Prior to the year 1971, the "alcohol[ic] analysis contained in an autopsy report was obtainable and admissible pursuant to case law (see Hayes v. City of New York, 23 A.D.2d 832; Iovino v. Green Bus Lines, 277 App. Div. 1002)." (Cook v. Town of Nassau, 33 N.Y.2d 7, 10.) However, in 1971 the Legislature amended section 674 (subd. 3, par [b]) of the County Law to provide that "Such results shall be used only for the purpose of compiling statistical data and shall not be admitted into evidence or otherwise disclosed in any legal action or other proceeding."

The coroner further testified that he took the blood sample in compliance with section 674 County of the County Law and solely for the purpose of compiling statistical data. Whether such a report may properly be received in evidence was considered by the Court of Appeals in Cook v Town of Nassau ( 33 N.Y.2d 7, 11), wherein that court sustained the trial court's exclusion of such evidence and stated "It is plain that the proscription for use of the blood test in a negligence action could hardly be made more explicit." The respondent, however, urges that pursuant to section 118 Work. Comp. of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the board is not bound by common-law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure and, therefore, the report was properly admitted.

The Legislature has the power, which it exercised in this case, to alter existing rules of evidence and establish new rules (Board of Commrs. of Excise v Merchant, 103 N.Y. 143). A litigant possesses no vested right in a rule of evidence (Cook v Town of Nassau, 40 A.D.2d 1050, affd 33 N.Y.2d 7). Petitioner's suggested approach is erroneous for another reason.

It is clear that a litigant possesses no vested rights in a rule of evidence. (Cook v Town of Nassau, 40 A.D.2d 1050, affd 33 N.Y.2d 7; Preston Co. v Funkhauser, 261 N.Y. 140, 144, affd 290 U.S. 163; Board of Comrs. of Excise of City of Auburn v Merchant, 103 N.Y. 143; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 7, p 213.) The Legislature clearly has the power to prescribe new rules of evidence, as well as the power to alter existing rules of evidence or prescribe methods of proof.

The report was made pursuant to law and in the regular course of business." See Hayes v. City of New York ( 23 A.D.2d 832), which followed Iovino; also Cook v. Town of Nassau ( 33 N.Y.2d 7, 10) stating that "Those cases [ Hayes and Iovino] indeed advanced forceful reasons why this evidence should be made available. "In addition, Matter of Robert P. ( 40 A.D.2d 638) clearly implies that a report on drug content, certified in accordance with the established procedure of the police department, is admissible under CPLR 4518 (subd. [c]) without the certifier's testimony, though it fails to hold definitively on this issue for extraneous reasons.

The court reserved decision on that motion. Having now reviewed section 674 (subd. 3, par. [b]) of the County Law and the Court of Appeals findings in Cook v. Town of Nassau ( 33 N.Y.2d 7), it is this court's ruling that any reference to the alcohol analysis is inadmissible as evidence and shall be excluded from the trial record. Accordingly, that portion of the autopsy report referring to the alcohol analysis has been deleted.