Opinion
NO. 01-16-00201-CR
04-11-2017
CRISTEN ELIZABETH COONS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. MD-0357952
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Cristen Elizabeth Coons, guilty of assault causing bodily injury—family member and assessed her punishment at 190 days' confinement in the county jail and a $2,000 fine. The trial court suspended appellant's sentence and fine and placed her on community supervision for twenty-four months. In two points of error, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting her custodial statements made to police and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm.
Background
On December 13, 2013, Craig Lodrigue took his son, E.L., to basketball practice at the Perry YMCA in League City. Appellant, Lodrigue's ex-girlfriend and E.L.'s mother, showed up at practice to see E.L.
Appellant had completed a thirty-day drug rehabilitation program one day earlier and had not seen E.L. during the thirty-day period.
At trial, Lodrigue testified that appellant told him at the end of practice that she was going to take E.L. home to spend the night with her. Lodrigue told appellant "no" because she had just left a drug treatment facility the day before and they had not planned for E.L. to stay with appellant. Lodrigue testified that appellant became angry and began yelling at him. Lodrigue, who had been carrying E.L., put him down and turned to argue with appellant. As he turned to face her, appellant leaned toward Lodrigue, bit off his lip, and spit it on the ground. Lodrigue then pushed appellant causing her to fall down, took his shirt off and put it over his lip, picked E.L. up, and drove to the emergency room.
Lodrigue and appellant shared custody of E.L. but did not have a court-ordered custodial arrangement in place at the time.
Officer Giovanni Mejjia with the League City Police Department met Lodrigue at the hospital after the incident. Lodrigue told Officer Mejia that appellant had bitten his lip off at the YMCA. When Officer Mejia called appellant, she told him that she had gone to the YMCA to see her son at basketball practice and that she wanted to take E.L. home after practice but that Lodrigue objected. Appellant told Officer Mejia that she and Lodrigue began arguing in each other's faces, and that Lodrigue grabbed her by the arms, shook her forcefully, and then grabbed her by the hair and threw her to the floor. Appellant told Officer Mejia that when she got back up and Lodrigue grabbed her again, she bit his lip off to get him off her. Appellant did not call the police after the incident. Appellant told Officer Mejia that Lodrigue had alcohol on his breath at the time of the incident. Officer Mejia, however, testified that he did not smell alcohol when he spoke to Lodrigue at the hospital and that no medical personnel advised him that Lodrigue smelled like alcohol. Officer Mejia further testified that he spoke to E.L. and that E.L.'s account of the incident did not match appellant's.
On December 17, 2013, Detective Morton Grant with the League City Police Department began an investigation into the incident. Detective Grant testified that he has investigated hundreds of domestic assault cases in his twenty-six years with the department. In the course of his investigation, Detective Grant spoke with Lodrigue, appellant, E.L., a YMCA coach, and the YMCA director. He testified that he reviewed the YMCA's surveillance video but that it only showed the front doors and the entrance and not the inside of the building where the incident took place.
Detective Grant testified that he spoke to appellant in his office, that she was not in custody, and that she was aware that she was free to leave. In the audio and videotaped interview, Detective Grant advised appellant that she was not obliged to be there, her presence was voluntary, and that she was free to leave at any time. He further advised her that if she was uncomfortable with any of the questions, she did not have to answer them. Appellant acknowledged that she understood that she could leave. At the end of the interview, appellant left Detective Grant's office. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court admitted the recording into evidence.
Appellant told Detective Grant that after she arrived at the YMCA to see E.L., she and Lodrigue had an altercation over whether E.L. was going to go home with appellant or Lodrigue. Appellant told Detective Grant that Lodrigue grabbed her by the shoulders and pushed her down, causing her to strike her head on the ground, and that she jumped up and bit him on the lip. Appellant also told Detective Grant that she screamed for help. When asked if he noted anything in particular about appellant's story, Detective Grant testified that, in his experience, victims typically call police once they had been assaulted but that appellant did not call police in this case. Detective Grant also testified that E.L. did not give the same account of the incident as appellant.
In the course of his investigation, Detective Grant interviewed Faite Williams, a juvenile who was present at the YMCA during the assault. Williams told Detective Grant that he saw a man and woman arguing over a child, shouting at each other nose-to-nose, and that the woman slapped the basketball out of the man's hands. Williams stated that it looked like the man head-butted the woman and that she then bit his lip. Williams further stated that the man pushed the woman down after she bit him on the lip. Detective Grant testified that, based on the investigation as well as his training and experience, it was his opinion that appellant was not acting in self-defense when the assault occurred.
Anthony Sanchez, E.L.'s basketball coach, and Kelli Borer, the YMCA senior program director, both testified that they were at the YMCA on the evening of the assault but that they did not see or hear the altercation.
