The sole issue is whether a claimant whose claim is voluntarily reopened after his aggravation rights had expired, but during the continuance of the existence of appeal rights from the final determination order, is entitled to closure of his claim pursuant to ORS 656.268, rather than under ORS 656.278, which denies the right to appeal. The dispositive case on this subject is Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 592 P.2d 242 (1979). In Coombs, a total of four determination orders were issued. Following entry of the second determination order, the parties stipulated to a reopening.
Or Laws 1965, ch 285, § 33. Before that time, orders entered under own motion authority were not subject to judicial review at all. See Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or App 293, 592 P2d 242 (1979). We have long construed ORS 656.278(4) to state the exclusive bases for seeking review of own motion orders.
At oral argument, it came to light that the deceased worker's claim had never been properly closed after it was reopened in 1974. The purported aggravation claim that was submitted to the Board in 1977 was not properly before the Board on its own motion calendar, because the worker was entitled to a determination order under ORS 656.268, from which he could appeal. Had the claim been properly closed by determination order, the worker would have been entitled to another hearing on the issue of the extent of his disability, Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 592 P.2d 242 (1979), as well as to Board review of the referee's decision and judicial review of the Board's decision. Instead, the Board issued a series of "own motion" orders, including the order addressing the issue of whether the worker was permanently and totally disabled, from which he could not appeal. At the time those orders were issued, the Board did not have "own motion" jurisdiction.
Generally, the Workers' Compensation Act should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the worker. Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 300, 592 P.2d 242 (1979). One of the objectives of the Workers' Compensation Act is:
We do not regard the latter as the source of the former. Consequently, the cases cited to us involving the conclusive effect of "own motion orders" are not relevant. See, e.g., Buell v. S.I.A.C., 238 Or. 492, 395 P.2d 442 (1964); Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 592 P.2d 242 (1979). "The carrier elected to proceed with the reconsideration of the award by the Board.
The effect of adopting claimant's position would be to create the entire panoply of appeal rights for any individual who is once able to obtain "Own Motion" assistance from the Board. If such general rights of appeal were to follow from every exercise of "Own Motion" jurisdiction, the other language of subsection (3) to the effect that the claimant "has no right to a hearing, review or appeal" would be reduced to a nullity. See, generally, Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 592 P.2d 242 (1979). Affirmed.
ORS 656.278 is to the contrary. See also Short v. SAIF, 38 Or. App. 523, 590 P.2d 1238, rev den, 284 Or. 341 (1979); Coombs v. SAIF, 39 Or. App. 293, 592 P.2d 242 (1979). Employer also contends claimant has failed to sustain his burden of proof that his present condition is an aggravation of the 1968 industrial injury. This is a factual issue and after a review of the record we are persuaded the Board's findings were correct. Bowman v. Oregon Transfer Company, 33 Or. App. 241, 576 P.2d 27 (1978).