Opinion
No. 3-707 / 02-1051
Filed October 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Larry J. Conmey, Judge.
Cooney appeals, challenging 1) the adequacy of the district court's damage award, 2) the district court's denial of his motion for continuance of trial, and 3) a jury instruction. AFFIRMED.
Pete Leehey of Pete Leehey Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
James Craig and Nichole Claussen of Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
James Cooney was driving a bus down an eastern Iowa highway when Brad Yahnke ran a stop sign and broadsided the bus with his pick-up truck. Cooney sued Yahnke and obtained a jury verdict of $20,000.
Cooney moved for a new trial, contending the award was inadequate and contrary to the evidence. He later supplemented the new trial motion to allege that the district court should have granted his pretrial motion for continuance. The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
I. Scope of Review
The scope of our review depends on the grounds asserted in the new trial motion. In re Estate of Long ex. rel. Smith v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 656 N.W.2d 71, 88 (Iowa 2002). "`[I]f the motion is based on a legal question, our review is on error,' but if `the motion is based on a discretionary ground, we review it for an abuse of discretion.'" Id. (citation omitted).
We review a ruling on a motion for new trial based upon the adequacy of a jury verdict for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1997). We also review the court's denial of the motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. Ragan v. Petersen, 569 N.W.2d 390, 392-93 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
II. Adequacy of Verdict
Cooney contends the jury award of $20,000 is inadequate because his medical expenses alone exceeded $22,000. He suggests that the jury must have relied on a "flawed" defense expert opinion in declining to award more damages.
This figure appears in the Appellant's brief without citation to the appendix or record. The jury apparently did not have a summary document containing a total of Cooney's medical expenses.
Cooney does not specifically argue that the jury failed to award him damages for pain and suffering.
We begin with the well established principle that "[t]he amount of damages awarded is peculiarly a jury, not a court, function." Gorden v. Carey, 603 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Iowa 1999). In reviewing the adequacy of a damage award we ask whether the award will "fairly and reasonably compensate an injured party for the injury sustained." Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974).
The jury was instructed that it needed to consider "[t]he reasonable value of necessary hospital charges, doctor charges, prescriptions, and other medical services from the date of injury to the present time." The jury was also instructed to consider lost wages, loss of function of the body, the present value of future loss of function of the body, physical and mental pain and suffering, and the present value of future physical and mental pain and suffering.
Because the jury entered a general verdict, we have no way of knowing how the jury compensated Cooney for each element of damages. See Matthess v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 1994). We do know that the record contains disputed evidence concerning the cause and severity of Cooney's impairments. Dr. Sims, a witness for the defense, attributed Cooney's pain to degenerative disk disease of the spine that preexisted the accident. In contrast, Cooney's treating physician and two other physicians opined that Cooney's pain was caused by the accident. As for the severity of the pain, characterizations ranged from "minor" to "chronic" to "progressive worsening." Given the disputed evidence concerning the relationship of Cooney's pain to the accident as well as Cooney's failure to advise the jury of the total damages he was seeking for medical expenses, the jury very well could have found that some of the pain treatments Cooney received were not "necessary" within the meaning of the jury instruction. As such, the jury could have found the cost of those treatments would not be reimbursed. This was the jury's prerogative and "[w]e should not set aside a verdict simply because we might have reached a different conclusion." Id. at 704. There was sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could have found that $20,000 was enough to compensate Cooney for his injuries.
III. Motion to Continue Trial
Cooney next contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance of the trial date. We disagree. Cooney filed his petition in August 2000. The district court administrator set a trial date of May 20, 2002. Less than three weeks before trial, Cooney moved to continue the trial, alleging new medical evidence would be generated in the near future. We agree with the defendants that Cooney had ample opportunity to generate this evidence between the time of the accident in mid-1998 and the date of trial, and indeed did so. The medical reports he attached to his motion do not reflect a new diagnosis but continued evaluation for the same medical problems that surfaced after the accident. We affirm the district court's denial of Cooney's motion for continuance.
IV. Challenge to Jury Instruction
Cooney finally challenges the district court's failure to instruct the jury on future medical expenses as a component of a damage award. We agree with Yahnke that Cooney did not preserve error on this issue. See Sievers v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 581 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 1998). Although his proposed instructions included an itemization for future medical expenses, the court's damage instruction did not, and Cooney failed to object to this omission. Accordingly, we decline to consider his challenge.