Appellant testified that, on the evening in question, Lodrigue became angry when she asked him if E.L. could spend the night with her, and that he lunged at her, grabbed her arms, pressed his face against hers, and yelled obscenities at her. Appellant testified that when she tried to move her head and get him off her, she bit his lip. She testified that she incorrectly told Officer Mejia and Detective Grant that Lodrigue had pushed her down before she bit his lip but that Lodrigue actually pushed her down afterwards.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In her second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's rejection of her claim that she acted in self-defense. The State argues that it proved all the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that a rational jury could have rejected appellant's self-defense claim.
We begin with appellant's legal sufficiency point because, if she prevails on that challenge, she would be entitled to judgment in her favor. See McGuire v. State, 493 S.W.3d 177, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd); see also Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.
A. Standard of Review
"[T]he Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (referring to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)). Under this standard, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction if, considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, no rational fact finder could have found that each essential element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient under this standard when either: (1) the record contains no evidence, or merely a "modicum" of evidence, probative of an element of the offense; or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 n.11, 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786, 2789, n.11; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, and our role on appeal is simply to ensure that the evidence reasonably supports the jury's verdict. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
B. Applicable Law
Self-defense is a defense to prosecution for the offense of assault causing bodily injury—family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 2.03, 9.02, 9.31 (West 2011). Under section 9.31(a), a person is justified in using force against another "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." Id. § 9.31(a) (West Supp. 2014). A "reasonable belief" is defined as a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(42).
A defendant bears the burden to produce some evidence supporting a claim of self-defense. Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). Once the defendant produces some evidence raising the issue of self-defense, the State then bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the asserted defense. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 380. The burden of persuasion does not require the State to produce evidence; rather, it requires that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it has made an implicit finding against any defensive theory raised by the defendant. See id. at 914.
C. Analysis
Appellant does not dispute that she bit Lodrigue's lip. Rather, she argues that the only testimony supporting the jury's implicit rejection of her self-defense claim came from Lodrigue, and that his testimony conflicted with other evidence presented at trial.
The jury heard evidence that the day after appellant left a drug treatment facility, she went to the Perry YMCA to see E.L. at basketball practice. Lodrigue testified that appellant wanted E.L. to go home with her but Lodrigue objected because appellant had only just left the treatment facility and they had not discussed E.L. staying with her that night. Lodrigue further testified that appellant became angry and began yelling at him, and that when he turned around to argue with her, she bit off his lip and spit it on the ground.
Detective Grant and Officer Mejia both testified that E.L. gave a different account of the incident than appellant's. Detective Grant also testified that Williams, the juvenile who witnessed the assault, told him that a man and woman were arguing over a child, that the woman slapped the basketball out of the man's hands, and that the man pushed the woman down after she bit him on the lip. Detective Grant testified that, in his experience, victims typically call police once they have been assaulted but that appellant did not call police in this case. Detective Grant testified that, based on the investigation as well as his training and experience, it was his opinion that appellant was not acting in self-defense when the assault occurred.
The record also reflects that appellant gave different versions of the incident during the course of the investigation and trial. In her statements to Officer Mejia and Detective Grant, she told them that Lodrigue grabbed her and threw her to the ground and that she bit his lip afterwards. At trial, however, she testified that Lodrigue did not throw her down until after she had bitten his lip. Appellant also told the officers during the investigation that she yelled for help during the altercation, and that Sanchez and Borer would be able to corroborate her version of events. At trial, however, Sanchez and Borer both testified that they neither heard nor saw the incident.
Appellant argues that Lodrigue's self-serving testimony is the only evidence that support the jury's rejection of her claim of self-defense. However, "[a]s factfinder, the jury is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses, and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties." Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The statements of a defendant do not conclusively prove a claim of self-defense. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (concluding jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant's conduct in chasing decedent and attempting to stab him second time was inconsistent with his defensive claims); Denman v. State, 193 S.W.3d 129, 132-33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (finding evidence sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault under Jackson standard despite defendant's claim of self-defense, which was based on testimony of defendant and other witnesses who stated that complainant had assaulted or threatened defendant on prior occasions); see also Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that only evidence weighing against jury finding that defendant entered home with specific intent to commit sexual assault was defendant's own statement that he had no such intent did not render evidence insufficient).
Appellant also contends that some of Lodrigue's testimony conflicts with other testimony he offered at trial. In particular, she argues that while Lodrigue testified that appellant was belligerent and demanding, he also testified that she had previously consulted with him about whether E.L. could stay with her for the night. Aside from the fact that these statements are not contradictory, the record reflects that Lodrigue testified that appellant did not ask him whether E.L. could stay with her but rather told Lodrigue that he was going to spend the night with her. Appellant also argues that Lodrigue's testimony that appellant was in an aggressive state of mind conflicts with his other testimony that just moments earlier appellant had "engaged in a loving situation with their son, who threw his arms around his mother and wanted to go home with her." This testimony is likewise not contradictory. However, even if it were, the resolution of such conflicts is the province of the jury. See Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (jury is exclusive judge of facts proved and weight to be given to testimony); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("[A] witness may be believed even though some of his testimony may be contradicted and part of his testimony recorded, accepted, and the rest rejected.").
The jury's decision to reject appellant's defensive claim ultimately hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. Here, appellant's testimony in support of her self-defense claim, in light of Lodrigue's, Officer Mejia, and Detective Grant's testimony, as well as the fact that no other witness corroborated appellant's version of events, does not render the evidence in this case insufficient to support the jury's verdict. See Smith, 355 S.W.3d at 146; Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461.
We conclude that the jury rationally could have found that each element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and could have rejected appellant's claim of self-defense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2781; see also Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for assault causing bodily injury. We overrule appellant's second point of error.
Admission of Videotaped Statement
In her first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting her recorded statements to Detective Grant because she made them during a custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
A. Standard of Review
A trial court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We use a bifurcated standard of review in assessing the trial court's ruling. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A trial court's ultimate custody determination is a mixed question of law and fact. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer almost totally to a trial court's custody determination when the questions of historical fact turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. at 526-27. Conversely, we review a trial court's custody determination de novo when the questions of fact do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. at 527.
B. Applicable Law
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court determined that an accused person who is held in custody must be warned "at the outset" of interrogation. 384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624 (1966); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Failure to comply with the Miranda warning requirements results in forfeiture of the use of any statement obtained during that interrogation by the prosecution during its case-in-chief. Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 772. Likewise, the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a statement is only admissible if, among other requirements, the defendant was given the warnings in section 2(a) of article 38.22 before the statement was made and the defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived the rights set out in the warnings. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, §§ 2(a), 3(a) (West 2005). However, a noncustodial, voluntary, oral statement of a defendant is admissible at trial even if the statement was unwarned or unrecorded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. §5 ("Nothing in this article precludes the admission . . . of a statement that does not stem from custodial interrogation.").
A person is in "custody" only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that her freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). There are at least four general situations which may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave; (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. The determination of custody must be made on an ad hoc basis, after considering all of the objective circumstances. Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
C. Analysis
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting her statements to Detective Grant because she made them while in custody and without having been given Miranda warnings. She argues that the trial court reversibly erred because admission of the statements was not harmless.
The record shows that appellant never received Miranda or article 38.22 warnings. But neither Miranda warnings nor article 38.22 warnings are required unless the interrogation of the accused was custodial. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(a). In support of her argument that she made her statements to Detective Grant while in custody, appellant relies on the following facts: (1) appellant met with Detective Grant in his office after he had already met with Lodrigue and interviewed other witnesses; (2) Detective Grant testified that he used various tactics to elicit more truthful testimony; and (3) appellant mentioned to Detective Grant that she was represented by an attorney.
Appellant's statements were not made during a custodial interrogation. The record reflects that appellant voluntarily came to the police station and made a recorded videotaped statement in Detective Grant's office. Detective Grant advised appellant that she was there so that he could get "her side of the story," she was free to leave at any time, she was not obliged to be there in any shape or form, that her presence was voluntary, and that she did not have to answer any questions with which she was uncomfortable. When Detective Grant asked whether appellant understood that she was free to leave at any time, appellant responded "yes." During the interview, appellant thanked Detective Grant for allowing her to tell him her side of the story.
After appellant informed Detective Grant that she and Lodrigue only had an informal custody arrangement with regard to E.L., Detective Grant advised her to get a written custody order. Appellant told Detective Grant that her attorney, Keith Gross, was assisting her in getting a custody order in place and that a court hearing was set for the following month. Appellant mentioned her attorney only in connection with the family law matter, and at no time did she mention him with regard to any criminal matter. When the prosecutor asked Detective Grant why he told appellant during the interview that he might obtain witnesses' phone records and E.L.'s school records, Detective Grant testified that it was simply a tactic to elicit a more truthful response during the interview. He also stated that appellant was allowed to leave when the interview terminated.
We conclude that, under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that she was under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977) (holding person not in custody when he came voluntarily to police station, was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, participated in interview, and left police station without hindrance); Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (finding no custody when suspect came to station voluntarily at time of his own choosing, was allowed to step outside building and go unaccompanied to his car during interviews, and "a few hours" later was allowed to leave unhindered after statements were completed); Nelson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 113, 129-30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd) (concluding defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation where she met officer at police station, acknowledged in recorded statement that she was there voluntarily and was making statement voluntarily, and officer told defendant he was going to let her go home at end of interview); Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (finding no custody when suspect voluntarily went to station, was told she could leave, remained unhandcuffed, was at station for four hours, and went home after making incriminating statements).
Because appellant was not subject to a custodial interrogation, the trial court did not err in admitting her statements into evidence. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).