Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1963-12T2
07-01-2014
MARY F. COOMBE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW and SUN NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
Mary F. Coombe, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Sun National Bank has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Lihotz.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 380,905.
Mary F. Coombe, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Sun National Bank has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Mary Coombe appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review (Board), which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's (Tribunal) determination to dismiss as untimely, her appeal from the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.
The record shows Coombe was employed by Sun National Bank from 1988 to 2011, last holding the title of supervisor. During her employment, she witnessed several armed bank robberies, including multiple robberies in 2002, a robbery in 2009 and 2010. In December 2011, Coombe's supervisors directed her to receive coaching. She chose to resign.
Coombe filed for unemployment benefits. A deputy director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance denied her request on January 30, 2012 because she left work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Further the deputy explained:
You left your job voluntarily because you felt that the work was adversely affecting your health. You failed to submit medical documentation required by your employer which would have enabled your employer to offer you work within your medical limitations. Therefore, your reason for leaving does not constitute good cause attributable to the work. You are disqualified for benefits.
The decisional letter informed Coombe: "ANY APPEAL FROM THIS DETERMINATION MUST BE SUBMITTED IN WRITING WITHIN [SEVEN] DAYS AFTER DELIVERY OR WITHIN [TEN] DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF MAILING. THE TENTH DAY AFTER THE DATE OF MAILING IS 2/09/12." Coombe filed her appeal on April 5, 2012.
The Tribunal notified Coombe of its receipt of her appeal from the denial of benefits. A telephonic hearing was conducted on September 26, 2012, during which Coombe and a representative of Sun National Bank testified. Coombe admitted she received the denial notice in February, but did not read the letter until mid-March 2012, when she discovered her mail had been mixed-up in boxes in the midst of her move. She admitted she filed her appeal on April 5, 2012.
The Appeals Examiner assigned to review the matter issued an initial determination, dismissing Coombe's appeal as untimely. The Board issued its final determination finding the appeal had been properly dismissed in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1), and Coombe had not shown good cause for consideration of her untimely challenge to the deputy's decision. Consequently, the deputy's determination became final. This appeal followed.
The arguments raised by Coombe on appeal center on the merits of her claim for benefits. They do not discuss the untimeliness for her appeal or present a basis for finding good cause for the late submission.
Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. Futterman v. Bd. of Review, 421 N.J. Super. 281, 287 (App. Div. 2011). When challenging the determination of the Board, the appellant carries a substantial burden. The "right to unemployment compensation benefits is purely statutory. . . . " Lowden v. Bd. of Review, 78 N.J. Super. 467, 469 (App. Div. 1963) (citations omitted). Accordingly, "[r]ules and regulations adopted by administrative authorities pursuant to power delegated to them by the Legislature have the force and effect of law." Id. at 469-70.
N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) lists the procedure to claim unemployment compensation benefits. Included within subsection (b)(1) is the requirement regarding an appeal of an initial decision, which states in pertinent part:
Unless the claimant . . . , within seven calendar days after delivery of notification of an initial determination or within 10 calendar days after such notification was mailed to his or [her] . . . last-known address . . . files an appeal from such decision, such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith. . . .Subsection (c) also directs:
The parties shall be duly notified of [an appeal] tribunal's decision, together with its reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the board of review, unless further appeal is initiated . . . within 20 days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision . . . .The time for appeal may be extended upon a showing of good cause. Rivera v. Bd. of Review, 127 N.J. 578, 590 (1992). "Good cause" is defined by regulation as follows:
[N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(c).]
Good cause [for filing a late appeal] exists in circumstances where it is shown that:
1. The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant; or
2. The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented.
[N.J.A.C. 12:20-4.1(h).]
The statute contains the time limit for action. Such limitations on actions are necessary to derive certainty of result and to prevent a party from sitting on his or her rights. Simply because a limitations period is short does not make it unfair or otherwise excuse a party's noncompliance. See Lowden, supra, 7 8 N.J. Super. at 440. ("It has already been held by our Supreme Court that this time limitation, though short, may be said to be fair."). Importantly, courts are not free to extend the statutory limitations periods, which the Legislature intended to be an absolute deadline. Ibid.
Coombe never disputed she received the notice, which included instructions regarding her right to appeal the adverse determination. During the hearing, she acknowledged an understanding that a deadline was imposed with regard to challenging the denial of her claim. Even if we allow the indulgence of additional time based on Coombe's misplacement of the notice during her move, the record includes no explanation of her inaction from mid-March until she submitted her appeal on April 5, 2012, approximately twenty days after she rediscovered the notice. Coombe relates no impediment to an ability to have timely complied at that juncture or demonstrate the late submission resulted solely from circumstances beyond her control. Absent proof of such good cause, we have no basis to interfere with the Board's determination to dismiss the late filing in accordance with the statute.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION