions of the City of Los Angeles (the Department) to set aside its rejection of his pension application and to determine that application. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Cooper failed to show the element of reliance required to equitably estop the Department from denying his application for a service-connected disability pension because Cooper did not file that application within the one-year limitations period in the Los Angeles City Charter. We also conclude that Cooper has not shown that the one-year limitations period should have been equitably tolled. We affirm the judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Gary D. Cooper was employed by the Los Angeles Police Department as a patrol officer from April 1974 until 1989, when he was transferred to the medical liaison section, where he worked as a claims investigator in the Claims Validation Unit. Claims investigators investigated other officers’ claims for worker’s compensation benefits and for pension benefits, and disseminated information to City of Los Angeles (sometimes City) entities dealing with those benefit claims.
Claims investigators knew that claims for workers’ compensation benefits were filed with the employment department and decided by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and that claims for disability pension benefits for sworn police department employees were filed with the Department of Pensions. Claims investigators knew that workers’ compensation benefits and disability pension benefits were two different benefit systems, which operated independently in making determinations about injuries or illness pursuant to the law governing each system. Cooper knew that the Department of Pensions separately handled claims for disability pensions.
In February 1992, Cooper lost consciousness while driving to work in an unmarked police car. Cooper’s physician advised him that he had a mitral valve prolapse. Cooper reported his blackout and his doctor’s diagnosis to a supervisor. Cooper asked if a mitral valve prolapse was work connected. He was told it was not, that mitral valve prolapse was genetic, and that his employer would deny any claim related to mitral valve prolapse. His supervisor, Lieutenant Gagnon, told him that asking for workers’ compensation would be a waste of time. A co-worker in the medical liaison unit confirmed that mitral valve prolapse was genetic and not covered as a work injury. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Gagnon informed Cooper that he discussed his mitral valve prolapse with Jurutha Brown, Chief of the Workers’ Compensation Division of the City’s Personnel Department. Brown confirmed to Gagnon that mitral valve prolapse was not a work-related injury or illness and the City would not accept Cooper’s claim. Gagnon told Cooper “not to bother” filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Cooper continued to work in the Claims Validation Unit until he retired with a service pension on September 3, 1994. When applying for a pension, he believed his only realistic choice was to apply for a service pension. Based on his knowledge at the time that his medical condition was not an employment-related disability, he concluded there was no reason to apply for a service-connected disability pension. Cooper could have applied for a nonservice-connected disability pension, but he believed this application would have produced a pension of half the amount of his service pension and would require him to submit to an arduous, adversarial process in dealing with the Department of Pensions. Thus he did not consider applying for a nonservice-connected disability pension.
From his retirement from the Los Angeles Police Department in 1994 through 2006, Cooper was employed as a Workers’ Compensation Investigator by the City of Los Angeles and Cambridge Integrated Services.
In April 2002, while talking with a City worker’s compensation adjustor, Cooper learned that his mitral valve prolapse was a heart condition that might be covered under workers’ compensation as industrially caused. The next day he filed an application for workers’ compensation. Initially his claim was denied as untimely filed. However, a Workers’ Compensation Judge issued findings that the statute of limitations did not bar Cooper’s claim, that Cooper had heart trouble within the meaning of Labor Code section 3212.5 that manifested itself during Cooper’s employment in 1992, and that Cooper was entitled to the heart presumption. Cooper’s injury was found to cause him permanent disability, described as “slight heart disease,” with restrictions of no heavy work and avoidance of more than ordinary stress and working at unprotected heights or around dangerous, moving equipment. Cooper was awarded 60 percent permanent disability on July 26, 2006.
On April 4, 2007, Cooper applied for disability pension retroactive to September 3, 1994. On May 3, 2007, the Department determined that Cooper was not eligible to apply for disability pension benefits because he had not applied within 12 months of his separation from his employing department, as required by the City of Los Angeles Administrative Code section 5.170.
On July 24, 2007, Cooper filed a petition for writ of mandate against the Department. It sought a writ of mandate directing the Department to set aside its determination refusing to accept Cooper’s application for pension benefits and to determine that application in accordance with law.
The trial court found that the Department was not equitably estopped from finding that the statute of limitations had passed for Cooper’s disability pension claim from his September 3, 1994, retirement until he filed his workers’ compensation claim in April 2002. Advice from his supervisor and Brown that his mitral valve prolapse was not work related and that the City would deny a workers’ claim based on it did not prevent Cooper from applying for a disability pension. The trial court found Cooper did not show the element of reliance necessary to equitably estop the Department.
The trial court entered a judgment denying the petition on July 8, 2008. Cooper filed a timely notice of appeal.
ISSUES
Cooper claims on appeal that:
1. The City of Los Angeles is estopped from pleading the statute of limitations to deny processing Cooper’s disability pension application; and
2. The statutory limitations period is equitably tolled from the time of notice to the Department to the time of denial in writing of industrial causation.
DISCUSSION
1. The Department Was Not Equitably Estopped From Rejecting Cooper’s Service-Connected Disability Claim As Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Cooper claims that the Department should be equitably estopped from invoking the one-year statute of limitations in City of Los Angeles Charter section 350.
This opinion will refer to sections of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles as City Charter sections.
a. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a petition for writ of mandamus brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, this court ordinarily confines its inquiry as to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and judgment. When an appellate court must resolve questions of law on undisputed fact, the standard of review then requires an independent analysis. (Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1418.)
b. The Pension System of the Department
A board of five commissioners controls and manages the Department. (City Charter § 500(a).) California Constitution, Article XVI, section 17 and City Charter section 1106 give the Board authority to administer the Department’s pension system to provide benefits to system participants and their beneficiaries.
System members can apply for a service-connected disability pension or for a nonservice-connected disability pension. If the Board determines the system member became physically or mentally incapacitated by reason of injuries received or sickness caused by the discharge of the person’s duties as a department member and as a result is incapable of performing his duties, the Board retires such person and such retired member is paid a monthly service-connected disability pension. (City Charter, § 1412(a).) If the Board determines that the system member became physically or mentally incapacitated by reason of injuries other than injuries received or sickness caused by discharge of the person’s duties as a department member and as a result is incapable of performing his duties, and determines that the system member’s moral turpitude did not cause the disability, the Board retires such person and such retired member is paid a monthly nonservice-connected disability pension. (Id. at § 1412(b).)
When a system member applies for a disability pension, City Charter section 1412, subdivision (c) requires the Board to cause three physicians to examine the system member and to obtain a written report of that examination, to hold a hearing on the application, and to receive and hear other evidence relating to the system member’s disability or claimed disability. City Charger section 1412, subdivision (c) further states: “The Board shall have the power to hear and determine all matters pertaining to the granting and denying of any such application or request for a disability pension. The Board first shall determine whether or not the System Member is incapable of or from performing his duties as a Department Member. If the Board were to determine that he is not so incapable, it then shall be the duty of the Board to deny the application or request. If the Board were to determine that he is so incapable, it then shall determine, pursuant to the language used in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, whether his incapacity or disability is service-connected or nonservice-connected.”
An application for a pension to a pension board constitutes a “claim” against the City. (Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 43 Cal.2d 497, 505.) Thus it is governed by the limitations period in City Charter Section 350, subdivision (a), which prohibits a suit on a claim for money damages against the City from being brought until a claim has been filed with the City Clerk and rejected in whole or in part. It states: “Except in those cases where a shorter period of time is otherwise provided by state law, all claims for damages against the City must be presented within six months for personal injury and within one year for property damage after the occurrence from which the damages arose, or after the last item of the account or claim accrued.” (City Charter, § 350, subd. (a).)
Cooper did not apply for a disability pension with the Pension Board of the Department within the one-year time limit in City Charter Section 350. Having retired on September 3, 1994, he did not file an application for a disability pension until April 4, 2007. His claim would be barred unless, as he argues, the Department is equitably estopped from raising the defense of untimeliness.
c. Cooper Has Not Shown His Reliance on Conduct of the City of Los Angeles Necessary for Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that: “(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Driscoll v. City of Los Angele (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297,305.)
“The existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact for the trial court whose determination is conclusive on appeal unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence. [Citation.] When the evidence is not in conflict and is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel is a question of law.” (Driscoll v. City of Los Angele, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 305.)
The trial court found that that equitable estoppel did not apply because Cooper had not established his reliance on the conduct of City of Los Angeles employees. After he lost consciousness while driving to work and was diagnosed by his physician as having a mitral valve prolapse, Cooper asked his supervisor, Lieutenant Gagnon, about this diagnosis. Gagnon told him that asking for workers’ compensation would be a waste of time; a co-worker confirmed that mitral valve prolapse was not covered as a work injury; and Gagnon discussed that matter with Jurutha Brown, Chief of the Workers’ Compensation Division, who confirmed to Gagnon that mitral valve prolapse was not a work-related injury or illness and the city would not accept Cooper’s claim. Gagnon told Cooper “not to bother” filing a workers’ compensation claim. Cooper stated that in reliance on these representations, he did not make a workers’ compensation claim at that time.
There was evidence, however, that claims investigators in the Claims Validation Unit, where Cooper was employed, knew that claims for workers’ compensation benefits were filed with the employment department and decided by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, and knew that claims for disability pension benefits by sworn police department employees were filed with the Department of Pensions. Claims investigators knew that workers’ compensation benefits and disability pension benefits were different benefits systems, which operated independently in making determinations about injuries or illness pursuant to the law governing each system. Cooper knew that the Department of Pensions separately handled claims for disability pensions.
The issues, and the law, differ in workers’ compensation claims and disability pension claims, and the Workers Compensation Appeals Board and the pension board exist for different reasons and to achieve independent objectives. (Garrick v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 243, 246.) More specifically, “a WCAB proceeding decides whether the employee suffered any job-related injury. If that injury results in some permanent residual loss (i.e., loss of normal use of a body part, impaired earning capacity, or some other competitive handicap in the labor market), the WCAB awards the employee a permanent disability rating. [Citation.] Retirement boards, on the other hand, focus on a different issue: whether an employee has suffered an injury or disease of such magnitude and nature that he is incapacitated from substantially performing his job responsibilities. [Citation.] Because of the differences in the issues, ‘[a] finding by the WCAB of permanent disability, which may be partial for the purposes of workers’ compensation, does not bind the retirement board on the issue of the employee’s incapacity to perform his duties.’ [Citation.]” (Bianchi v. City of San Diego (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 563, 567.) Even where the record contains medical opinions of a permanent disability for purposes of a prior workers’ compensation claim, a workers’ compensation ruling is not binding on the issue of eligibility for disability retirement. (Smith v. City of Napa (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 194, 207.)
Winn v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 532, involving the provisions of the City of Los Angeles Charter at issue in this appeal, illustrates the differing determinations of the WCAB of an application for workers’ compensation benefits and of the Pension Board of an application for disability benefits. “The determinations of the pension board were not the same as those made by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. The pension board determined appellant was not incapable of performing duties to which he may be assigned. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board... found that appellant had suffered injury to his back and psyche and awarded 48 ¼ percent permanent disability. These findings and award would not preclude a finding by the pension board that appellant was capable of performing the duties to which he may be assigned.... [¶] ‘[A] person “should not be retired if he can perform duties in a given permanent assignment with the department. He need not be able to perform any and all duties performed by... policemen.” [Citation.] The court relied on the “well recognized public policy favoring the employment and utilization of physically handicapped persons.” [Citation.] [Craver v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 76] concluded that if a person is not disabled to a degree which prevents him from serving in any position, “he should not be retired with payment of a disability pension.” ’ ” (Winn, at pp. 539-540.)
Cooper has not alleged that anyone from the City of Los Angeles told him that he could not file for a disability pension. It was not reasonable for Cooper to rely on the statements by Gagnon, his co-worker, and Brown because those statements referred to whether Cooper should file a worker’s compensation claim. There was evidence that all claims investigators, such as Cooper, knew and understood that the opinion of a supervisor or co-worker about whether Cooper should file a workers’ compensation claim or whether that claim would be approved were only opinions of those individuals. Moreover, those opinions addressed a worker’s compensation application, a different benefit decided upon by a different entity than a claim for a service-connected disability pension. There was evidence that all claims investigators knew that, pursuant to City Charter section 1412, only the Pension Board could determine the validity of a claim for a service-connected disability pension. In deciding whether he should file an application for a service connected disability pension, it would be unreasonable for Cooper to have relied on the opinions of his supervisor, co-worker, and Brown about whether he should apply for workers’ compensation.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Cooper failed to allege the reliance necessary to equitably estop the City from rejecting Cooper’s application for a service-connected disability pension as untimely. As Cooper’s application was untimely filed, the trial court correctly denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
2. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply to Cooper’s Disability Pension Claim
Cooper also claims that the limitations period for applying for a service-connected disability pension was equitably tolled from the time of notice to the Department of workers’ compensation issues to the time of denial in writing of industrial causation.
This claim relies in part on Cooper’s assertion that the City of Los Angeles was required to give him notice of his workers’ compensation rights (see Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 57, 64). The workers’ compensation statutes in the Labor Code, however, do not apply to pension proceedings of a charter city such as the City of Los Angeles, and thus do not require the City of Los Angeles to give notice to Cooper of his service-connected disability pension rights. (Garrick v. Board of Pension Commissioners, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 246.)
Cooper cites Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674. That case held that when an insured files a timely notice of loss with the insurer, the one-year policy limitation period is equitably tolled from the time the notice of loss to the time the insurer formally denies the claim in writing. (Id. at p. 678.) Here Cooper did not timely file his notice of his workers’ compensation claim within the one-year period required by City Charter section 350. Therefore that limitations period was not equitably tolled. A pending workers’ compensation application equitably tolls the one-year period in which to file an application for a service-connected disability pension until the applicant receives a final workers’ compensation award. (Barth v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 826, 833.) Because Cooper did not file for workers’ compensation until April 2002, there was no pending workers’ compensation proceeding which could toll the one-year period (which began on the date of his September 3, 1994, retirement) within which he had to apply for a service-connected disability pension. No equitable tolling occurred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to the Department of Fire and Police Pensions of the City of Los Angeles.
We concur: CROSKEY, Acting P. J. ALDRICH, J.